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Introduction 
The nature and direction of Communist China's foreign policy are 
inevitably intertwined with the particular political culture of the given 
country in which it is to be implemented. Conceivably, for the maxi-
mum realization of their policy goals, the Chinese decision-makers are 
likely to take into full consideration the major characteristics and vari-
ous dimensions of Laos' political development, both domestic and ex-
ternal. In this brief introduction, I intend to identify some basic 
socio-economic conditions of Laos' heterogeneous political culture and 
to establish a broad conceptual backdrop against which a subsequent 
case study of Communist China's changing strategies and tactics toward 
Laos can be presented. 
Among Communist China's Southeast Asian neighbors, the King-
dom of Laos—about the size of Oregon, with a population estimated 
somewhere between 2 and 2.8 millions—is the least developed and 
populated one. Its terrain is exceedingly mountainous, except that of 
the Mekong River valley, and its climate is tropical with two main 
seasons—a monsoon period (May-October) and a dry period (Novem-
ber-April). The combination of inaccessible mountains, thick jungles, 
and long monsoon season is naturally conducive to the conduct of a 
modern guerrilla warfare. Even a cursory survey of some selected 
statistics is sufficient to reveal the Kingdom's massive poverty: as of 
1967, Laos' estimated annual per capita income was between $50 and 
$67; the ratio of total arable land was 7%, the level of literacy 12%, 
the number of modern doctors 10, the length of total highways 3,600 
miles, and the number of newspaper circulation 3 per 1,000 persons.1 
More than 90% of the Laotian population are subsistence farmers, 
and perhaps half of them are ethnic Lao who speak Lao, believe in 
Theravada Buddhism, and live in the cities and along the Mekong 
River area. There are also Lao Theng (Kha and Khmu: 25%), Lao 
Yung (Meo and Yao: 6%), and other hill tribes who use mutually 
unintelligible languages and practice various forms of animism. As 
Professors Halpern and Kunstadter suggest, it is in the areas where the 
ethnic Lao are in the minority that the Pathet Lao have been most 
successful in creating their administrative structure parallel to that of 
the Royal Laotian Government.2 
This diversity of ethnic, linguistic, and religious backgrounds, 
coupled with the virtual absence of modern mass communication 
media, makes national unity extremely difficult. It is questionable in-
deed whether Laos, even in the most favorable external circumstances, 
can constitute a viable and independent political system. Under the 
constitutional monarchy the King, who resides in the royal capital of 
Luang Prabang, reigns with the assistance of the 12-member King's 
Council, but he seldom rules the country. The Prime Minister, ap-
pointed by the King with the approval of the popularly elected Na-
tional Assembly, leads the Council of Ministers at the administrative 
capital of Vientiane. Nevertheless a small group of French-educated 
aristocrats, bureaucrats, merchants, and military officers has effectively 
monopolized Laos' political life for many years.3 
A considerable gap in social prestige and political orientation sepa-
rates the urbanized elite from the populace in general. This separa-
tion is reinforced by weak national consciousness, poor communication 
systems, and lack of education in rural areas. The limitations on social 
mobility and political recruitment serve to perpetuate the elitist nature 
of Laos' political processes and to intensify the sense of alienation 
among ethnic minorities. The exclusive ruling group, however, is 
divided into competitive factions mainly along the lines of princely 
families and vague ideological inclinations. For the past two decades 
instability caused by factional struggles has marked Laos' politics. 
Political parties are also based upon personal loyalties and factional 
differences with the possible exception of the Neo Lao Haksat, a politi-
cal wing of the Pathet Lao movement, which has attempted to tran-
scend factionalism and to establish a mass party. 
The long history of Laos is full of tragedies of internal strife and 
external aggression. An independent Laos was first set up in 1353, 
under the name of Lan Xang or Lan Ch'ang (Land of a Million Ele-
phants). In the seventeenth century, however, it disintegrated into 
three principalities—Luang Prabang, Vientiane, and Champassak. 
Early historical experiences of Laos make it abundantly clear that the 
requirements for an independent and unified Laos are (1) the presence 
of an energetic and powerful ruler who can secure the allegiance of 
centrifugal social forces and (2) the existence of international checks 
and balances which can permit the political freedom of Laos. 
viii 
The expansion of French colonial power into Asia gradually 
brought these Lao principalities under its control in the later nine-
teenth century; first, France installed a vice-consulate at Luang Pra-
bang after the 1885 agreement with Siam (Thailand), which had main-
tained de facto control over Laos since early nineteenth century; second, 
Laos became a French protectorate according to the 1893 Franco-
Siamese treaty, which was concluded under the threat of French 
power. The French colonial policy, which was carried out by the 
Resident Superieur in Vientiane, did not recognize the economic and 
political potential of Laos, which consequently remained the least ex-
ploited country of Indo-China. Under this alien domination King 
Sisavang Vong of Luang Prabang could nominally unify the other 
principalities and provinces, but obviously without independent power 
of his own.4 
During and after the Second World War Laos experienced a series 
of instances of foreign interference; Japanese invasion (March-August, 
1945), Nationalist Chinese occupation (late 1945), and French reoccu-
pation (1946). The resumed French colonial authority was immedi-
ately challenged politically and militarily by the Lao Issara (Free 
Laos) movement under the leadership of Princes (and brothers) 
Phetsarath, Souvanna Phouma, and Souphanouvong. The mounting 
pressures of nationalism and decolonization in post-war Asia compelled 
France to take measures for granting Laos its full independence and 
sovereignty: first, King Sisavang Vong obtained domestic political 
autonomy for Laos in August, 1946; second, he gained an independent 
status within the French Union in the General Franco-Laotian Conven-
tion of July, 1949. Satisfied with this French concession, the moderate 
Lao Issara leaders headed by Souvanna Phouma dissolved their govern-
ment-in-exile in Bangkok in October, 1949, and returned to Vientiane 
one month later. But Prince Souphanouvong, inspired by Ho Chi 
Minh's revolutionary ideals and assisted by Viet Minh cadres in Laos, 
refused to join the moderate nationalists; instead, he organized a "na-
tional resistance government" in August, 1950, and launched the Pathet 
Lao movement with the blessings of Vietnamese and Chinese Commu-
nists. Into these historical circumstances was injected the highly un-
settling influence of the world-wide cold-war conflict. 
The strategic and symbolic significance of Laos in cold-war politics 
ix 
stems mainly from the geopolitical fact that it shares a long and un-
stable borderline with six countries in the Southeast Asian Peninsula: 
263 miles with China's southwestern province of Yunnan, 818 miles 
with North Vietnam, 277 miles with Cambodia, 146 miles with Burma, 
301 miles with South Vietnam, and 1,090 miles with Thailand, includ-
ing over 500 miles along the Mekong River. As its primary routes of 
access to the outside world are by way of Bangkok, Saigon, Hanoi, and 
Phnom Penh, Laos' very survival depends upon political developments 
in its immediate neighbors. The Sino-Laotian frontier, demarcated at 
the end of nineteenth century, runs through rugged mountains and 
forests where a number of uncontrolled ethnic minorities—such as 
Chinese-influenced Meo and Yao—straddle the boundary. Apropos of 
the frontier problem we may note that Liu Pei-hua's controversial 
Brief History of Modern China, published in Peking in 1952, included 
Laos, together with Vietnam, Cambodia, Burma, Malaya, and Korea, 
in the "Chinese territories taken by the imperialists in the Old Demo-
cratic Revolutionary Era (1840-1919) ."5 
The geopolitical and strategic setting of Laos tends to generate prob-
lems of vital importance not only to its bordering states, but also to 
major world powers concerned with Southeast Asian affairs, especially 
the United States and the Soviet Union. The Kingdom of Laos is thus 
caught in the turbulent cross-currents of domestic and external political 
dynamics—the emergence of modern nationalism, the process of de-
colonization, the pressure of international Communism, the movement 
for neutralization, the recurrence of civil wars, and the reassertion of 
TABLE 1 
LAOS AND NEIGHBORS*1 
Populationb Total Land Population 
(in Area Density 
Country thousands) (sq. km.) (per sq. km.) 
Laos 2,763 236,800 12 
China 720,000 9,561,000 75 
Burma 25,811 678,033 38 
Cambodia 6,415 181,035 35 
Thailand 32,680 514,000 64 
No. Vietnam 20,100 158,750 127 
So. Vietnam 16,973 173,809 98 
a Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1968 (New York: United Nations, 1968). 
b Population figures are as of mid-1967. 
X 
traditional interests of such neighbor countries as Vietnam, Thailand, 
and China. In order to help resolve some of these basic problems, 
major world powers have twice attempted to effect a negotiated settle-
ment for Laos at the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1961-62. Efforts 
for Laos' international neutralization, however, have failed. Con-
sequently, this weak and land-locked country still remains both a 
victim and an aggravating element in the protracted international 
conflict which is indeed one of the most representative cases of contem-
porary world politics. 
Notes 
1. See Fact Sheet (Vientiane: USAID/Laos, 1967), pp. 1-11, and Ebauche D'Une Comp-
tabilite Rationale Lao: Comptes Economiques pour 1964 (Vientiane: Ministre du Plan et de 
la Cooperation, 1967), pp. 12, 23. 
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in George McT. Kahin (ed.), Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia (Ithaca: Cornell 
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The Chinese Communist Conception of Laos 
The Chinese Communist conception of Laos, as of other countries, 
is apparently based on a delicate and unstable equilibrium between a 
professed belief in the "universal truth" of Marxism-Leninism and an 
ethnocentric pursuit of China's national interest. The variations and 
consequences of this conceptual dualism have indeed characterized the 
basic pattern of Chinese policy toward Laos from 1954 to 1967. 
Communist Ideology: The Chinese invariably manage to harmo-
nize—at least verbally—their ideology and their practical objectives. 
In theoretical discussions on the relationship between nationalism and 
internationalism they often equate the concept of national interest 
(min-tsu-li-i) with "genuine patriotism"—defined as love for one's own 
fatherland, people, language, literature, and best tradition. Unlike 
"self-centered and exclusive bourgeois nationalism," they argue, gen-
uine patriotism conforms with the principle of proletarian internation-
alism; therefore, according to both Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i, a 
good Communist ought to be a patriot as well as an internationalist and 
to safeguard the legitimate national interests of his own people.1 
There can be little doubt that as a set of values and dogmas Com-
munist ideology theoretically guides the Chinese, thus shaping much of 
their historical outlook and policy preference. Such analytical notions 
as imperialism, contradictions, class struggle, and dialectical materialism 
are instrumental to the Chinese in evaluating their domestic and 
foreign problems and rationalizing their policies and attitudes.2 
Equipped with what they consider the true and scientific laws of 
political development, the Chinese are all the more confident after 
having already learned successful revolutionary strategy and tactics 
in their protracted struggle against the Kuomintang (KMT). In the 
perspective of universal ideological commitments they tend to view 
Laos in the context of a global Communist revolution. But the exces-
sive emphasis on ideology inevitably limits their choice of policy alter-
native and their freedom of diplomatic maneuvers. For example, this 
ideological constraint governed the public behavior of Chinese dele-
gates at the Geneva Conferences on Indo-China (1954) and on Laos 
(1961-62). 
1 
It must be noted, however, that China, like other countries, can-
not afford to act simply within a given set of predetermined ideological 
prescriptions. For Communist doctrine does not offer precise answers 
to a variety of practical problems and situations. Mao Tse-tung admits 
that Communism is not a closed system of definite rules applicable to 
all daily problems; rather, he says, "Marxism-Leninism has in no way 
exhausted truth but ceaselessly opens up roads to the knowledge of 
truth in the course of practice."3 In order to practice the "truth," a 
great nation-state like China must preserve its own survival and pro-
mote its own interests. 
The position of governing responsibilities often demands that 
ideology be compromised in the interest of political expediency. No 
doubt, in certain situations, China's national interest can be served by 
application and exploitation of Communist phraseology. For example, 
a Marxist interpretation of the policies pursued by United States "im-
perialists" and Laotian "reactionaries," an endorsement of the pro-
Communist Pathet Lao's national liberation movement, or Communist 
propaganda toward progressive elements in Laos—all these may assist 
Chinese policy. When ideology and expediency conflict, however, the 
Chinese seem to attach a higher priority to their national interest than 
to their ideologically inspired commitments. Moreover, they do not 
hesitate to apply ideology flexibly in the context of Laos' "peculiarities." 
While they take into full consideration the political reality of Laos 
and attempt to capitalize on it, they tend to define their national in-
terest toward Laos in the light of their own images, beliefs, and expec-
tations. Hence, they make political judgments according to Chinese— 
not Laotian—experiences and criteria. Major elements of their national 
interest are reflected in an extension of China's traditional outlook, 
which promotes a subtle aspiration for revival of historical hegemony 
over Laos and a cautious concern with China's national security vis-
a-vis United States' power in Southeast Asia. The possibility of China's 
economic interest in Laos, unlike Thailand or Vietnam, is almost 
nonexistent; for Laos lacks raw materials and market value except for 
certain presumed mineral resources. 
Historical Interest: In his opening address to the Eighth National 
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in September, 1956, 
Mao Tse-tung warned the audience against a "conceited attitude of 
2 
great-nation chauvinism" in China's foreign relations and said that 
each sovereign state, irrespective of its size and power, had an equal 
and independent role to play in international affairs.4 Nevertheless 
the Chinese openly seek a number of special functions in the manage-
ment of diplomatic issues and in leadership over the revolutionary 
movement in Laos. 
The Chinese hope to gain the mantle of revolutionary leadership by 
presenting Mao's political thought and strategy as a model for other 
revolutionaries. Liu Shao-ch'i said in 1947, even before the birth of the 
Chinese People's Republic (CPR), that one of Mao's primary achieve-
ments was to change Marxism "from a European to an Asian form," 
thus stressing the applicability of Mao's revolutionary formula to non-
European conditions.5 In a famous article published in September, 
1965, Defense Minister Lin Piao emphasized a clear difference in social 
conditions and revolutionary processes between China and Russia: 
The October Revolution took place in imperialist Russia, but the Chinese revolu-
tion broke out in a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. The former was a 
proletarian socialist revolution, while the latter developed into a socialist revolu-
tion after the complete victory of the new-democratic revolution. The October 
Revolution began with armed uprisings in the cities and then spread to the 
countryside, while the Chinese revolution won nation-wide victory through the 
encirclement of the cities from the rural areas and the final capture of the cities.6 
The universal validity of Mao's model is unreservedly proclaimed in 
the development of Sino-Soviet ideological polemics and especially dur-
ing the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." By extending Mao's 
model into "semi-colonial" and "semi-feudal" Laos the Chinese evi-
dently are trying to become the chief champion and adviser of the 
Pathet Lao's rural-oriented strategy for "new democratic revolution." 
According to their rather presumptuous claim, the Laotian people have 
realized that "Mao Tse-tung's thought is the beacon that guides their 
war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation."7 
The Chinese also pursue a special role in diplomatic questions re-
garding Laos. When it was announced in February, 1954, that the CPR 
would be invited to a Geneva Conference on Korea and Indo-China, 
People's Daily (February 22, 1954) immediately responded with an 
enthusiastic editorial saying that China's participation in the Confer-
ence was in itself a stride forward toward improving relations among 
major powers which bore "special responsibility for safeguarding peace 
3 
and security among nations." It made clear that without the participa-
tion and consent of China none of the important world problems 
could be resolved. China, it said, was a member of the "Big Five," as 
recognized in the United Nations Charter, and its special role simply 
conformed with the "wishes of the people in all Asian countries." 
The point that China shares and represents the wishes and interests 
of Laos serves to fill an apparent gap between Laos' "equal" and "inde-
pendent" role and China's special responsibility assumed by virtue of 
its great power. The identity of common interests between China and 
Laos rests on historical experiences with imperialism, economic un-
derdevelopment, and aspirations for national unification. 
It appears likely that China's self-righteous pursuit of revolutionary 
and diplomatic leadership represents a continuation of its traditional 
ethnocentric world outlook and a reassertion of its historical hegemony 
over Laos. The traditional pattern of relations between the "Middle 
Kingdom" and its neighboring "barbarians" like Laos was a hier-
archical and unequal tributary system. The "barbarians" were supposed 
to respect China's absolute cultural superiority and to send tributary 
missions to Chinese courts as a token of that respect. It differed from 
naked territorial conquest or outright political domination for it was 
more cultural than political and based less on force than on persuasion. 
Professor Tsiang concludes: 
Since all foreign relations in the Chinese view were ipso facto tributary relations, 
it followed that all types of international intercourse, if they occurred at all in 
the experience of China, had to be fitted into the tributary system.8 
When the Chinese Communists discuss the history of Laos, they usually 
start from a review of tributary relations between China and Laos 
as officially recorded in the Chinese dynastic histories. This tendency 
suggests the extent to which the Chinese perception of Laos is con-
ditioned by tributary experiences. 
Although the Chinese documents indicate many earlier contacts 
with those who had lived in the general area of present day Laos, the 
formal tributary relationship with an independent Laos Was estab-
lished only after Fa Ngoum unified the area in 1353. In 1403, his son, 
King Sam Sen Thai, sent the first tributary mission to the Ming court 
and in turn received an official seal to be used on ceremonial occasions. 
From that time the courts of Ming and Ch'ing accepted irregularly 
4 
from Laos or its principalities such tribute as elephants, horses, jade, 
gold, silver, and silk until 1853, approximately every ten years in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Laotian missions were officially 
recognized, given precious gifts, entertained in the courts, and ac-
companied by Chinese officials to the border. The Chinese courts, 
however, did not normally interfere in the intricate power struggles, 
wars, and rebellions in and around Laos except on a few critical oc-
casions. For example, the Chinese Emperor in 1793 intervened and 
liberated King Anourouth of Luang Prabang from his captivity in 
Bangkok. On the basis of these historical records, Chen Yu-lung sum-
marily concluded in People's Daily in August, 1956, that "the peoples 
of China and Laos had very close cultural relations, very deep tradi-
tional friendship, and mutually beneficial contacts without interrup-
tions."9 
But the Middle Kingdom, with its heavenly mandate (t'ien-ming), 
regarded itself as the center of the cosmic universe and the absolute 
leader in the hierarchical international system. Accordingly, the no-
tion of foreign relations with equal, independent, and sovereign states 
was unthinkable. The Chinese Communists—whose conduct in foreign 
affairs is often self-centered, over-confident, and arrogant—seem to 
have inherited this traditional parochial universalism and ethnocentric 
political behavior. And given the continuity or traditional perspective 
and interest the Chinese may find it natural to reassert their historic 
influence over Laos. Their methods may be modern; but, in substance, 
they are not entirely different from those of the past leaders of the 
Middle Kingdom. 
The new methods and techniques do appear more rational, tactful, 
and sophisticated than the old imperial ones. This procedural and 
tactical adjustment is required by the very fact that the CPR no longer 
enjoys the comfortable status of cultural and political superiority over 
its neighbors. Certainly a century of foreign aggression and exploita-
tion taught the Chinese that they must modify their traditional world 
outlook. Now, however, the small and weak neighbors jealously pro-
tect their own self-esteem and learn how to use other major powers 
against growing Chinese and other foreign influence. Furthermore, 
these states dislike the memory of unequal and inferior tributary rela-
tions with the Middle Kingdom and resist any attempt to revive a 
5 
semblance of such relations. This inevitably makes them skeptical and 
apprehensive about any assertive movement of China. But the Chinese, 
when confused or frustrated in foreign affairs, are often inclined to 
return to the familiar and complacent traditional pattern—a state of 
self-centered dogmatism or self-imposed isolation. 
To avoid these two extremes, the Chinese, while claiming their 
intentions are peaceful and friendly, attempt to mobilize the emerging 
nationalism among their neighbors against the influx of non-Chinese 
influence. In countries like Laos, then, they have their own "Monroe 
Doctrine" of maintaining close contact and eliminating foreign in-
fluences. For this purpose many Chinese statements and articles 
emphasize the theme of "traditional friendship" and "harmonious 
cooperation" with Laos. For instance, the first Sino-Laotian joint 
statement signed by Premiers Chou En-lai and Souvanna Phouma in 
August, 1956, declared: 
China and Laos have been friendly neighbors since ancient times. It was only at 
the end of the past century and as a result of foreign invasion that the ties be-
tween our two countries were severed. Now that China and Laos have both 
regained their independence and freedom, they ardently desire to renew their 
traditional friendly links.10 
Since American influence impeded the renewal of this traditional 
friendship, the Chinese said the two countries should cooperate to 
eliminate that influence. Only when this was accomplished, they de-
clared, could China and Laos live together in peace and friendship. 
Strategic Interest: In addition to this traditional interest the Chi-
nese have a more serious and direct security interest in this land-locked 
country. As one legitimate reason for their unavoidable interest in 
Laos the Chinese cite the fact of geographic proximity. They claim a 
special responsibility for the solution of Laotian questions which the 
United States or the Soviet Union—not sharing a common border 
with that country—do not possess. Given their thesis of the "indivisi-
bility of peace" in Southeast Asia, however, the Chinese reason that 
the problems of war and peace in Laos are not isolated from, but inte-
grated with, the strategic and political complexity of Southeast Asia 
as a whole. Believing that the United States regards Laos as the gate-
way to Southeast Asia, they pay particularly minute attention to any 
strategic move—actual or imagined—of the United States and its allies 
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toward that land. Indeed the United States, to effect its containment 
of Communist movements supported by Communist China and North 
Vietnam, has taken a number of specific commitments in Laos, 
ranging from considerable economic assistance to various military 
maneuvers.11 
The Chinese regard such U.S. commitments in Laos, as elsewhere 
in Southeast Asia, as threatening their national security. This pre-
occupation with security is only one indication of a general sense of 
insecurity that they have felt in regard to their territorial integrity and 
military capabilities ever since 1949. Since then they have occupied 
themselves with trying to liberate Taiwan, with fighting the Korean 
war, with several unsettled border disputes, and with the presence of 
nuclear-tipped U.S. strategic power in Asia. They have also been con-
cerned with the gradual erosion of the Sino-Soviet military alliance 
system and with their encirclement by a number of bilateral and 
collective security arrangements forged by the United States and its 
allies. 
As an expression of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia, the Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) has become a convenient target 
of China's indignation and accusations. Undoubtedly the Chinese are 
well aware of the intrinsic weakness of SEATO as a collective security 
system; it lacks a standing army, has difficulty in reaching unanimous 
agreements among its member-states, and needs a complicated pro-
cedure to enlist each member's military action in the event of armed 
conflict. Nevertheless, the Chinese vigorously attacked SEATO's com-
mitment to Laos and its frequent "display of military might" around 
China's periphery. To counter SEATO's anti-Peking "activities" and 
"intentions," they relied on propaganda, diplomatic maneuvers, and 
military pressure. Such notions as a collective peace pact and a nuclear-
free zone were used to isolate and weaken SEATO and to gain time for 
developing China's strategic capabilities. 
China's feeling of insecurity is not reduced by Mao's various mili-
tary concepts and slogans—such as "people's war," "substitution of 
men for weapons," and "paper-tiger." In a sense these notions are de-
signed to disguise actual Chinese weakness. For example, the thesis 
that all imperialists and reactionaries are "paper-tigers" is a strategic 
and ideological substitute for China's inferiority in the face of U.S. 
7 
power.12 It preaches strategic contempt for imperialist power in his-
torical determinism, but requires tactical respect and prudent appraisal 
of imperialist superiority at the present time. The thesis is thus em-
ployed to dispel a fear of American military strength, to boost revolu-
tionary morale among anti-imperialist forces, and to counterbalance the 
arrogance of any superior power. In order to increase their great-
power status, anti-U.S. resistance, and strategic independence from 
Moscow, the Chinese adopted measures for military modernization, 
ideological regimentation, and political mobilization. 
In the process of realistic strategic assessment the Chinese estab-
lished the supremacy of vital security interest over universal ideological 
commitments, recognized their limited military capabilities, and re-
frained from provoking a direct armed confrontation with the United 
States over Laos. This strategic calculation—coupled with awareness of 
the growing nationalist sentiment among the Laotian elite—led the 
Chinese to preserve a high degree of self-restraint in realizing their 
traditional interest in Laos. In polemical arguments and declaratory 
pronouncements the Chinese may sound militant and irresponsible, 
but in practice they are generally prudent and non-committal, especially 
in military matters. This gap between words and deeds was eventually 
to become the subject of a Sino-Soviet controversy; Moscow denounced 
the "ulterior motive" of China's intentional "bellicose tone" and "phony 
militancy." For instance, Moscow asserted in June, 1964, that China's 
leftist phrases meant nothing but a "screen for great power designs and 
claims to hegemony."13 
To suggest that the Chinese are generally prudent and cautious 
does not necessarily mean they are so fearful that they will never use 
their armed forces. They have both an optimistic revolutionary con-
viction and an unshakable forward strategy for global revolution in 
the long-range historical perspectives. Only within this grand strategy 
are they careful to avoid the mistake of "infantile adventurism." 
Even though they are not interested in a general and nuclear war with 
the United States, they are nonetheless prepared for limited conven-
tional warfare on the Asian continent. And they have persistently 
demonstrated a presumably genuine determination to deal with a 
vital threat to their security interest during critical situations both in 
Vietnam and in Laos. It was believed in 1966 that out of the 2.7 mil-
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lion regular military forces the CPR concentrated more than 300,000 
troops and several air force units in the provinces of Yunnan and 
Kwang-hsi just north of Vietnam and Laos.14 
Policy Patterns: It has been suggested in the preceding discussion 
that China's policy objectives in Laos are largely determined by a 
dualistic conceptual scheme in which ideological considerations are 
often compromised by or subordinated to the realistic requirements of 
China's national interest, both historical and strategic. But the specific 
policy patterns the Chinese adopt in Laos depend upon how they 
evaluate and manage the interaction between given objectives and 
available means. The manner in which the Chinese reconcile ends and 
means and the extent to which they are willing to assume costs and 
risks involved are a useful measure of their policy rationality. They 
use diplomatic, propagandists, and economic instruments in pursuing 
their policy objectives; they also apply the methods of "people's diplo-
macy" and exploit the organizations of Overseas Chinese in Laos. 
Available means of political communications include the Geneva 
Conferences, the Geneva Co-chairmen (British and Soviet Foreign 
Ministers), the International Commission for Supervision and Control 
(ICC), the Pathet Lao organizations, the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam (DRV), and the Chinese diplomatic and economic missions 
in Laos.15 
In setting out a policy, the Chinese may realize that circumstances 
in Laos could develop into one of five analytically identifiable political 
forms: (1) establishment of a unified Communist state, (2) total con-
quest by a pro-U.S. group, (3) de jure partition, (4) de facto partition, 
and (5) neutralization. Since the Chinese are primarily, though not 
exclusively, concerned with their strategic and traditional interests in 
Laos, they are likely to examine these conceivable forms carefully, but 
to prefer a medium-range solution of Laos' neutralization and its con-
comitant devices, including a coalition government with Pathet Lao 
participation. For a neutralized Laos can offer them a combination 
of practical advantages lacking in other circumstances. A Laos with-
out hostile foreign military forces or bases can become a useful buffer 
zone in Southeast Asia and thus help increase a sense of national 
security among the Chinese. If Laos remains genuinely neutral and 
friendly, the Chinese can avoid those risky responsibilities that may 
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arise in the cases of Communized or divided Laos. Under these favor-
able conditions they can expect to establish and develop close relations 
with Laos in diplomatic, cultural, and economic fields. The increase 
in these relations may help restore their traditional leadership over 
Laos in a subtle and indirect way. 
The concept of neutralization may clash with China's ideology of 
supporting militant national liberation movements. If, however, the 
Chinese are reasonably convinced that indigenous revolutionary forces 
have long-range political advantages in the absence of any foreign in-
terference, they might well reason that such a compromise does not 
sacrifice the revolutionary movement. The Chinese have apparently 
had confidence in the Pathet Lao's potential strength. In fact, it has 
seasoned leaders, experienced troops, integrated organizations, and 
revolutionary bases in Sam Neua and Phong Saly provinces. And it 
enjoys some popular local support and has access to Communist China 
and North Vietnam. At a time when Laos is not ripe for a Communist 
revolution, it is apparently desirable to the Chinese that the Pathet Lao 
seek to neutralize Laos, participate in the coalition, consolidate political 
foundations, and accomplish the new-democratic stage of revolutionary 
strategy. 
Since the early 1950's, when they modified their rigid "two-camp" 
world outlook, the Chinese have recognized the anti-imperialist tend-
ency of a neutral foreign policy adopted among Asian and African 
states. They have tried to dissuade these states from joining "aggres-
sive" military systems and encouraged them to form an international 
united front against imperialism and colonialism. A successful revolu-
tionary strategy, the Chinese assert, requires both military and political 
forms of struggle, including negotiations with the enemy. Arguing 
that those who refuse to negotiate under all circumstances are poor 
revolutionaries, they often quote Mao Tse-tung's dictum of having 
"all the flexibility permissible and necessary for carrying out our 
principles."16 Hence, a compromise formula of neutralization can be 
a legitimate means of political struggle necessary for carrying out a 
"principle." 
The neutralization of Laos, striking a reasonable balance between 
Chinese national interest and Communist ideology and between aspired 
ends and available means, has steadily proved attractive to the Chinese 
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since 1954. Yet the Chinese, as political realists, are skeptical about the 
viability of a neutralized Laos. For one thing they suspect that the 
United States would not renounce its containment policy voluntarily. 
In addition they realize that Laos does not have internal and external 
conditions favorable for effective neutralization. Moreover, the experi-
ments for Laos' neutralization have been difficult and often frustrating 
to the Chinese. As a result they have shifted from a moderate policy 
aiming at a neutralized Laos to a militant policy supporting the Pathet 
Lao's military activities. 
In response to the highly unstable state of Laotian affairs, there-
fore, the Chinese have continued to adjust and reorient their positions 
and techniques. During the period under consideration this process 
of adjustment has taken four broad tendencies: (1) a policy of peace-
ful coexistence (1954-57), (2) a policy of assertive pressure (1958-60), 
(3) a policy of negotiations at the Geneva Conference (1961-62), and 
(4) a policy of reappraisal (1963-67). Although these tendencies were 
not always distinctive but often overlapped, each of them exhibits a 
certain pattern of challenge and response and a particular set of objec-
tives, tactics, and consequences. 
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The Chinese Policy of Peaceful Coexistence 
Section One: China and the First Geneva Formula on Laos 
At the time that the Chinese People's Republic (CPR) was pro-
claimed in October, 1949, there appeared in the Kingdom of Laos a 
new trend toward diplomatic accommodation with France and 
domestic political rearrangement. As Laos was granted an independent 
status within the French Union, many moderate Lao Issara leaders 
resumed their normal political life in Vientiane and some of them 
even joined the Royal Laotian Government (RLG). But the establish-
ment of Prince Souphanouvong's "resistance government" against the 
RLG and France heralded the beginning of Laos' long domestic 
turmoil and constituted a small part of the broader conflict which was 
spreading throughout Indo-China under Ho Chi Minh's revolutionary 
leadership. From the moment Ho formed the Indochinese Communist 
Party in 1930, he had striven to unify the revolutionary groups in 
Indo-China and to impose Vietnamese hegemony over Laos and 
Cambodia. When the Indochinese Communist Party was dissolved 
and succeeded by the Vietnam Lao Dong Party in March, 1951, its 
platform clearly revealed Ho's persistent interest in giving every as-
sistance to anti-French movements in Indo-China and in bringing 
about "an independent, free, strong and prosperous federation of the 
states of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia."1 Ho's region-wide cam-
paign was soon formalized in an alliance of the national united fronts 
of Vietnam, Khmer, and Pathet Lao to fight against the French "im-
perialist invaders." 
This alliance was conveniently used to justify commitments of 
Vietnamese "people's volunteers" on behalf of Souphanouvong's "re-
sistance government" in the following years. Accompanied by a small 
number of Pathet Lao forces, the Viet Minh made two major thrusts 
into Laos toward the end of the Indochinese war. In April, 1953, they 
occupied Sam Neua, advanced in May toward Luang Prabang, and 
then suddenly retreated to Vietnam. They again invaded Central Laos 
in December, reached the Mekong River in January, 1954, and moved 
northward toward Luang Prabang in February only to withdraw. In 
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the process Souphanouvong set up his revolutionary bases at Sam Neua 
and enlarged the "liberated areas"; in February, 1954, he claimed—his 
estimate was palpably inflated—that the Pathet Lao controlled nearly 
half of the Laotian territory containing one-third of the population.2 
It is unclear whether the CPR had any direct contact with the 
Pathet Lao movement up to this time, outside of Souphanouvong's 
visits to China during 1951 and 1952, apparently for policy consulta-
tions. There is little doubt, however, that the triumph of Communist 
revolution in China and the presence of Chinese troops on the Indo-
chinese frontier encouraged Souphanouvong's movement and that the 
extensive Chinese military assistance for the Viet Minh operations 
indirectly aided the Pathet Lao. As Eden recalls, the Viet Minh could 
indeed find "refuge, equipment, money and training facilities across 
the Chinese border" and could get Chinese advisers, technicians, and 
officers. Undoubtedly the availability of Chinese assistance bolstered 
the continuous struggles of the Viet Minh and the Pathet Lao as well.3 
Meanwhile, Foreign Ministers of America, Britain, France, and 
Russia, meeting at Berlin in early 1954 to discuss the German-Austrian 
question, agreed to sponsor an international conference to be held at 
Geneva in April for reaching "a peaceful settlement of the Korean 
question" and for discussing "the problem of restoring peace in Indo-
China."4 At the insistence of Secretary of State John F. Dulles, who 
refused to allow any precedent of de facto recognition of the CPR, the 
Berlin Communique contained a specific understanding that "neither 
the invitation to, nor the holding of, the above-mentioned conference 
shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it 
has not already been accorded." With McCarthyism on the rise in the 
United States, the inflexible Dulles said that the CPR would come to 
Geneva not to be honored by "us" but to account before the bar of 
world opinion for its aggressive roles in Korea and Indo-China. This 
vindictive position created some technical problems at the subsequent 
Geneva Conference; Dulles, for example, opposed a rotating chairman-
ship which would have devolved upon the Chinese and refused to 
participate in private discussions or to sign any document with CPR 
delegates. 
Although there was a fear that the Chinese might desire the freedom 
to intervene in Indo-China, they nevertheless welcomed the invitation 
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to attend the Geneva Conference. Hence, People's Daily carried an 
editorial on February 22,1954: 
The major powers bear a special responsibility for safe-guarding peace and 
security among nations. If they can solve outstanding disputes through negotia-
tion instead of force, all vital international issues can be settled and relations be-
tween the major powers can be made normal. Our fundamental obejctive is to 
settle the Korean and other Asian questions peacefully, so as to defend the peace 
and security of the Far East and the whole world. 
At the same time, however, the Chinese stepped up their military aid 
to the Viet Minh, which were then preparing for an all-out assault on 
the isolated French outposts at Dien Bien Phu in order to gain a deci-
sive military victory before the forthcoming negotiations at Geneva. 
Both China and the Viet Minh planned to obtain their negotiating ob-
jectives through military superiority. The United States estimated that, 
in addition to Chinese artillery, ammunition, and equipment used in 
Indo-China, about 2,000 Chinese persons assisted General Vo Nguyen 
Giap's operations at Dien Bien Phu.5 
When the Viet Minh besieged Dien Bien Phu—the key to Laos' 
defense in France's opinion, the United States issued tough warnings 
against the besiegers and their Chinese supporters, and seriously con-
sidered direct military intervention in Indo-China. In March Dulles 
defined the problem in Indo-China as a "grave threat to the whole free 
community" and appealed for "united action" among Western powers 
against the Viet Minh.6 But any radical step was restrained by a com-
bination of factors. Both France and Britain desired to give a fair trial 
to negotiations at Geneva rather than endorse "united action" with 
America. The specter of another ground war in Asia was unpopular 
in America. And the United States belatedly realized that a limited 
use of air power could not itself save the beleaguered French positions. 
The Viet Minh victory at Dien Bien Phu on May 7 substantially 
weakened the negotiating leverage of the Western delegates at Geneva. 
The Geneva Conference set up two deliberative procedures. One group 
of nineteen states futilely discussed the Korean question from April 26 
to June 15; a second group of nine delegations—the five big powers, 
three Associated States of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, and the Viet 
Minh—took part in the Indochinese negotiations from May 8 to July 
21. One phase of the Geneva Conference was to end hostilities in Indo-
China for a time; but it also promised to secure a number of Chinese 
15 
objectives. It kept U.S. military power out of Indo-China; it demon-
strated the status of China as a great power independent of Russia; it 
finally enhanced China's voice in the management of Asian affairs. In 
his first speech on the Indochinese question Premier Chou En-lai said 
the danger of escalating war in neighboring countries required China's 
close attention, and presented principles to be followed in international 
politics: 
The Asian states should respect each other's independence and sovereignty in-
stead of interfering in each other's internal affairs, should settle disputes among 
themselves by the peaceful means of negotiations instead of resorting to force or 
threats, and should establish and develop normal economic and cultural relations 
among themselves on the basis of equality and mutual benefit instead of per-
mitting discrimination or restrictions.7 
As the Geneva Conference was the first formal diplomatic contact 
between the CPR and the Royal Laotian Government, Chou En-lai 
assumed the responsibilities of two opposing directions—to cultivate 
cordial relations with Lao Foreign Minister Phoui Sananikone, and to 
represent the Pathet Lao's revolutionary interest. The art of diplomacy 
required a judicious balance between these two roles in a manner con-
sistent with China's national interests. Naturally one of his most diffi-
cult problems was the legal and military status of the "resistance 
governments" of Laos and Cambodia. Whereas French Foreign Minis-
ter Georges Bidault suggested that the only solution for Laos and Cam-
bodia was to effect the withdrawal of invading Viet Minh troops and 
restore the full authority of the Royal Laotian and Cambodian Govern-
ments, Ho's Acting Foreign Minister Pham Van Dong, Soviet Foreign 
Minister V. M. Molotov, and Chou En-lai insisted on representation of 
"resistance governments" at Geneva. They argued that the Pathet Lao 
controlled over one half of the Laotian territory and more than one 
million people and that the Khmer Issara, headed by Son Ngoc Minh, 
occupied over one third of the Cambodian territory and one fourth of 
the population. Phoui Sananikone, however, responded forcibly to the 
issue; since the fighting in Laos was the work of Viet Minh troops, he 
argued, the Pathet Lao "government" had been "fabricated lock, stock 
and barrel by the foreign invaders."8 
As Eden correctly foresaw, both Molotov and Chou did not wish 
to sabotage the entire Conference by urging representation for the 
Pathet Lao and Khmer "resistance governments." When Dulles seri-
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ously warned of a possible military confrontation between the U.S. and 
Communist China in June, Chou En-lai, in his discussions with Eden 
and Bidault, withdrew Communist sponsorship of these "resistance 
governments." He proposed rather that the Viet Minh delegation 
should represent them at the military talks with the French Command. 
Even though Pham Van Dong emphatically denied the presence of 
Viet Minh forces in Laos and Cambodia, Chou nevertheless told Eden 
that China could persuade the Viet Minh to withdraw from the two 
countries and that China would recognize the royal governments of 
Laos and Cambodia if "there were no American bases in the territory."9 
This suggested that China was more concerned with the security prob-
lem arising from possible American bases than with the revolutionary 
movements in Laos and Cambodia. Indeed, as the most important con-
dition for putting an end to foreign interference, Chou proposed a ban 
on foreign military personnel and armaments in Indo-China. When 
the Conference seemed about to collapse, his initiatives constituted a 
major diplomatic breakthrough on the questions of Laos and Cambodia. 
Soon thereafter Chou exchanged visits and consultations with Phoui 
Sananikone and Cambodian Foreign Minister Tep Phan. Furthermore, 
Chou, in his July talks with new French Prime Minister Pierre Mendes-
France, abandoned Pham Van Dong's proposal for creating the Pathet 
Lao's autonomous government in the provinces of Phong Saly and Sam 
Neua. 
On July 20-21, 1954, the Geneva Conference adopted a series of 
agreements for cessation of hostilities in Indo-China and for political 
settlements in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.10 A combination of 
complex political forces made this successful conclusion of the Confer-
ence possible: France lost the will to carry on a costly fight against the 
determined Viet Minh; America failed to exert positive leadership both 
in the conduct of war and in the process of negotiations; Russia and 
Britain adroitly mediated the difficult diplomatic entanglements; and 
China was capable of moderating the extreme positions held by the 
Viet Minh, Pathet Lao, and Khmer Issara. 
In the Final Declaration each member of the Geneva Conference 
undertook to respect the sovereignty, independence, unity, and terri-
torial integrity of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and to refrain from 
interfering in their internal affairs. The RLG promised to take the 
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required measures to integrate all citizens, without discrimination, into 
the national community and to guarantee them their constitutional 
rights and freedoms, including free participation in general elections. 
The Government also affirmed a policy of qualified military nonalign-
ment —neither to participate in a military alliance which was inconsis-
tent with the principles of the United Nations Charter or with the pro-
visions of Geneva agreements, nor to permit establishment of any 
foreign military bases on its soil "unless its security is threatened." 
The Geneva agreements required a complete and simultaneous 
cease-fire to be followed by the withdrawal of French and Viet Minh 
forces from Laos within 120 days. Excepted were a body of French 
military personnel—not to exceed 5,000—who were permitted to remain 
in Laos for the purpose of training the Royal Laotian Army and pre-
serving two French military establishments at Seno and in the Mekong 
Valley. Chou En-lai first opposed, then accepted, this exception on the 
assumption that France would respect Laos' military nonalignment 
and even counterbalance the spread of American military influence 
there. But, Laos was prohibited from accepting any more foreign mili-
tary personnel and any type of new armaments other than a specified 
quantity considered necessary for its national defense. The execution 
of these accords was to be guaranteed and supervised by the Internation-
al Commission for Supervision and Control, which was composed of 
representatives from India (Chairman), Canada, and Poland. It was 
charged with the broad functions of "control, observation, inspection 
and investigation" of such matters as the withdrawal of foreign forces, 
the release of prisoners of war and civilian internees, and the introduc-
tion into Laos of military personnel and war materials.11 
Not only did the Geneva formula of military disengagement and 
qualified neutralization in Indo-China satisfy the needs of China's cam-
paign against "colonialism" and "imperialism," it also helped secure 
China against U.S. military intervention in its bordering countries. 
These results promoted the policy of peaceful coexistence which China 
had already espoused in the early 1950's upon modifying its earlier 
position of encouraging violent revolution in Asia. The slogans of 
"revolution" and "struggle" were therefore replaced by those of "peace" 
and "cooperation." In his concluding speech at the Geneva Conference 
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Chou En-lai explained the significance of the Geneva settlements in 
this new perspective: 
The armistice in Indo-China once again testifies that the forces for peace are 
irresistible. More and more nations of the world are coming out for peaceful 
coexistence. No policy of strength aimed at creating splits and forming opposing 
military groups can have the support of the people. What the peoples of Asia 
desire is certainly not splits or antagonism, but peace and cooperation.12 
At Geneva, Chou was one of the dominant diplomats, handling the 
intricacies of Asian politics at least as skillfully as Eden and Molotov. 
He conducted important negotiations with Eden, Bidault, and Mendes-
France, especially during Molotov's absence from Geneva. Through 
the Conference China gained a hearing for its legitimate concern over 
Laos. The Conference also gave rise to subsequent Chinese strategy 
and tactics not dictated simply by the fact of geographic contiguity. 
"For the first time as one of the Big Powers," a People's Daily editorial 
of July 22, 1954, rejoiced, "the CPR joined the other major powers in 
negotiation on vital international problems and made a contribution of 
its own that won the acclaim of wide sections of world public opinion. 
The international status of the CPR as one of the big world powers has 
gained universal recognition." 
Perhaps China's influence in Indo-China grew at the expense of Ho 
Chi Minh's interests. As Bell implies, Chou En-lai—together with 
Molotov—persuaded Ho, who could otherwise have taken Laos and 
Cambodia within a year, to accept a less favorable settlement than he 
had a right to expect from military realities.13 During a Conference 
recess in July, Chou flew back to China and met with Ho. A brief joint 
communique issued after the meetings simply said they fully "ex-
changed" views on the Indochinese question without indicating the 
nature of their positions.14 Chou apparently soothed Ho's dissatisfaction 
with the negotiations at Geneva and persuaded him to accept a compro-
mise. Indeed Professor Paul Mus cogently argues that the Chinese in 
1954 were engaged in keeping the Viet Minh from carrying out its 
design to inherit all of French Indo-China.15 If so, this only demon-
strates a divergence of national interests and regional aspirations be-
tween China and North Vietnam in regard to Laos and Cambodia. 
From the perspective of China's long-range interests, it was obviously 
desirable to continue the age-old policy of "divide and rule" in Indo-
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China and thus check Ho's aspirations for hegemony in Laos and Cam-
bodia. One can hardly argue that the Chinese considered Laos and 
Cambodia the permanent sphere of Vietnamese influence. 
The unique Geneva arrangements for the Pathet Lao movement 
eventually proved far more controversial than the Vietnamese and 
Cambodian settlements. The Pathet Lao's demand for formal auton-
omy and independent status was completely ignored at Geneva; their 
acceptance of cease-fire agreements was handled by the Viet Minh dele-
gation. But the Pathet Lao received much better terms than did the 
Khmer Communists, who were militarily defeated and politically out-
maneuvered by King Norodom Sihanouk. The Khmer resistance forces 
were to be demobilized on the spot within thirty days after the cease-fire 
order, while the Pathet Lao, "pending a political settlement," was per-
mitted to regroup their troops in the northern provinces of Phong Saly 
and Sam Neua (Houa Phan). They were also allowed to participate 
in the nation-wide elections to be held in 1955. The Pathet Lao leaders 
officially called these Geneva agreements an "initial victory," but they 
were determined to preserve their fighting capacity until final political 
settlements with the RLG were achieved. 
At Geneva the Chinese exposed a willingness to compromise the 
Pathet Lao's revolutionary objectives in order to further their own 
national interests in the region. Only within this basic limit were they 
prepared to represent and enhance the Pathet Lao's positions and to 
cooperate with other Communist delegations. Their emphasis on 
"peace" and "cooperation" at the time of the Geneva Conference har-
monized with the peaceful strategy adopted by the Soviet Union. It 
seems likely, though, that the decision to alter Chinese policy from the 
rigid formula of uniting with revolutionaries to the flexible one of 
uniting with all with whom unity was possible was reached indepen-
dently after a reappraisal of China's internal and external conditions. 
At the international level the Chinese evidently had learned through 
their recent experiences with the Korean and Indochinese wars that 
it was highly risky and costly to promote revolutions by means of overt 
violence. They believed that any radical attempt to change the world-
wide strategic equilibrium would be effectively resisted by the massive 
retaliatory power of the United States and its allies. The Korean war, 
in particular, inflicted great sacrifices upon Chinese forces and revealed 
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striking shortcomings in their military technology and training. When 
their national security was threatened by General MacArthur's proposal 
to bomb Manchuria during the Korean war and later by Dulles' sugges-
tion to escalate the Indochinese war, the Chinese must have taken stock 
of their limited strategic capabilities. It is not surprising how obsessed 
they became with the idea that America might attack.16 
A second factor contributing to China's prudence was their current 
program of socialist economic reconstruction, political consolidation, 
and military modernization. The first Five-Year Economic Plan (1953-
57) required a concentration of their limited resources, human and 
material, on the domestic front to the detriment of external "adven-
tures." Their economic ambitions at home, coupled with the proven 
strength of their foreign foes, made it necessary for China to settle for a 
"peaceful international environment." 
In line with the spirit of the Geneva negotiations Chou En-lai 
launched a broad diplomatic campaign of peaceful cooperation summed 
up in his five principles of peaceful coexistence. These principles were 
first promulgated in the Sino-Indian trade agreement of April, 1954, 
and soon reaffirmed in Chou's separate joint statements with Indian 
Prime Minister Nehru and Burmese Prime Minister U Nu in June.17 
The Chou-Nehru statement, in particular, observed that if these princi-
ples were applied in general international relations, they could form a 
"solid foundation for peace and security" in the world, replacing the 
existing atmosphere of "fear and apprehension" with a "feeling of 
confidence." The application of these principles in Indochinese affairs, 
the statement emphasized, should promote an "area of peace" all over 
the world. Of course, the Chinese hoped these principles would help 
protect their national security and allow them to work on domestic 
progress, while gradually expanding their influence in a neutralized 
"area of peace" of Indo-China. 
However, the devolopment of a Chinese policy of peaceful coexis-
tence in Laos met opposition from the United States. When Dulles' 
call for "united action" failed, he adopted at Geneva what has been 
accurately termed a policy of "innocence by non-association." At the 
concluding session of the Geneva Conference the U.S. issued a uni-
lateral declaration to the effect that it would take note of the cease-fire 
agreements and refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb the 
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Geneva settlements. But it was made clear that the U.S. would view 
any renewed aggression as a serious threat to international security and 
peace. On the same day President Eisenhower said at his press con-
ference that the U.S. was not prepared to join in the Final Declaration 
because the Geneva agreements contained features which it did not 
like, and that it was not party to or bound by the Geneva decisions.18 
This position of "non-association" reflected Dulles' strategic think-
ing that U.S. capabilities of massive retaliation, not agreements, were 
the only effective way to rescue from Communist aggression nations 
unable to defend themselves alone.19 When the withdrawal of French 
forces soon created a power vacuum in Indo-China, this strategic con-
cept—and its corollary the domino theory—gave rise to a system of 
peripheral military containment designed as a credible threat to the 
spread of Asian Communism. 
In September, 1954, barely seven weeks after the conclusion of the 
Geneva Conference, the long-considered plan for the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization (SEATO) was accepted in Manila by eight coun-
tries.20 Article Four affirmed SEATO's objective of collective security: 
Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty 
area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties 
by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace 
and safety, and agrees that it will in the event act to meet the common danger 
in accordance with its constitutional processes. 
It was clear that SEATO's major purpose was to deter an "aggressive 
intention" of Communist China, whose advocacy of peaceful coexis-
tence was taken as a ruse. As a defiant challenge to Chinese and North 
Vietnamese ambitions in Indo-China, SEATO placed Laos, Cambodia, 
and South Vietnam under its "protection." When Dulles was ambiva-
lent as to the eligibility of these Indochinese states for full membership 
in SEATO, Eden, apparently recalling his assurance to Chou at Geneva 
that these states should be debarred from joining any military alliance, 
opposed the plan.21 
At any rate it was not surprising that the establishment of SEATO 
and its protective umbrella provoked Peking's anger. The Chinese 
immediately accused SEATO of "aggressive intentions" against them 
and of "total incompatibility" with the Geneva agreements. The United 
States, however, reached an agreement with France at the end of 
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September that both countries would continue to assist Cambodia, Laos, 
and South Vietnam in "their efforts to safeguard their freedom and 
independence and to advance the welfare of their people."22 The U.S. 
promised to revise and reinforce the Mutual Defense Assistance Agree-
ment of December, 1950—providing for indirect American military 
aid to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos through France—and to consider 
direct financial support for the armed forces of the three states. 
On this basis the U.S. absorbed as of January, 1955, the cost of main-
taining and training the Royal Laotian Army and embarked upon an 
expensive military and financial assistance program. The following 
month when Dulles visited Vientiane after attending the SEATO 
Council meeting, he testified to the importance of Laos in his strategic 
calculations. He assured Crown Prince Savang Vatthana that under 
SEATO provisions the U.S. was prepared to defend Laos with air and 
naval power against any Communist invasion. In turn he advised the 
RLG to fight the Pathet Lao's subversive acivities rather than negotiate, 
and stated that U.S. officers in Thailand should train Laotian soldiers 
for that purpose.23 His inclusion of Laos within the U.S. defense peri-
meter further expanded the scope of anti-Communist containment 
structures in Asia and gave a psychological boost to the RLG in its con-
tinuing conflict with the Pathet Lao. 
The shortcoming of the Geneva agreements (notably Article 14), 
which failed to specify how to interpret and resolve the political and 
military status of the Pathet Lao dissidents in Phong Saly and Sam 
Neua provinces, permitted various legal interpretations and left a 
crucial problem unclear in Laos. The RLG insisted on extending its 
authority over these disputed provinces while the Pathet Lao wanted 
to control the "totality" of these provinces until a comprehensive politi-
cal settlement was achieved.24 The controversy became so serious that 
the International Control Commission emphasized in its first Interim 
Report that "unless the political settlement envisaged in the Geneva 
Agreement is not reached at an early date, the provinces might become 
a source of constant friction and jeopardize the very objectives of the 
agreement."25 In this regard the ICC's role was limited not only by 
the ambiguity of Article 14 and the absence of elementary cooperation 
between the RLG and the Pathet Lao, but by the continuing interna-
tional conflict in Indo-China. Its functions were also impaired by the 
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difficulty of communicating in a jungle country and more importantly 
by the rapid disintegration of the French colonial administrative system 
which had hitherto linked Laos with France and other parts of Indo-
China. With mobility, communication, and inspection nearly impos-
sible, the Commission had to rely on the word of the foreign combatants 
that each had withdrawn its forces out of Laos. 
Under the good offices of the Commission, however, negotiations 
between the RLG and the Pathet Lao continued intermittently from 
January to April, 1955. At various stages the Pathet Lao presented a 
series of demands for political settlement with the RLG: Souphanou-
vong demanded an "equal status" with the RLG and establishment of 
diplomatic relations with China and North Vietnam; Kaysone Phoum-
vihan, representing the Pathet Lao Command, asked the RLG to re-
move about three thousand Kuomintang forces whom the United 
States had allegedly transferred from Burma into northern Laos; and 
Col. Singkapo Chounlamany proposed forming a coalition govern-
ment with the RLG.26 It is hardly unusual that the Chinese paid special 
attention to Kaysone's claim and responded favorably to Souphanou-
vong's proposals. But staunch anti-Communist Premier Katay Don 
Sasorith refused each of these Pathet Lao proposals and rather showed 
himself willing to depend on U.S. military assistance to disband the 
Pathet Lao forces and deter interference from Hanoi and Peking. In 
his memoranda and letters submitted to the Commission in April, he 
declared that negotiations in Laos were impeded because the Pathet 
Lao leaders considered themselves "still under the authority of the 
Viet Minh High Command." He also said North Vietnam had violated 
the Geneva agreements on numerous occasions by sending Viet Minh 
soldiers back into Laos.27 
Section Two: The Bandung "Spirit" and Sino-Laotian Relations 
The unsettled situation in Laos, coupled with the steadily increasing 
financial and military commitments of the United States, posed an 
obvious dilemma to China's policy of peaceful coexistence. At Geneva 
the Chinese had expected that the big power formula would create a 
neutralized area of peace in Laos and make the RLG friendly toward 
them. By the spring of 1955, all these expectations were being upset. 
More important, Dulles declared in March that the United States might 
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use tactical nuclear weapons in the event that China attacked Southeast 
Asia.28 Thus, the Chinese must have seen that a peaceful solution of 
the Pathet Lao question was necessary to prevent Laos from drifting 
further into the American military camp and to establish Peking-Vien-
tiane diplomatic rapport. If, however, China gave priority to its diplo-
matic tie with Vientiane, it might amount to withdrawing her support 
and sympathy from the Pathet Lao and to permitting U.S. power to 
stifle the movement. But the Chinese, too, recognized the importance of 
the Pathet Lao-controlled provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua, not 
only as revolutionary bases but as direct means of influencing northern 
Laos. The best they could expect from this dilemma was a compromise 
solution—namely, Pathet Lao participation in a coalition government 
as the quid pro quo for relinquishing Phong Saly and Sam Neua prov-
inces to the RLG authority. 
When 29 countries of Asia and Africa met at Bandung in April, 
1955, Premier Chou En-lai used the opportunity to maneuver a com-
promise solution within Laos. He wished to demonstrate China's ad-
herence to a policy of peaceful coexistence with Laos and to develop 
an understanding with Premier Katay D. Sasorith. At the Political 
Committee, Chou declared that China would not infringe "one inch" 
on the territories of Laos and Cambodia and that it had no intention of 
intervening in their domestic affairs.29 He voiced an "earnest hope" 
that these two countries would follow the peace-loving path practiced 
by India and Burma. He subtly implied that, in line with the political 
stance of India and Burma, both Laos and Cambodia should adopt a 
genuine neutral foreign policy, foster friendly cooperation with Peking, 
and refrain from accepting military protection from SEATO or the 
United States. It should be noted that by sponsoring the Bandung 
Conference, Nehru hoped to encourage Peking to peaceful relations 
with these small countries so that they could avoid involvement with 
SEATO. As Kahin points out, Nehru believed that the more often 
China publicly pledged to respect the principles of peaceful coexistence 
with non-Communist countries, the greater would be the moral pres-
sure on China to adhere to its pledge.30 At this stage of their relations 
both Nehru and Chou found a common interest in the relaxation of 
tensions in Asia. 
As a further cooperative measure toward settling the Laotian prob-
25 
lem at Bandung, Chou joined Nehru in arranging an informal meeting 
between Katay Sasorith and Foreign Minister Pham Van Dong. This 
meeting produced the Hanoi-Vientiane agreement in which Pham Van 
Dong unequivocally stated: 
. . . the political settlement which is due to take place between the Royal Govern-
ment of Laos and Pathet Lao, by virtue of the Geneva agreements, is a question 
of internal order which the Royal Government of Laos and Pathet Lao are entirely 
free to solve in the best interests of the country and people of Laos.31 
Pham Van Dong and Katay Sasorith also agreed to develop good 
neighborly relations "within the framework of the five principles de-
fined in the Sino-Indian agreement." The fruitful conclusion of Chou-
Nehru mediation suggested that both Hanoi and Peking were prepared 
to observe the principle of noninterference in the Laotian "internal 
order" and thus to encourage a peaceful unification of Laos. This pub-
lic clarification was deemed necessary in view of Katay Sasorith's deep 
fear that Hanoi and Peking were attempting to control Laos through 
the instrument of Pathet Lao dissidents. 
Just as he had done at Geneva, Chou again put pressure on Pham 
Van Dong to normalize relations with the non-Communist government 
in Vientiane. Admittedly, the formal communique adopted at the 
Bandung Conference offered a long list of vague resolutions reflecting 
a compromise of conflicting tendencies among participants; neverthe-
less, the Conference, in the footsteps of the Geneva Conference, helped 
China considerably in developing friendly approaches toward Asia and 
Africa. Chou's skillful salesmanship of peace at public forums and in 
informal talks gained friends, disarmed enemies, and won the confi-
dence of neutrals. He was apparently pleased with his diplomatic co-
operation with Nehru and was anxious to see a negotiated settlement 
between the RLG and the Pathet Lao leading to a detente between 
Peking and Vientiane. This hope was expressed in his report to the 
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in May, 1955. 
As one of the major achievements of Bandung, Chou claimed a role in 
the making of the Hanoi-Vientiane accord, which, he said, would con-
tribute "to the thorough implementation of the agreements of the 
Geneva Conference and to the consolidation of peace in Indo-China."32 
To give credence to his diplomatic overtures from Geneva to Ban-
dung, Chou En-lai proposed in July, 1955, at the National People's 
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Congress that "the countries of Asia and the Pacific Region, including 
the United States, sign a pact of collective peace to replace the antagon-
istic military blocs now existing in this part of the world, so that the 
collective peace first advocated by the Indian Government may be 
realized."33 He thus tried to counter the effects of military containment 
which the United States was pursuing in Asia. The presence of U.S. 
power in Asia, however, prompted China to turn to Russia for nuclear 
protection and modern armaments. In pursuit of strengthening its 
alliance with Russia, China sent Defense Minister P'eng Teh-huai to 
the foundation ceremony of the Warsaw pact in May, 1955, and to 
Moscow for military consultations the following month. 
As far as the Chinese were concerned, the RLG betrayed the Ban-
dung "spirit" first in failing to achieve a reconciliation with Soupha-
nouvong, Hanoi, and Peking. In the months following Bandung, 
Katay Sasorith again charged North Vietnam with interfering in Laos 
and put forward a tough precondition for negotiations with the Pathet 
Lao—i.e., the effective establishment of the royal administration in the 
provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua, a demand spelling defeat for 
the Pathet Lao.34 In a sense both Chou En-lai and Pham Van Dong 
were shrewdly outmaneuvered by Katay Sasorith, who took advantage 
of Peking's and Hanoi's commitments to noninterference in the internal 
order of Laos to seek a military rather than a political settlement. Mis-
trusting the friendly gestures of Peking and Hanoi, Laos concluded 
another aid agreement with the United States in July, 1955, to 
strengthen its military preparedness against the Pathet Lao, 
In the year following Geneva, U.S. activities in Laos increased tre-
mendously. Whereas there had been only two American officials in 
1953, there were some 45 in 1955; the U.S. military and economic aid 
of about 50 million dollars during 1955 was several times the total 
regular budget of the RLG.35 Even though the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
recommended a force goal of 12,000 to 15,000 for Laos, the State De-
partment reached a "political decision" in 1955 that Laos, to protect 
its security, should increase the size of its army from 15,000 to 25,000. 
After several attempts at negotiations the RLG and the Pathet Lao 
again engaged in an armed conflict in late 1955, albeit on a small scale 
and in a sporadic manner. 
Meanwhile the Pathet Lao leaders, to defend against any major 
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offensive from Vientiane, consolidated their administrative control in 
the provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua. Recruiting members both 
by coercion and persuasion, they increased their ranks from about 1,000 
at the time of truce to over 4,000 in 1955. Sen. Mansfield alarmingly 
reported: "There is also evidence that Viet Minh officers and cadres 
hold key positions in these forces. Chinese units, moreover, are available 
across the border."36 An anti-Communist newspaper in Laos even indi-
cated in November, 1955, that Communist China and North Vietnam 
had concluded a mutual assistance program to provide the Pathet Lao 
with Chinese war material and North Vietnamese personnel and to 
allocate 100 million yuan to the Pathet Lao out of China's 800 million 
yuan (approximately $338 million) in aid given to Hanoi.87 It is con-
ceivable that although the Chinese in 1955 gave priority to a negotiated 
settlement in Laos, they also gave aid to the Pathet Lao to augment its 
negotiating position or to meet any contingency situation. 
After the Pathet Lao leaders boycotted the general elections which 
the RLG held in December, 1955, they formed a new political party 
named the Neo Lao Haksat (or Laotian Patriotic Front), whose main 
purpose was to broaden the Pathet Lao's appeals and activities. The 
growing tension between the RLG and the NLH inevitably had un-
favorable repercussions on Vientiane's relations with Peking and Hanoi. 
Both Premier Katay Sasorith and Foreign Minister Phoui Sananikone 
denounced the support which Hanoi and Peking continued to give to 
the Pathet Lao, and also threatened to avail themselves of the military 
protection offered by SEATO and the U.S. In early 1956, Katay Sasor-
ith specifically referred to the danger of Asian Communism and said: 
Laos has common borders with Red China and North Vietnam and, therefore, 
is much exposed to Communist menaces. . . . Though Laos is not a signatory 
of the Manila Pact, it lies within the protective orbit of the Treaty. It is satisfying 
to receive the promises of the United States [with regard to] their will to defend 
the principles of security and mutual aid in this part of the world.38 
Katay Sasorith's blunt anti-Communist tendency seemed to disturb 
China's policy of peaceful coexistence, especially her hope of making 
Laos neutral. The Chinese could not hide their displeasure over his 
position but refrained from issuing direct warnings or diplomatic pro-
tests. In trying to improve their international respectability and develop 
friendly relations with non-Communist neighbors, they sought to con-
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ceal both their "great nation chauvinism" and their support for violent 
revolutionary movements. The rise of Sinophobia among sensitive 
neighbors would merely have played into the hands of Americans, who 
were eager to justify the need of collective security against the Chinese 
"menace." Although Vientiane moved gradually under Washington's 
protective umbrella, the Chinese did not take steps to improve their 
strained relations with Laos. They were watchful but silent. Perhaps 
they decided to attach less priority to Laos in their foreign affairs, or 
could conceive of no other option than to tolerate Vientiane's "hard-
line" policy and wait for the pendulum to swing back in their favor. 
But the Chinese could take hope from the cabinet crises in Laos which 
followed the 1955 general elections. 
The Chinese position of calculated self-restraint toward Vientiane 
yielded a political dividend in March, 1956, when Prince Souvanna 
Phouma resumed the premiership. The opportunity arose for resuming 
the long-suspended dialogue between Peking and Vientiane, and the 
prospect for reviving the Geneva formula and the Bandung spirit in 
Laos brightened. In his inaugural speech to the National Assembly, 
Souvanna Phouma made it clear that his main internal policy problem 
concerned the Pathet Lao. To this end he requested the help of the 
"Big Powers"—obviously including China.39 Thus, the Chinese policy 
of peaceful coexistence elicited a favorable response from the leader of 
Vientiane, whose political thinking was inspired by Nehru's neutralist 
policy. Not only was Souvanna Phouma, like Nehru, friendly to Peking 
at that time, but also he overturned Katay Sasorith's hard-line policy 
toward the Pathet Lao. Soon Souphanouvong sent a letter to Premier 
Souvanna Phouma, proposing resumption of negotiations in Vientiane. 
One month later Souphanouvong followed up this initiative with a 
proposal that Laos should adopt a neutral foreign policy and form a 
broad united front against American interference.40 These proposals 
were endorsed by the Committee for the Maintenance of a Peaceful and 
Neutral Policy (Khana Santiphab), organized in July by Bong Souvan-
navong and Quinim Pholsena, the latter a protege of Souvanna 
Phouma. 
In cooperation with the International Commission and the Geneva 
Conference Co-chairmen, the RLG subsequently held extensive top-
level negotiations with the Pathet Lao delegation in Vientiane in 
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August, 1956, and both sides reached agreements on most of the politi-
cal problems pending since Geneva. In two joint declarations Princes 
Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong resolved to follow a neutral 
policy, to apply the five principles of peaceful coexistence, and to pro-
mote friendly relations with all countries, especially with neighboring 
states. They also promised to desist from adhering to any military 
alliance or allowing any country to establish military bases on Laotian 
territory apart from those provided for in the Geneva agreements.41 As 
to domestic affairs, each pledged to cease all acts of hostility immedi-
ately, to guarantee democratic rights and freedoms to all citizens, and 
to legalize the Neo Lao Haksat. Most important, it was agreed that 
while the Pathet Lao would place their troops and provinces under 
Vientiane's authority, the RLG would set up a National Union Govern-
ment with the participation of Pathet Lao representatives and organize 
supplementary general elections on the basis of universal suffrage and 
secret ballot. The specific procedures for coalition, integration, and 
elections were entrusted to the Joint Military and Political Commissions 
composed of members from both sides. Thus, the general principles 
for "political settlement" in Laos which were envisaged in Article 14 of 
the Geneva agreements and subsequently endorsed at Bandung were 
finally accepted by half-brothers Souvanna Phouma and Souphanou-
vong. 
Section Three: Peking and the Peaceful Unification of Laos 
The Chinese, who had sought a peaceful settlement of the Laotian 
question since Geneva, immediately supported the Vientiane negotia-
tions. They considered the RLG-NLH rapprochement a major contri-
bution to their policy of peaceful coexistence with Vientiane. Hence 
People's Daily (August 8,1956) carried a favorable editorial: 
The Chinese people will firmly support the agreements reached in the negotia-
tions, and ardently hope that both sides will continue to march along the road 
of peace and unification so that at an early date Laos may play its role as a 
completely independent and unified state in the great family of peace in Asia. 
As for the remaining issues of coalition and elections, the editorial 
urged "rational solutions" and praised the International Commission for 
its role of mediation in Laos. 
China's greatest enthusiasm was directed toward two parts of the 
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Vientiane agreements—Laos' declared intentions to develop friendly 
relations with its neighbors and to formulate a policy of peaceful co-
existence and military nonalignment. The Chinese not only expressed 
their willingness to work toward establishing friendly and diplomatic 
relations with Laos, but pointed out the merits of a strict neutral foreign 
policy. By endorsing a neutral policy for Laos and reaffirming their 
interest in friendship and coexistence, they hoped to nullify their earlier 
record of opposition to neutralism. In the past their "two-camp" world 
outlook had underplayed the importance of the third camp or inter-
mediate zone between socialists and capitalists. For example, in his 
manifesto "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship" [June, 1949], 
Mao Tse-tung attacked the "illusion of a third road" and stated: "Not 
only in China but also in the world, without exception, one either leans 
to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Neutrality is a 
mere camouflage and a third road does not exist."42 
Mao's dogmatic rejection of neutrality was further elaborated by 
Liu Shao-ch'i when, in November, 1949, he called such neutral leaders 
as Nehru, U Nu, and Sukarno "stooges of imperialism" and advised 
the Communist revolutionaries in these neutral countries to begin 
armed insurrection after the Chinese pattern. But this extremism gave 
way in the early 1950's to a more pragmatic policy of peaceful coexis-
tence with those states having different social systems. So Chou En-lai 
began to emphasize China's respect for neutral countries, and Liu 
Shao-ch'i, too, pushed the same theme. At the Eighth National Con-
gress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1956, Liu acknowledged that 
the overwhelming majority of newly independent Asian nations were 
pursuing a peaceful neutral foreign policy which put a "powerful 
check on the colonial aggrandizement of United States imperialism."43 
This contrasted sharply with Dulles' statement of June, 1956, in which 
he characterized the notion of neutralism as obsolete, immoral, selfish, 
and shortsighted except under special circumstances. In response to 
Dulles' remarks Souvanna Phouma said that "our country has no in-
tention of joining any bloc, even the neutralist bloc."44 In apparent 
reference to the Dulles-Souvanna Phouma exchange, Vice-Premier 
Chen Yi observed in September that it was not the policy of neutrality 
which was immoral but rather the "policy of war pursued by the 
United States monopoly circles themselves."45 Against this back-
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ground the Chinese probably saw in Laos' decision to uphold a neutral 
policy an excellent opportunity to gain rapport with Vientiane and 
thus draw it from SEATO's embrace. 
The enthusiasm with which the Chinese welcomed the Vientiane 
agreements led to long-awaited direct consultations between Peking 
and Vientiane. Now that the Pathet Lao question no longer prevented 
the invitation of Chou En-lai, Premier Souvanna Phouma could feel 
free to pay his first state visit to China, from August 19 to 26, 1956, 
accompanied by an impressive 30-member delegation.46 The Chinese 
seized the opportunity to show their peaceful intentions, to encourage 
domestic harmony in Laos, and to establish official ties with the RLG. 
The fact that, of their eleven independent neighbors, only Laos and 
Bhutan had withheld recognition from the CPR no doubt spurred the 
Chinese move. Souvanna Phouma, on his part, sought Chinese leaders' 
personal assurances that they would encourage the Pathet Lao and 
Hanoi to abide by the Vientiane agreements and live in peace with 
the RLG. At a banquet sponsored by Chou En-lai, therefore, Souvanna 
Phouma candidly stated: "Only upon the good faith and sincerity of 
our surrounding nations, among whom we count upon China, can Laos 
expect to live peacefully."47 The Chinese responded with a pledge to 
respect the principles of peaceful coexistence and support Souvanna 
Phouma's efforts for national unification and international cooperation. 
Noting that peoples of China and Laos were not only neighbors but 
also relatives, Chou En-lai emphasized that there had never been any 
conflict between the two countries. Mao Tse-tung also said China and 
Laos should begin to renew their "historical friendship" on the basis of 
peaceful coexistence.48 In return Souvanna Phouma himself acknowl-
edged the importance of the historical Sino-Laotian relationship. 
Among other things he noted that one thousand years ago the people of 
Laos had migrated from China's southern border area to the Mekong 
valley and that the Laotian missions, despite high mountains and diffi-
cult roads, had visited China to bring the "loyal friendship" of Laotian 
people. He even observed that Laos had survived its turbulent history 
by inheriting the very great spiritual element fostered in China.49 
The visit proved to be productive and satisfactory to Peking. In 
their first joint statement, signed on August 25, Premiers Chou En-lai 
and Souvanna Phouma noted three points of mutual agreement.50 
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First, Laos declared to carry out a policy of peace and neutrality, to 
decline membership in any military alliance as long as its own security 
was not threatened, and to refuse the establishment of any foreign 
military base on its territory other than those provided in the Geneva 
agreements. China in turn affirmed its respect and support for these 
policies. Second, both Governments pledged to develop "good neighbor 
relations" in accordance with the five principles of peaceful coexistence, 
and to promote in every possible way the cross-border relations between 
local authorities along the Sino-Laotian boundary. Third, they agreed 
to develop economic and cultural relations for the greater benefit of 
the two countries. Apart from the joint statement Souvanna Phouma 
expressed his willingness to accept the offer of Chinese economic aid 
and suggested that the Chinese Government send representatives to 
Laos to make a first-hand investigation of Laos' economic planning. 
Although the Chinese could not persuade Souvanna Phouma to 
establish diplomatic relations at once, they were pleased to win so 
many commitments. Of special importance to them was Souvanna 
Phouma's promise to pursue a policy of economic and cultural coopera-
tion with China. Most significant, he, by echoing the central theme of 
the Chinese campaign that SEATO's protective role over Laos was 
incompatible with the Kingdom's sovereignty and the Geneva agree-
ments, reversed Katay Sasorith's March, 1956, statement and struck a 
blow at U.S. policy. Just as Prince Sihanouk did at Peking in February, 
1956, Souvanna Phouma declared at a Peking press conference that 
Laos should never accept SEATO's protection because it was decided 
"without our participation" and was not consistent with the Geneva 
agreements.51 On the following day, People's Daily (August 26) com-
mented on the importance of the Sino-Laotian agreement and observed: 
We firmly believe this agreement will not only revive our long-standing tradi-
tional friendship, but also put it on a new basis that will open wide prospects for 
new development. Those who have plotted to drive a wedge between the two 
countries and who have resisted the current tendency of peaceful coexistence will 
be greatly disappointed. 
Since Sino-Laotian relations were inevitably entwined with the con-
flict between Hanoi and Vientiane, the Chinese probably persuaded 
Hanoi to promote peaceful coexistence with Vientiane—just as they had 
done at Geneva and Bandung. And they welcomed the joint statement 
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signed by Souvanna Phouma and Pham Van Dong in Hanoi as a "vital 
contribution to peace in Indo-China."52 In view of recent tensions and 
suspicions, the statement emphasized that North Vietnam and Laos 
would respect each other's national sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
and refrain from interfering in the domestic affairs of the other party. 
To this end Pham Van Dong reiterated his adherence to the Geneva 
agreements and the Bandung understanding which Nehru and Chou 
had helped him conclude with Katay Sasorith. 
It was no secret that the United States enormously disliked Souvanna 
Phouma's soft-line policy toward Asian Communism. U.S. Ambassador 
J. Graham Parsons persistently advised Souvanna Phouma not to form 
a coalition government with Pathet Lao dissidents and, to show his 
dissatisfaction, stayed away from the airport when the Laotian delega-
tion left for Peking and Hanoi. Fully aware of American dissatisfac-
tion, Souvanna Phouma made it clear in September that "we are not 
ready to establish diplomatic or economic relations with China or North 
Vietnam."53 Once the assistance of Peking and Hanoi was enlisted for 
his domestic programs, however, Souvanna Phouma determined to 
carry on discussions with the Pathet Lao. This led to a series of further 
agreements on domestic and foreign policies from November to De-
cember, 1956.54 Meanwhile, Premiers Chou En-lai and Pham Van Dong 
supported the progress of domestic negotiations in Laos. Chou was 
particularly pleased with Laos' decision to establish diplomatic relations 
with those neighboring countries which had so requested and to re-
ceive unconditional economic assistance from those same countries 
from the beginning of 1957. 
In the spring of 1957, when the Pathet Lao leaders stipulated—as a 
condition for final political reconciliation with the RLG—that Laos 
should accept the Chinese aid of approximately $70 millions, they 
were acting in Chinese interest as much as their own.55 They argued 
that this aid would effectively assure Laos of "true neutrality" because 
it could counterbalance the impact of enormous U.S. aid. For the 
fiscal years 1955-57 the United States had committed to Laos $165.3 
millions, a substantial portion of which was earmarked for strengthen-
ing the 25,000-man national army. This sum made Laos the highest 
per capita recipient of U.S. aid in Southeast Asia. 
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TABLE 2 
U.S. FOREIGN AID TO LAOS, FISCAL YEARS 1955-57a 
(In Millions of Dollars) 
Development 
Fiscal Grants and Budget Military 
Year Technical Support Equipment Total 
Cooperation 
1955 40.9 40.9 
1956 1.0 47.3 27.4 75.7 
1957 1.5 42.9 4.3 48.7 
Total 25 13L1 3L7 1653 
a Source: Arthur J. Dommen, Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization (New York: 
Praeger, 1964). 
But the possible consequences of Chinese aid programs aroused 
growing apprehension both in Vientiane and in Washington. It was 
argued among right-wing Laotian leaders that the acceptance of Chi-
nese assistance and technicians would eventually lead to diplomatic 
recognition of Peking and increase the Pathet Lao's political strength 
in Vientiane. The United States too was fearful of Communist pene-
tration into Southeast Asia under the cover of aid, peace, and neutrality. 
For, as SEATO's second annual report put it, "despite statements 
stressing the feasibility of peaceful coexistence between Communist 
and non-Communist nations . . . . the ultimate objective [of Commu-
nists] in the Treaty area continues to be the establishment of disciplined 
Communist regimes."56 It also said the Communist exploitation of 
"neutralism" was incompatible with collective defense organizations 
in the region. 
A Chinese presence in Laos would threaten America's containment 
policy in Southeast Asia. Accordingly, the United States expressed more 
forcibly than ever its disapproval of Souvanna Phouma's conciliatory 
posture. In an unusual move the U.S. Government protested to Laos 
in April, 1957, that the objectives of Laotian national unification had 
been made impossible because the Pathet Lao forces placed "extraneous 
conditions" upon their acceptance of the RLG authority and upon 
their reintegration into the national community.57 This diplomatic 
note asked the RLG to act with determination so that "the political 
future of the Kingdom of Laos shall not be dictated by dissident groups 
enjoying no constitutional status." A week later a State Department 
spokesman cited the following as examples of Pathet Lao's extraneous 
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conditions: first, neutrality involving the exchange of diplomatic 
representatives with the Communist bloc; second, acceptance of eco-
nomic and technical assistance from the Communist bloc, particularly 
Communist China; and third, establishment of a coalition government 
including the Communists. It was even hinted that should these 
measures of appeasement go into effect, the United States would cut 
off its aid to Laos. 
The U.S. move was designed as a "psychological lift" to the vulner-
able RLG in its attempt to resist Communist pressures. As evidence of 
China's southward thrust, U.S. "observers" in Vientiane reportedly 
confirmed that two Chinese and several North Vietnamese battalions 
were stationed within Laos.58 This American fear of Chinese expan-
sionism in Southeast Asia was well expressed in a joint statement signed 
by Presidents Eisenhower and Ngo Dinh Diem in May. They noted 
with alarm that "the continued military buildup of the Chinese Com-
munists, their refusal to renounce the use of force, and their unwilling-
ness to subscribe to standards of conduct of civilized nations constitute 
a continuing threat to the safety of all free nations in Asia."59 
Aware of the latent opposition to its involvement in Southeast Asia, 
China did not make any overt countermove against Vientiane or Wash-
ington for fear of aggravating the delicate political situation in Laos. 
She contented herself instead with publicizing Souphanouvong's state-
ment denouncing the U.S. pressure as an attempt to destroy the Laotian 
people's desire for coalition and peaceful foreign relations. To counter 
such a "crude interference," Souphanouvong called on all Laotians to 
unite—"irrespective of class, religion, and political tendency"—to pre-
serve the "fatherland, religion and the Crown."60 By arousing such 
hostility toward the United States, he hoped to counter the criticism 
that the Pathet Lao represented foreign ideology and foreign powers, 
especially China and North Vietnam. 
Amidst these cross-currents of internal and external pressures Sou-
vanna Phouma, proclaiming the purity of his intentions, told the 
National Assembly in May, 1957, that, although Laos agreed "in prin-
ciple," it could not at the moment accept Chinese aid. Compelled to 
resign as premier shortly thereafter, he was reappointed in August to 
form a six-member emergency cabinet. He again promised not to 
"sacrifice our old civilization, our religion, our customs, and institutions 
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on the altars of the East or the West."61 The U.S., however, frankly 
disliked Souvanna Phouma's blindness toward Asian Communists. 
Speaking at the U.N. Special Political Committee in October, 1957, 
U.S. representative Genoa S. Washington complained about the pres-
ence of Viet Minh cadres in Laos, the importation of "voluminous 
quantities of arms" from Communist countries, and "a constant stream 
of Chinese Communist military personnel" entering Laos.62 
Despite U.S. pressure Souvanna Phouma steadfastly resumed nego-
tiations with the Pathet Lao in Vientiane, and by November reached 
a complete settlement of all pending problems within the framework 
of the agreements of November and December, 1956.63 Soon Soupha-
nouvong formally transferred the authority over Phong Saly and Sam 
Neua provinces to Crown Prince Savang Vatthana and swore allegiance 
to the Kingdom on behalf of all Pathet Lao officials and soldiers. The 
National Assembly unanimously approved Premier Souvanna Phouma's 
National Union Government, which included Katay Sasorith (Minis-
ter of Interior and Social Welfare), Phoui Sananikone (Foreign Minis-
ter), and two Pathet Lao representatives—Souphanouvong (Minister 
of Reconstruction and Planning) and Phoumi Vongvichit (Minister of 
Religion and Fine Arts). It was agreed that the supplementary general 
elections for the National Assembly would be held in May, 1958. The 
Pathet Lao also maintained great influence in Phong Saly and Sam 
Neua provinces, where the leading administrative personnel were se-
lected equally from the RLG and the Pathet Lao. In February, 1958, 
1,501 Pathet Lao soldiers were officially integrated into the Royal Army 
and, a few days later, another 4,284 Pathet Lao soldiers and 1,479 civilian 
personnel were discharged. The Pathet Lao also surrendered 4,773 
weapons which included 23 machine guns, 10 automatic rifles, and 65 
mortars.64 This was perhaps the first significant experiment in which 
Communist revolutionary leaders voluntarily surrendered their war 
materials and agreed to disband more than 70% of their armed forces. 
The peaceful progress of military and administrative integration set 
the tone of the International Commission's Report which confidently 
observed that "peace has at last been restored in Laos."65 
Although its threatened suspension of aid in April failed in its ob-
jective, the United States continued to oppose the movement toward 
"neutralization" in Laos. Asian Communists, it was argued, would 
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penetrate and subvert a coalition government; or such "expansionist" 
states as China or North Vietnam would effect a takeover. As a nation 
most deeply involved in Laotian affairs since Geneva, the United States 
explained its position in a statement issued by a State Department 
spokesman: 
The United States feels, however, that a coalition with the Communists is a 
dangerous line of conduct, for the history of similar coalition elsewhere in the 
world reveals that they end tragically in penetration and seizure of the country 
by the Communists. Consequently the evolution of the situation in Laos is a 
source of serious concern to the United States, which is observing very closely 
the situation in that country.66 
This "serious concern" was widely shared in the United States; for 
example, an editorial in the New Yor\ Times (December 13, 1957) 
commented that " a perilous experiment which cost the Eastern Euro-
pean nations their freedom and contributed to the debacle in China 
has started." The American suspicions about this "risky gamble" grew 
in 1958, in spite of Souvanna Phouma's personal assurances that the 
Communist ideology could not penetrate the Buddhist-inspired civili-
zation of Laos.67 
Unlike the United States, China apparently considered peace-
ful unification of Laos a major victory for its policy of peaceful co-
existence. Having dissipated the tensions and suspicions growing from 
the Pathet Lao problem, Peking and Vientiane could reasonably expect 
to implement the spirit of the 1956 Sino-Laotian joint statement in vari-
ous fields with a view to normalizing diplomatic relations. Moreover 
Peking could influence the direction of Laotian politics through two 
Pathet Lao Ministers who, as lawful partners of the RLG, constituted 
a built-in check against America's military and economic influence. 
Since the question of Chinese aid to Laos had proved controversial in 
the past, no reference was made to it in the Vientiane settlements. But 
the fact that Souvanna Phouma accepted it in principle still left the 
door open for the beginning of Sino-Laotian economic cooperation. 
While welcoming and endorsing the modus vivendi reached in 
Laos, the Chinese nonetheless were wary of its future, particularly in 
view of the serious concern voiced by the U.S. They promptly warned 
against any U.S. plan to meddle in the internal affairs of Laos and to 
set up a military base there for threatening China and Vietnam. Wish-
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ing to forestall this possibility, People's Daily (December 10, 1957) 
presented a broad but vague suggestion: 
When the formation of the National Union Government in Laos and the con-
tribution of the International Control Commission is congratulated, the Laotian 
people, the Geneva Conference participants and the International Control Com-
mission should continue their efforts to realize a thorough implementation of 
the Geneva agreements in Laos and to uphold the agreements for non-interference 
and no military establishment in Laos. 
Needless to say, the Chinese concern about the prospects for a unified 
Laos reflected the underlying conflict of interests among contending 
Laotian groups and, more importantly, the persistent confrontation 
between China and America in Southeast Asia. 
Through their experiences with Laos during the 1954-57 period the 
Chinese evidently learned that their early optimistic expectations 
formed at Geneva were effectively undermined by U.S. determination 
and strength in Laos. The Geneva Conference provided a rare oppor-
tunity for direct Sino-American diplomatic dealings, but neither coun-
try took any substantial initiative to improve their relations except for 
a brief meeting between Wang Ping-nan and U. Alexis Johnson in June, 
1954. At the Bandung Conference, Chou En-lai expressed his willing-
ness to seek peaceful settlements of disputes with the United States for 
the "relaxation of tension" in the Far East and for the "postponement 
and prevention of a world war." This overture resulted in the bilateral 
ambassadorial talks which started in Geneva in August, 1955. But Dul-
les' policy of isolating the CPR diplomatically and militarily prevented 
productive discussion. Only one agreement—on the exchange of persons 
—was reached. A basic cause of Sino-American tensions remained the 
Taiwan issue. The United States protected Nationalist Chinese interests 
in the world community, continued to maintain the Seventh Fleet in 
the Taiwan Straits, and pledged to defend Taiwan in the Mutual De-
fense Treaty of December 2, 1954. Thus, the CPR saw America as 
rejecting its legitimacy, disrupting its territorial integrity, and posing 
a threat to its national security. The resulting aggravation of Sino-
American conflict, together with the working of disruptive forces within 
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Chapter III 
The Chinese Policy of Assertive Pressure 
Section One: Collapse of the Policy of Peaceful Coexistence 
The preceding chapter has shown how China's emphasis on peaceful 
coexistence in Laos contributed to a series of agreements at Geneva 
(1954), Bandung (1955), Peking (1956), and Vientiane (1957). These 
achievements, however, were challenged in the following years by 
forces evolving in both Laos and China. By the fall and winter of 1957, 
the Chinese, preparing for their ambitious "Great Leap Forward," had 
already started to foment a mood of revolutionary radicalism. With 
Russia in possession of intercontinental missiles and satellites, Mao Tse-
tung offered a succinct new appraisal of the balance of international 
forces; the East wind, he declared in November, 1957, was now pre-
vailing over the West wind.1 He clearly meant that the balance was 
tilted decisively in favor of the socialist camp. This view departed 
substantially from the strategic stalemate between East and West, the 
underlying assessment that had made for peace in the early 1950's. 
This change in China's domestic politics and world outlook began just 
as an alliance of conservative groups was gaining power in Laos with 
America's advice and support. 
These groups were challenging the former Pathet Lao members 
well before May, 1958, the date set for the supplementary general elec-
tions for the National Assembly—elections which could reveal how far 
the illiterate electorate supported the Pathet Lao and how durable was 
the unification of Laos. The election campaign for twenty additional 
deputies and one vacant seat was marked by the heightened emotional-
ism which accompanied the renewal of old conflicts over ideology and 
personalities. It made the free and democratic contest extremely acri-
monious and rendered the political fate of the Neo Lao Haksat party 
unpredictable. In his letters written to the International Commission 
and the RLG authorities, Souphanouvong registered a formal protest 
against the "systematic discriminations and reprisals" which some 
Cabinet Ministers, including Katay Sasorith and Phoui Sananikone, 
were applying against ex-Pathet Lao members. He asked that these 
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tactics, aimed at "reviving, rousing and poisoning the old hatred," be 
eliminated.2 
Even though the Chinese were skeptical of parliamentary methods, 
they carefully watched the Laotian elections as indicative of the NLH's 
political future and even the possible fate of Asian Communist move-
ments in future contests. Since right-wing politicians in Laos attacked 
the NLH during the campaign as a puppet of foreign powers, both 
Peking and Hanoi were careful not to show any direct support for the 
NLH candidates. Rather, they accused the United States of sabotaging 
the chance for a "just and fair" election. Perhaps they remembered how 
the United States, fearful of Ho Chi Minh's immense popularity and 
organization, had discouraged Ngo Dinh Diem from holding elections 
in July, 1956, as envisaged in the Final Declaration of the Geneva Con-
ference. "The U.S. aim in Laos," People's Daily commented on May 1, 
1958, "is to create antagonism between the different political parties and 
wreck the atmosphere of unity in the country so that it can fish in 
troubled water." To frustrate this aim and effect a united front of 
patriotic forces, the paper suggested: 
The Government of the Kingdom of Laos and patriots from all ranks of society 
in the country should strengthen their unity and oppose United States interven-
tion, thus creating more favorable conditions for the peaceful unification of Laos. 
On the eve of the election, People's Daily again carried a conspicuous 
editorial with a mixture of advice for and intimidation of Laos and 
America; only a fair election, it indicated, would serve the interest of 
peace in Indo-China. No doubt the Chinese were also making provision 
for future moves in the event the NLH were defeated in the election. 
The precaution proved unnecessary, as the NLH won an impressive 
victory. Nine of their thirteen candidates were elected, and Souphanou-
vong received the largest popular vote in the country. Their success 
was not limited to their northern strongholds of Phong Saly and Sam 
Neua, but widely spread over such southern and central provinces as 
Luang Prabang, Vientiane, Khammouane, Saravane, and Savannakhet.3 
Whereas 85 candidates of the Nationalist, Independent, and other con-
servative parties were hopelessly divided among themselves, the NLH 
and the neutralist Santiphab combined their strength to win a majority 
of 21 contested seats. This NLH triumph apparently pleased the Chi-
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nese, who praised it as a "new important development" in Laotian poli-
tical life and as the implementation of the Geneva agreements. 
But it is clear that the Chinese endorsed the NLH's parliamentary 
method from tactical considerations rather than from theoretical re-
quirements. In their "Outline of Views on the Question of Peaceful 
Transition" submitted in November, 1957, to the Soviet Communist 
Party, the Chinese said it was inappropriate to overemphasize the pos-
sibility of a peaceful transition. They argued that neither the universal 
law of class struggle nor revolutionary experiences vindicated that 
possibility and that an unwarranted stress on peaceful tactics would dis-
arm the revolutionaries ideologically and weaken their fighting will.4 
As a correct revolutionary formula, therefore, the Chinese suggested the 
simultaneous use of dual tactics, both peaceful and violent. In an at-
tempt to dispel any illusions the NLH leaders might cherish about the 
parliamentary road, the Chinese forthwith set a limit to what the elec-
tions could achieve and emphasized the probable counteroflfensive of 
U.S. "imperialism." For this reason they publicized Souphanouvong's 
warning that since the May elections were only an "initial victory," the 
Laotian people should maintain the vigilance and solidarity against 
possible U.S. "conspiracies."5 
But the NLH's successful tactics almost caused panic in Vientiane 
and in Washington. Before the elections some State Department offi-
cials had confidently predicted that the NLH would get three or four 
seats at best. Now, however, they realized that the NLH was a definite 
threat to win a parliamentary majority in the next general elections.6 
Apparently to disrupt Souvanna Phouma's coalition government with 
the NLH Ministers, the United States suspended a monthly aid pay-
ment to Vientiane and advised him to terminate his cooperation with 
the NLH. Equally alarmed by the NLH's potential threat, the Nation-
alists and the Independents merged in June to form the Rally of the 
Laotian People, an anti-Communist united front under the joint leader-
ship of Souvanna Phouma, Katay Sasorith, Phoui Sananikone, and 
Pheng Phongsavan. In the process Souvanna Phouma himself warned 
against the spread of Communist ideology and activity in Laos. The 
resulting line-up in the National Assembly was: the RLP—36, the 
NLH—9, the Santiphab—7, Democrats—3, National Union Party—2, 
and Non-affiliated—2. Excluded from the Assembly was a new anti-
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Communist Committee for the Defense of National Interest (CDNI), 
which a few young intellectuals, junior bureaucrats, and military officers 
organized in June, for the purpose of outlawing all political parties 
with "revolutionary tendencies" and stopping Communist infiltration 
into the Administration.7 In the new political arrangements in Laos, 
therefore, the CDNI emerged as the most militant organized opposition 
totheNLH. 
With the election accomplished, the International Commission—an 
instrument, by Chinese thinking, to protect the NLH's political free-
dom and check the military encroachment of the United States—could 
no longer justify its presence. On the ground that the supplementary 
general elections constituted the last phase of the implementation of 
the Geneva arrangements concerning Laos, Premier Souvanna Phouma 
and Foreign Minister Phoui Sananikone requested in May, 1958, that 
the Commission terminate its operations in preparation for leaving 
Laos.8 As the formal procedures for Pathet Lao's integration were fol-
lowed, they reasoned, the Commission's role in Laos' domestic affairs 
was at an end. That this request spelled the doom of the Geneva agree-
ments was clear enough to the Chinese who, together with Hanoi and 
Moscow, lodged a strong protest against it. The Chinese arguments to 
justify the Commission's continuation were threefold. First, the sup-
plementary elections left many problems still unresolved in Laos, in-
cluding the resumption of discriminatory acts. Second, in the Commis-
sion's absence, the United States would step up its interference, thus 
disturbing Laotian peace and neutrality. Finally, the Commission's 
presence in Laos should be considered in connection with existing con-
ditions in Vietnam and Cambodia. So long as political difficulties were 
not fully resolved in three Indochinese states, the Chinese concluded, 
the Commissions should attend to the duties prescribed by the Geneva 
agreements.9 
As diplomatic pressures from Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow increased, 
India joined Poland to reject the Canadian proposal for "immediate 
dissolution" of the Commission in Laos. In July, however, India and 
Canada, in a majority vote against Poland, decided to adjourn the Com-
mission sine die, but to reconvene it, if necessary, "in accordance with 
normal procedures."10 Even after this decision was taken, there re-
mained the problem of interpretation. The Soviet Union, for example, 
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eventually acknowledged the decision for adjournment as a procedural 
one, while both China and North Vietnam continued to call the deci-
sion "illegal and void" on the ground that it was made in violation of 
the principle of unanimity and without consultations with the Com-
missions in Vietnam and Cambodia. But the protests and caveats from 
Peking and Hanoi failed to stop the subsequent departure of the Com-
mission from Laos.11 
This controversy over the Commission's status took place in the 
middle of a political crisis in Laos; four days after the Commission de-
cided to adjourn, Premier Souvanna Phouma tendered his resignation 
—putting an end to the seven-month-old coalition experiment with the 
NLH representatives. He resigned in protest of America's persistent 
opposition to his policy of neutrality and coalition. In this connection 
it is important to note that even before the votes for supplementary 
elections were fully counted in May, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State Parsons testified at the House Foreign Affairs Committee that 
the United States had "some basis for hoping that when the present 
government [of Souvanna Phouma] resigns . . . a government may be 
formed which does not include Communists."12 Indeed, when Phoui 
Sananikone formed a new government in August, in cooperation with 
Katay Sasorith, the NLH Ministers were ignored. 
This heralded a radical reorientation in Vientiane's domestic and 
foreign policies. In his inaugural address at the National Assembly, 
Phoui Sananikone voiced his determination to fight against 
"Communist infiltration and development" in Laos.13 He redefined 
"neutralism" in such a manner as to commit his government to an anti-
Communist foreign policy, and made it clear that Laos would stand 
unequivocally with the "Free World." In the winter of 1958, Phoui 
Sananikone further angered both Peking and Hanoi by strengthening 
Laos' political and economic ties with Taipei and Saigon; after con-
sultations with Ngo Dinh Nhu (President Ngo Dinh Diem's brother 
and adviser) and Dr. Hang Li-wu (Nationalist China's Ambassador 
to Thailand), he concluded secret consular agreements with both coun-
tries. In addition, he devalued—against the NLH's opposition— the 
%ip, made an agreement with Japan on technical and economic aid 
amounting to one billion yen (about $2.8 million) and showed an en-
thusiastic interest in the Mekong River project. 
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The Chinese evidently regarded Phoui Sananikone's extreme anti-
Communist policy as inconsistent with the political requirements for 
Laos' domestic harmony and neutral foreign policy. In the latter half 
of 1958, however, the Chinese conspicuously failed to respond to such 
unfavorable developments as Taiwan's growing influence in Vientiane. 
Indeed, they made fewer and fewer public reports or comments on 
Laos. They were possibly preoccupied with a number of external prob-
lems other than Laos which were more vital to their over-all strategic 
considerations. The landing of U.S. marines in Lebanon in July, a 
threat to a new revolutionary regime in Iraq, intensified the disagree-
ment between Moscow and Peking over the Middle East situation. 
Even though the Chinese urged Moscow to take vigorous military 
action, Premier Khrushchev appealed for a peaceful solution of the cri-
sis among major world powers without China and even accepted a 
Western proposal for a Security Council discussion of the question. 
This example shows that Moscow and Peking were drifting apart in 
certain strategic and diplomatic questions. On August 23,1958—twenty 
days after Khrushchev visited Peking and five days after Phoui Sanani-
kone became premier of Laos—the Chinese started their heavy artillery 
barrage on the Quemoy Islands. Although Chou En-lai's proposal for 
the resumption of Sino-American ambassadorial talks partly relieved 
the crisis, the Chinese kept up the pressure on the Islands throughout 
1958. Internally they were occupied with the problem of people's 
communes. By comparison the question of Laos appeared relatively 
unimportant. 
In January, 1959, Phoui Sananikone took further steps to consolidate 
his anti-Communist position. He obtained from the National Assembly 
a special mandate to rule for one year without reference to the legisla-
ture, to implement an anti-Communist program, and to cancel the 
general elections for a while. He also strengthened the government 
with more members from the Army and the CDNI, including Col. 
Phoumi Nosavan (Secretary for Defense).14 He justified these measures 
by alleging that North Vietnamese troops had infiltrated the area 
north of Tchepone near the boundary between North and South Viet-
nam. On January 14, the RLG asked United Nations Secretary-General 
Dag Hammarskjold to circulate among all U.N. members its report 
that "armed elements" of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam had 
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been occupying some Lao villages since December, 1958.15 It did not 
request a meeting of the Security Council or an observation mission 
from the U.N. although the Laotian Ambassador to Thailand suggested 
such a step. 
On the other hand North Vietnam accused Laos of conducting a 
series of air and ground intrusions into its territory under U.S. instiga-
tion and proposed reconvening the International Commission to deal 
with this question. This border dispute, coupled with the Pathet Lao 
question, had continuously plagued the relationship between Laos and 
North Vietnam. Fearing that the United States might use the dispute 
as a "pretext for intervention'* into Laos, the Chinese advised Laos to 
settle it by negotiations with North Vietnam.16 At the same time they 
warned against "some extreme pro-American elements" in Laos who 
had created conflict in Indo-China by asking for SEATO's protection. 
Two weeks later the Chinese accused the United States of handing over 
ten truckloads of weapons and munitions to Laos and of sending 82 
Filipinoes to do military construction works in Vientiane. This naked 
violation of the Geneva agreements, the People's Daily "Observer" de-
clared on February 4, 1959, could not but increase tension in Indo-
China and thus arouse his "greatest concern." To counter the close 
military collaboration between the United States and Laos, the "Obser-
ver" appealed to patriotic Laotians: "No Laotian with a sense of 
national dignity and patriotism will allow this to happen." And he 
warned: "No one concerned with peace in Indo-China will tolerate 
this." 
But persuasion and threats from Peking and Hanoi only hardened 
Phoui Sananikone's anti-Communism. On February 11, he declared 
that all agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Laos had been ful-
filled after the May, 1958, elections, thus cancelling the Geneva formula. 
In response to Communist countries' proposals for revival of the Com-
mission, he made it clear that an independent and sovereign Laos 
would recognize arbitration only from the United Nations. The fol-
lowing day he issued an explanatory statement to the effect that Laos 
did not intend to participate in any military alliance "at the present 
time," nor adhere to a pact inconsistent with the U.N. Charter.17 None-
theless, Laos reserved the right to join any alliance later or even to 
accept an American military mission. Naturally the U.S., which had 
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dissociated itself from the Geneva accords, welcomed Phoui Sanani-
kone's formal renunciation of these agreements. The Geneva provision, 
in fact, legally barred Laos from a military relationship with any coun-
try except France. In recent years, however, a diminishing interest in 
Indo-China and heavy commitments in Algeria had caused France to 
reduce its military personnel in Laos to the level of about one thousand 
men, one-fifth of the total number permitted at the Geneva Conference. 
In order to make Laos a "bastion of the Free World" in Southeast Asia, 
the United States therefore felt it necessary to lift the Geneva restraint 
and assume a direct responsibility for training the Laotian army. For 
this reason the United States was satisfied with Phoui Sananikone's 
"realistic" and "courageous" dismissal of the Geneva provisions.18 
Section Two: Assertive Approaches toward Laos 
Phoui Sananikone's bold policy against the status quo envisaged at 
Geneva gradually aroused extreme anxiety among Hanoi, Moscow, and 
Peking. As Laos aligned itself with the United States, the Chinese 
issued strong demands and pursued a variety of tactics in line with their 
analysis of the rapidly changing circumstances. In a major policy 
statement on February 18, 1959—a few days after Hanoi and Moscow 
issued similar statements, Foreign Minister Chen Yi declared that 
Phoui Sananikone's unilateral declaration of February 11 constituted 
an "unscrupulous violation of the Geneva agreements" and a part of 
the U.S. "imperialist plot of aggression against Indo-China."19 He 
argued that China, as a participant in the Geneva Conference and a 
neighbor of Laos, could not help expressing "grave concern" over the 
U.S. attempt to destroy the Geneva agreements and sabotage the peace 
in Indo-China. Toward Vientiane too he directed a bitter admonition: 
The Royal Laotian Government is fully bound by the Geneva agreements. It 
has the duty and obligation of implementing seriously and completely the various 
decisions of the Geneva Conference concerning the Laotian question. The Chinese 
Government firmly opposes the unilateral tearing up of the Geneva agreements 
by the Royal Laotian Government. The Royal Laotian Government must bear 
all the consequences arising therefrom. 
As a means of diplomatic pressure against Vientiane and Washington, 
Chen asked the International Commission to resume its duties in Laos 
and requested the Geneva Conference Co-chairmen to take "speedy 
action" against possible American military intervention in the country. 
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But the proposal for reviving the Commission failed to gain strong sup-
port from its Indian Chairman, who said India could not reconvene it 
unless the RLG so requested. 
The Chinese regarded the steady flow of war materiel into Laos as 
evidence of America's determination to transform Laos into a military 
base. And they interpreted the concomitant attempt to make SEATO 
directly responsible for the defense of Laos as disruptive of the existing 
distribution of power in Indo-China and as a threat to their own secur-
ity. The seriousness with which China reacted to these developments 
was probably calculated to present an advance warning to SEATO 
strategists. For the purpose of demonstrating collaboration between 
Laos and SEATO, China compiled a list of various "evidences." For 
instance, General Ouan Rathikoun, Laotian Army Chief-of-Staflf, ex-
pressed his willingness to accept SEATO's protection and even de-
manded its intervention in the border conflict with North Vietnam. 
Again, Admiral Harry D. Felt, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific 
Forces (CINPAC), visited Laos during his three-month tour of South-
east Asian countries. And, finally, Laos, together with Taiwan, South 
Vietnam, and South Korea, sent a delegation to observe the American-
Thai military maneuvers in northern Thailand.20 
The Chinese were also irritated by SEATO's practice of holding 
maneuvers—including an action in February involving nuclear weapons 
—against a hypothetical Chinese enemy. "This display of military 
might," Peking Review indignantly asserted on March 10, 1959, "is 
meant to intimidate the countries of Indo-China and drag them into 
the SEATO bloc . . . and to convert these countries into bases for mili-
tary provocations against People's China, the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam and other peace-loving countries of Southeast Asia." The 
Chinese objected especially to what they termed a system of anti-Com-
munist military barriers crisscrossing Laos, Thailand, and South Viet-
nam. They discerned such a system in the formation of a "tripartite 
military alliance" among these three states, the construction of a stra-
tegic highway across the Indochinese Peninsula, and the establishment 
of a U.S. military base in Lower Laos. 
No problem arising from these situations in Southeast Asia affected 
China's border security and diplomatic status more directly than the 
growing influence of Taiwan in Laos and the presence of Kuomintang 
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irregular forces in the rugged area along the Sino-Laotian border. The 
fact that Laos concluded consular agreements with Taiwan in Decem-
ber, 1958, and received a Nationalist Chinese consulate in Vientiane in 
January, 1959, was a decisive setback to Peking's long diplomatic over-
tures toward Laos. The CPR, always extremely conscious of anything 
that ignored its claim for international recognition as the only lawful 
government of China, angrily denounced what People's Daily (Febru-
ary 19,1959) called a "most unfriendly act of deliberate provocation by 
the Royal Laotian Government against the Chinese people." The con-
sular relations enabled Taiwan to promote economic and technical 
cooperation with Laos and even to exercise a supervisory role over 
Overseas Chinese communities. After Phoui Sananikone's anti-Com-
munist campaign expelled suspected Communist teachers from Chinese 
schools in Laos, the Nationalist Chinese Consulate supplied a few in-
structors from Taiwan with a view of controlling the Overseas Chinese 
educational system as well.21 
TABLE 3 
OVERSEAS CHINESE IN INDO-CHINA: 1959-60a 
(In Thousands) 
Overseas Chinese/ 
Overseas Total Total Population 
Country Chinese Population (%) 
Laos 35 1,805 1.9 
Cambodia 350 5,347 6.5 
No. Vietnam 55 15,916 0.3 
So. Vietnam 800 14,214 5.6 
a Source: Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 
Second Edition, 1965). 
Although the Overseas Chinese were numerically insignificant in 
the multi-ethnic milieu of Laos, they played an important commercial 
and financial role in the urban areas where they were principally con-
centrated. With a strong sense of ethnic superiority they preserved 
their cultural identity with their fatherland by using their own lan-
guage, customs, temples, and schools. The economic power and indus-
triousness of the Chinese created a fear and jealousy among the Lao-
tians, but also generated a sense of envy and respect toward the Chinese. 
It was to Peking's obvious political disadvantage that Taiwan pene-
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trated the Overseas Chinese communities—a potentially useful instru-
ment of Peking's policy toward Laos. 
But the presence of KMT irregulars near the Sino-Laotian border 
was a more urgent problem for Peking, particulary because there were 
signs of political unrest in Yunnan Province which was separated from 
the mainstream of Chinese life by geographic distance and ethnic differ-
entiation. The Chinese claimed that the precipitous increase in the 
activities of Kuomintang forces was made possible by an American-
Laotian scheme to carry out military provocations against China. This 
was the first time the Chinese had raised the issue publicly, though they 
had been concerned with the movement of these forces from Burma 
to Laos for some time. The United States, China asserted, had insti-
gated these activities; both American and Laotian aircraft had dropped 
arms and provisions to KMT forces, carried out low-altitude reconnais-
sance flights over southern China, frequently violated China's air space, 
and created "disturbances" within the Chinese border. In its most bitter 
accusation Peking alleged in March, 1959: 
Using Thailand and South Vietnam as its bases, the United States is trying to 
put Laos completely under its control, to subvert the Royal Government of Cam-
bodia and encircle the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in order to seize the 
whole of the Indochina peninsula, threaten the peaceful and neutral countries in 
Southeast Asia and menace the southern borders of China.22 
Furthermore, Peking insisted that Laotian military authorities, hav-
ing reached a secret agreement with Taiwan in December, 1958, were 
assisting the KMT's secret agents in collecting information, spreading 
rumors, and instigating riots in Yunnan Province. Serious warning was 
given that if the RLG continued to disrespect the principles of peaceful 
coexistence and the Sino-Laotian agreement, it must accept the "grave 
consequences" arising from its hostile actions. This warning even im-
plied that Peking might exercise the right to liquidate this border 
harassment just as it had eliminated a similar problem along its Bur-
mese border. But subsequent events suggest that the Chinese exagger-
ated the border question to influence the direction of Laotian policy as 
a whole. By overstating their concern, the Chinese hoped to deter 
Laos and America from accelerating their anti-Communist actions 
both inside and outside Laos. Peking also stressed the issue of KMT 
troops in Laos as a means of recalling the International Commission. 
52 
The use of China's diplomatic and psychological pressures upon 
Laos from February to May, 1959, was intended to frustrate the pro-
gram of political and military coordination which America was orga-
nizing with Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam, and to restore the legi-
timacy of the Geneva and Vientiane agreements in Laos without en-
couraging the Pathet Lao to direct military action. The revival of these 
agreements as the basic ground rules of the Laotian question could 
bring several advantages to the Chinese: the provision of a legal basis 
for their legitimate concern over Laos; the reactivation of the Interna-
tional Commission as a diplomatic deterrent to America's and SEATO's 
progressive military commitments; and the reopening of the way to a 
coalition government with NLH participation. But, by limiting them-
selves to diplomatic and psychological methods, the Chinese revealed 
their hesitation about getting involved in the Laotian turmoil. It is 
therefore evident that the leftward swing of China's general foreign 
policy—manifested in its attitudes toward Taiwan in 1958, and India in 
1959—had not yet involved her Laotian policy by early 1959. 
The continuation of China's verbal militancy merely encouraged 
Premier Phoui Sananikone to heighten his anti-Communist activities. 
Upsetting China's expectations, he introduced a measure to destroy the 
foundation of the Pathet Lao's political power. In May, 1959, he ordered 
the two remaining ex-Pathet Lao battalions (totalling 1,500 men) dis-
armed. These battalions had been allowed to retain their own com-
mand structure pending complete integration into the Royal Army but 
had been unwilling to receive the ranks offered by the RLG. The first 
battalion stationed near Luang Prabang reluctantly accepted this order, 
but the second battalion in the Plain of Jars defied it and successfully 
escaped the cordon of the heavily-armed government troops. As soon 
as the battalion completed a "Long March" close to the North Vietna-
mese border, it recruited former Pathet Lao soldiers and frontier minori-
ties and launched a counter-attack against Vientiane with the assistance 
of Hanoi's political cadres and military personnel. 
The RLG claimed that the Pathet Lao leaders, determined all along 
to renew armed resistance, had preserved many hidden stores of wea-
pons and sent several hundred officers and youth to North Vietnam and 
China for military training and political indoctrination. From the 
time the Pathet Lao voluntarily surrendered about 5,000 weapons in Feb-
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ruary, 1958, the Royal Army and police had reportedly seized within 
one year a great number of Pathet Lao's hidden arms.23 Nevertheless, 
although Prince Souphanouvong, Phoumi Vongvichit, Nouhak Phoum-
savan, Sithone Komadam, Phoun Sipraseuth, Col. Singkapo, and other 
NLH leaders were placed under house arrest in Vientiane in May and 
later in July charged with offenses against the security of the State, the 
dissident Pathet Lao forces were led by four other leaders—Faydang 
(NLH's Vice-Chairman), Kaysone Phoumvihan (ex-Pathet Lao com-
mander), Souk Vongsak (member of the National Assembly), and 
Khamtay Siphandone (NLH's spokesman).24 
The possibility of large-scale armed hostilities near North Vietnam 
and China was so grave that China formulated a new set of concepts 
and tactics toward Laos. As their diplomatic and psychological methods 
failed, the Chinese assumed an assertive policy to assist the Pathet Lao's 
rebellion and to bring militant pressure upon Vientiane. Perhaps this 
shift was more an inevitable reaction to the initiatives of Vientiane than 
a conscious application of a radical policy. In a Foreign Ministry state-
ment the Chinese caustically noted that Phoui Sananikone's efforts to 
liquidate the two ex-Pathet Lao battalions and to persecute the NLH 
leaders were even more serious than his repudiation of the Geneva ac-
cords and were tantamount to making "civil war" in Laos.25 Should 
he continue to act on behalf of America's aggressive plot in Indo-
China, they said, he would be held responsible for all the ensuing grave 
consequences and critical problems. And an unmistakable warning was 
given that China could not look on with indifference at the serious 
actions taken by Vientiane. 
While asking the Geneva Co-chairmen to reconvene the Internation-
al Commission in Laos, the Chinese also condemned the rapid increase 
in Vientiane's contacts with South Vietnam and Thailand. During 
May, Laotian Foreign Minister Khamphan Panya visited Saigon for 
political and military consultations and concluded with South Vietnam 
an agreement of commerce and friendship which emphasized the need 
to "consolidate their position in the face of the Communist threat." He 
also met with Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman in Vientiane; a 
joint statement declared that Laos had the right to join any international 
or regional organization.26 The United States publicly endorsed Phoui 
Sananikone's anti-Communist stand and let it be known that the tension 
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in Southeast Asia had arisen from China's "infiltration, subversion and 
threats of hostile military actions." In the face of the confusing situation 
in Laos and the criticism raised both by Communist countries and by 
Congress, the U.S. Government admitted that the "favorable develop-
ments" in Laos could not have succeeded without American material 
support. The Government described its objectives as assisting Laos to 
prevent a Communist takeover, to strengthen its association with the 
free world, and to develop and maintain a stable and independent 
government, willing and able to resist Communist aggression and sub-
version.27 
These American objectives, well within reach by May and July, con-
stituted a serious threat to Chinese interests—including national security 
—in Laos. China could hardly accept the total collapse of the Pathet 
Lao movement and the approach toward their border of hostile Laotian 
forces supported and controlled by the United States. Once convinced 
that diplomatic and persuasive tactics were futile and that only a suc-
cessful military counteroffensive by the Pathet Lao could reverse the 
unfavorable course of events in Laos, the Chinese, in close cooperation 
with Hanoi, undertook to strengthen the Pathet Lao's fighting capabili-
ties. They apparently provided the Pathet Lao with military aid, stra-
tegic advice, and personnel support, set up a center for training Pathet 
Lao cadres at Sze-mao in Yunnan Province, and sent into Laos Chinese 
cadres of the Ho tribe—"brothers" of the Ho tribesmen living in north-
ern Laos.28 They also allowed the Pathet Lao to use Radio Peking for 
disseminating anti-Vientiane propaganda. The deepening involvement 
of China in Laos prompted the RLG to complain to the United Nations: 
"A rebel aid committee has been set up at Hanoi, with the task of re-
ceiving arms and munitions arriving from the People's Republic of 
China and of providing the rebels with logistic support, clothing, medi-
cal supplies, etc."29 No doubt the coordinated assistance programs of 
China and North Vietnam, coupled with the limited commitments of 
North Vietnamese troops in Laos, contributed in no small way to the 
Pathet Lao's prolonged resistance against Vientiane's military drive. 
As the Pathet Lao were accepting vital assistance from China and 
North Vietnam, the RLG was stepping up its anti-Communist crusade 
in various ways. First, Laos and France reached an arrangement en-
abling the United States to give emergency aid to the Royal Army and 
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train it with American specialists and technicians. Second, Laos and 
America agreed to expand the Royal Army from 25,000 to 29,000; these 
troops would oppose Pathet Lao field forces estimated at about 2,000, 
but assisted by North Vietnamese troops estimated to number some-
where between several hundreds to several thousands. As People's 
Daily (July 27) correctly pointed out, the Franco-Laotian arrangement 
in effect "legalized" America's function of providing financial support, 
material supplies, advice, and training for the Royal Army. In reply to 
a Communist charge that the United States was turning Laos into a 
military base threatening the security of China and North Vietnam, 
the State Department categorically denied the existence of American 
military bases, airstrips, or other military installations in Laos.80 But 
it acknowledged the U.S. role in helping Laos strengthen its defensive 
positions, increase its army and village militia, and improve its military 
mobility. 
We should note here that China's assistance to the Pathet Lao 
struggle was essentially limited both in its objective and in its extent. 
The objective was not the Pathet Lao's total conquest of Laos. Surely 
the small size of Pathet Lao forces—less than one-tenth of the Royal 
Army—prohibited such a feat. Moreover, North Vietnam's massive 
military participation in such an attempt was neither possible nor desir-
able from the Chinese point of view. China hoped to sustain a limited 
civil war in northern Laos to help obtain a political goal—namely, res-
toration within the framework of Geneva and Vientiane agreements 
of the status quo ante July, 1958, when the International Commission 
had adjourned and the coalition formula had collapsed. In view of in-
creasingly unreliable military and nuclear relations with Moscow at 
this period, the Chinese could not risk escalating a local war into a 
major international conflict which might lead to their own military 
involvement and to massive retaliation from the United States. In the 
middle of 1959, Moscow refused to provide China with a sample atomic 
bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture or to fulfill the 
agreement on new technology for national defense concluded between 
both countries in October, 1957.31 
China's assertive policy toward Laos was thus designed, among 
other things, to utilize effectively the threat of a wider war and to 
create circumstances in which the Pathet Lao could acquire enough 
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leverage to negotiate on equal terms with Vientiane. China's military 
assistance, diplomatic pressure, and exaggeration of the Kuomintang 
question—all contributed to this goal. To achieve it, the Chinese pre-
sented four terms for peaceful solution of the Laotian question in a 
Foreign Ministry statement on August 12,1959: 
(1) the United States and the Sananikone government cease their activities 
against the Geneva and Vientiane agreements; (2) withdraw all American mili-
tary personnel, arms and ammunition from Laos and scrap all American military 
bases in that country; (3) the normal control and supervision functions of the 
International Commission are resumed; and (4) the Geneva and Vientiane agree-
ments are thoroughly implemented.32 
But none of these demands was acceptable or even negotiable in the 
eyes of Vientiane and Washington, which were more interested in 
destroying the Pathet Lao forces than in establishing a dialogue with 
these "armed rebels" backed by Hanoi and Peking. 
In the midst of the crisis, moreover, the Geneva Co-chairmen failed 
to reactivate the International Commission or take any "speedy" or 
"necessary" measures against Vientiane and Washington as requested 
by Peking. During the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers in 
June, Andrei Gromyko and Selwyn Lloyd held talks on Laos but pro-
duced nothing more than a number of vaguely worded appeals for 
restoration of peace in Laos. While Britain held the view that the 
actions of the United States and the Laotian Kingdom constituted no 
violation of Geneva and Vientiane agreements, the Soviet Union offered 
less than full support for the Pathet Lao's military efforts. Premier 
Khrushchev was prone to discourage militant struggle by Asian Com-
munists inspired by China as disruptive of his policy of peaceful coexis-
tence. His priority of peaceful coexistence militated against the violent 
methods of national liberation movements in favor of improving Soviet-
American relations. For this purpose, during July and August, he 
anxiously solicited and received an invitation to visit the United States 
in the fall of 1959. 
Section Three: The United Nations Presence and Its Effects 
In order to realize their primary political objective of reinstating 
the Geneva and Vientiane agreements in Laos, the Chinese persistently 
opposed the introduction of any new formula or instrument. The 
possibility that SEATO or the United Nations might involve itself in 
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the Laotian crisis annoyed the Chinese. Since they were not directly 
represented in the United Nations or in any regional organization, the 
Chinese were wary of any regional or international groups trying to 
interfere in Laos, a situation which would exclude their voice and par-
ticipation. Ignoring the Chinese concern, the RLG took a series of steps 
which gradually brought the United Nations into Laos. In August, it 
brought to Hammarskjold's attention acts of aggression and frontier 
violations by North Vietnam and instructed Ambassador Ngone 
Sananikone to consult with Hammarskj old for the purpose of finding 
ways and means of restoring peace to Laos. As there were reports of 
severe North Vietnamese attacks against the Royal Army posts in the 
northern provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly at the end of August, 
Foreign Minister Khamphan Panya sent to the Secretary-General a 
telegram in which he claimed: "Elements from the Democratic Repub-
lic of Vietnam took part in the attack, which was supported by artillery 
fired from the other side of the frontier."33 He requested that "an 
emergency force should be dispatched at a very early date in order to 
halt the aggression and prevent it from spreading." 
The wording of this complaint could easily be interpreted in line 
with the phrase "aggression by means of armed attack" as defined in 
Article 4 of the SEATO Treaty; despite this possibility, the protective 
obligations assumed by SEATO members were not invoked for Laos. 
SEATO's inaction seemed to rest on a number of political considera-
tions. First, the members disagreed about the desireability of collective 
military action, a course opposed by Britain and France. Second, they 
realized that action might provoke retaliation from China and North 
Vietnam. And, finally, they judged that the U.N. could contain the 
Communist military pressure more safely and effectively than SEATO. 
Although it preferred local military action to check the Pathet Lao, the 
United States supported the Laotian request for the U.N. "emergency 
force." At the same time the State Department accused Peking and 
Moscow of plotting with Hanoi to invade Laos. It added a stern warn-
ing: 
It is obvious that any further augmentation of the invading force or continued 
material support thereof by Communists in North Vietnam will require a major 
change in the nature and magnitude of the Royal Lao Government's need for 
support. The United States is confident that the free world would recognize such 
a new danger to peace and would take the action necessary. For its part, the 
United States supports that view.34 
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On the basis of Kamphan Panya's message the Secretary-General 
requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the 
crisis. The United States, Britain, and France submitted a draft resolu-
tion to appoint a Sub-Committee consisting of Argentina, Italy, Japan, 
and Tunisia. Its function was "to examine the statements made before 
the Security Council concerning Laos, to receive further statements and 
documents and to conduct such inquiries as it may determine necessary, 
and to report to the Council as soon as possible."85 When Mr. Sobolev 
of Russia raised the preliminary question of whether such a draft reso-
lution was procedural, the Council voted 10 to 1 (Russia) in favor of 
its procedural nature. After the Council President declared the draft 
resolution a procedural matter, the resolution itself was passed by a vote 
of 10 to 1, again Russia alone opposing the measure. 
The legal basis of this Security Council Sub-Committee became a 
subject of controversy. The Soviet Government called the Sub-Com-
mittee illegal on the ground that the preliminary question raised by 
Sobolev required an affirmative vote of more than seven members, in-
cluding all the permanent members, and that the decision on the Sub-
Committee as an "investigatory body" was a substantive matter requir-
ing the same qualified majority. Even though the Western powers did 
not reject the applicability of double veto power, they argued that the 
President's declaration stood unless overruled by the Council.36 They 
also said it was a procedural matter to set up the Sub-Committee of 
"inquiries" as a "subsidiary organ" for the performance of the Council's 
functions. According to Article 27, it is incontestable that the vote on 
Sobolev's preliminary question is a substantive matter, while Article 29 
shows that the establishment of subsidiary organs is a procedural one. 
Yet Professor Leo Gross, arguing persuasively that the question of a 
subsidiary organ of the Security Council must be evaluated in the con-
text of its intended objectives and functions, concludes that, as the 
Sub-Committee was intended to be a fact-finding or investigating body 
which ensured a U.N. presence in Laos, it can scarcely be regarded as 
a mere procedural matter.87 
These legal controversies attracted little attention or analysis from 
China. As Professor Hungdah Chiu suggests, the Chinese tend to con-
sider international legal questions as instruments of politics.88 Like-
wise, they were more concerned with the political consequences arising 
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from the Sub-Committee's functions than with its legal trappings. The 
Sub-Committee appeared to them an American instrument to legalize 
and engineer a new conspiracy in Laos. It would only handicap their 
own assertive policy in that country and, more importantly, introduce 
into the Laotian scene a new set of rules and procedures which would 
replace the Geneva and Vientiane agreements. The eclipse of the 
Geneva agreements would deprive the Chinese of a convenient legal 
ground for justifying their "sacred" and "legitimate" international 
obligations regarding Laos. It must have disturbed the Chinese to 
realize that the Soviet Union—as the Pathet Lao's U.N. spokesman— 
would gain influence over the movement, or that the Soviet Union 
might very well compromise the Pathet Lao's cause for the sake of its 
detente with the United States. 
Thus, Chen Yi stated: "The United Nations has no right whatsoever 
to meddle in the Laotian situation. Any attempt to use the U.N. to 
interfere in the Laotian question will only aggravate tension in this 
area and is unfavorable to a solution of that question."39 In an attempt 
to offset the Sub-Committee's role, the Chinese endorsed the Soviet 
proposal for a reconvocation of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China 
to consider the situation that had arisen in Laos.40 Once again they 
asked the Geneva Co-chairmen and the Indian Government to recall 
the International Commission so that a new international meeting 
could receive its reports and recommendations. By this diplomatic 
maneuver the Chinese admitted that their policy of assertive pressure 
had failed; thus, they sought to reorient their policy in line with the 
idea of another conference on Laos. But the Western powers were 
definitely unwilling to consider that idea, at least until they saw the re-
sults of the Sub-Committee's fact-finding mission. This line of reason-
ing was reflected in a communique announced by the SEATO Council, 
in which it supported the Security Council's decisions in response to 
the Laotian question.41. 
At the invitation of the RLG the U.N. Sub-Committee conducted a 
fact-finding "inquiry" in Laos from September to October; among 
other things, it received statements and documents from the Laotian 
Liaison Committee, interviewed the witnesses summoned by the RLG, 
and took field trips to places like Sam Neua and Luang Prabang. 
Strictly confined by its mandate to a factual account of the situation, 
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the Sub-Committee refrained from steps designed to influence the 
course of events in Laos and from conclusions or judgments on the 
validity of Khamphan Panya's substantive charge. In its report sub-
mitted to the Security Council on November 4, the Sub-Committee 
said that military actions had taken the characteristics of guerrilla ac-
tivity scattered almost throughout the Kingdom, but with a relatively 
small number of total casualties.42 
TABLE 4 
TOTAL CASUALTIES IN LAOS: JULY-OCTOBER, 1959a 
Royal Army Pathet Lao 
July 18- Sept. 12- July 18- Sept. 12-
Sept. 12 Oct. 11 Sept. 12 Oct. 11 
Dead 80 19 250 150 
Wounded 56 40 70 
Missing/Prisoners 120 5 7 25 
Total ~256 64~ 327 175~ 
a Source: United Nations Security Council Official Records: Fourteenth Year, Supplement For 
October, November and December 1959 (New York: U.N., 1960). 
On the basis of witnesses' declarations it was established that the 
Pathet Lao forces had received such support from North Vietnam as 
"equipment, arms, ammunition, supplies, and . . . political cadres." But, 
the report concluded: 
The body of information submitted to the Sub-Committee did not clearly estab-
lish whether there were crossings of the frontier by regular troops of the Demo-
cratic Republic of Viet-Nam. 
This inconclusive finding failed to substantiate the central elements of 
the Laotian charge against North Vietnam and consequently obscured 
any legal basis for discussing the request of a United Nations "emer-
gency force" to be sent to Laos. 
The Sub-Committee's report incidentally showed some "evidences" 
of such Chinese material assistance to the Pathet Lao forces as rifles 
and submachine-guns, hand grenades, uniforms, and medical supplies. 
China, however, officially dismissed these evidences of its role as minor 
and dubious. Although they raised many objections to the Sub-Com-
mittee's "illegal" functions, the Chinese quickly seized on its report to 
suggest that Vientiane and Washington had fabricated the story con-
cerning North Vietnam's aggression into Laos. On November 7, a 
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Hsinhua News commentator was authorized to state that the Sub-Com-
mittee's report drove home the point that "U.S. imperialism used it to 
cover its own interference and creation of tension in Indo-China." In 
view of the widespread news indicating the possibility of the United 
Nations' continuous involvement in Laos, the commentator said that 
the United States was plotting to set up some kind of United Nations 
permanent office in that country and use it for her interventionist in-
tentions. 
Notwithstanding its inconclusive report the Sub-Committee did 
help to relieve the tension-fraught situation in Laos. After the Sub-
Committee's arrival at Vientiane on September 15, there appeared signs 
of substantial reduction in the Pathet Lao's military activities and in 
the assistance given to them by Hanoi and Peking. The Sub-Commit-
tee's brief but watchful presence served as a kind of diplomatic buffer to 
protect Laos from the effects of the Pathet Lao's military campaign and 
from the pressures of its powerful Communist neighbors. This led to 
a state of military stalemate and controlled crisis in Laos during the 
winter of 1959, and afterwards. A significant contribution to the 
relaxation of Laotian conflict was also made by Khrushchev's peaceful 
gestures, which restrained or at least neutralized Peking's and Hanoi's 
militant pressure over Laos. One day before the beginning of Khrush-
chev's good-will visit to the United States and, coincidentally, of the 
Sub-Committee's operations in Laos, the Soviet Government issued a 
statement regretting that "certain circles" among the Western powers 
expected the Sub-Committee to poison the international atmosphere 
at a time "when, because of the forthcoming exchange of visits between 
the heads of government of the Soviet Union and the United States, all 
mankind looks hopefully for an end of the 'cold war.' "43 During his 
stay in America, Khrushchev emphasized the importance of peaceful 
coexistence in the world community and the possibility of eliminating 
both "cold" and "hot" wars. At the conclusion of talks at Camp David, 
Khrushchev and Eisenhower agreed that "all outstanding international 
questions should be settled not by the application of force but by peace-
ful means through negotiation."44 Khrushchev was aware of the need 
to "sell" his Asian comrades, especially the suspicious Mao Tse-tung and 
Ho Chi Minh, on this Camp David "spirit." It is also likely that 
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Khrushchev attempted to restrain the Pathet Lao's military activities by 
every available means. 
As soon as he returned to Russia, Khrushchev left for Peking for the 
tenth anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic. His main message 
to the Chinese leaders was the relaxation of tense relations with the 
United States. On October 1, 1959, he openly advised China not to test 
the stability of the capitalist system by force, but to recognize that "we 
on our part must do all we can to exclude war as a means of settling 
disputed questions, and settle these questions by negotiations."45 As his 
thesis indirectly condemned their assertive policy toward India and 
Laos, the Chinese adamantly refused to accept it at face value. They 
were especially opposed to the notion that imperialism had changed its 
aggressive nature in the nuclear age and that the promotion of East-
West reconciliation should be given precedence over the support for 
national liberation struggles. This serious disagreement on the prob-
lems of world-wide revolutionary strategy and tactics prevented Mao 
and Khrushchev from issuing even a customary joint statement. 
In a report to the Supreme Soviet at the end of October, Khrushchev, 
still mindful of the danger in the Laotian situation, made it clear that 
the Soviet Union opposed the "existence of even the smallest source of 
war in Laos which could give food to the aggressive forces."46 He hoped 
that a "sensible approach"—not the militant one advocated by Peking— 
would eliminate the armed conflict in Laos. The Chinese, perhaps 
intent on countering Khrushchev's optimism, publicized and criticized 
the continued persecution of the NLH leaders. In a letter to Gromyko 
and Lloyd on the same day that Khrushchev reported to the Supreme 
Soviet, Chen Yi called for immediate "emergency measures" to prevent 
Premier Phoui Sananikone's planned trial of the NLH leaders.47 This 
was accompanied by a series of mass rallies and declarations sponsored 
by China's various "people's organizations" to protest the trial. In early 
November, Kuo Mo-jo, Chairman of the Chinese People's Peace Com-
mittee, declared that the trial was a "new plot worked out by U.S. 
imperialism to instigate the Sananikone clique to further destroy the 
Geneva and Vientiane agreements and expand the civil war in Laos."48 
Even though Khrushchev proved unable to moderate China's atti-
tude toward Laos, his efforts seem to have contributed to restraining the 
militant stance of North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao to some extent. 
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Perhaps in response to his prodding, the NLH Central Committee, in 
a small conciliatory gesture toward Vientiane, sent a letter to the Geneva 
Co-chairmen in November, proposing "peaceful negotiations" with the 
RLG. However, its provisions were difficult. They called for the con-
vocation of a second Geneva Conference, the cessation of the civil war, 
the resumption of the International Commission's functions, the release 
of political prisoners, and the withdrawal of U.N. representatives from 
Laos.49 
In the meantime Secretary-General Hammarskjold took further 
steps to extend the United Nations' role in Laos. On November 10, he 
visited Vientiane in search of "independent and full personal knowl-
edge of the Laotian situation." Soon thereafter, he appointed Sakari 
Tuomioja, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Mission 
in Europe, as his "personal representative" entrusted to review economic 
conditions in Laos and determine what U.N. assistance it required.50 
The Secretary-General used a personal representative in order to bypass 
a procedural difficulty which Soviet veto would create in any attempt to 
authorize formally a U.N. mission to Laos. But Hammarskjold could 
not avoid a barrage of bitter accusations from the Communists. 
While the Soviet Union contended that since the Sub-Committee's 
report failed to verify the RLG's complaint, the case should be closed, 
the North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry and the NLH Central Com-
mittee denounced Tuomioja's representation as "illegal and invalid."51 
More scathing was a Chinese criticism that, by abusing his prerogatives 
and meddling in the internal affairs of Laos, Hammarskjold served as 
a "tool of the vicious conspiracy of the United States and the Sananikone 
government."52 The Chinese argued that his visit to Laos and his ap-
pointment of a U.N. representative, which supplanted the Geneva and 
Vientiane agreements and ruled out a possible resumption of the Inter-
national Commission, encouraged Washington and Vientiane in "per-
secuting and slaughtering the Laotian people and extending the civil 
war there." 
These Communist pressures did not deter Hammarskjold from 
preserving a kind of U.N. presence in Laos. After Tuomioja in Decem-
ber presented his recommendations for assisting Laos, Hammarskjold 
sent to Vientiane another U.N. representative, Roberto Heurtematte 
(Commissioner of the U.N. Technical Assistance Program), with in-
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structions to study ways of implementing Tuomioja's recommenda-
tions. The Secretary-General also was planning to create a permanent 
mission to include and coordinate all U.N. specialized agencies in Laos. 
Indisputably Hammarskjold's personal commitments helped to relax 
the crisis in Laos and organized a number of U.N. technical assistance 
programs to that country. Overwhelmed by the U.N.'s prestige in Laos, 
Edwin F. Stanton even suggested that careful parliamentary tactics and 
skillful diplomacy, as practiced by Hammarskjold, could enhance the 
U.N. authority in spite of big power politics. He concluded: "A Secre-
tary-General with initiative, ability and wisdom can, in his official and 
personal capacity, take rapid and effective measures without necessarily 
referring such measures either to the Security Council or the General 
Assembly."53 There arises, however, a legitimate counter-argument 
that cold-war issues like Laos are too intractable to yield to parliamen-
tary diplomacy and that a Secretary-General's personal initiatives, exer-
cised without the U.N.'s proper authorization, may jeopardize his 
general status as an impartial leader of the United Nations.54 
When the Royal Army and the CDNI, disillusioned with Phoui 
Sananikone's domestic and foreign policies, staged a coup d'etat at the 
end of 1959, Hammarskjold, together with U.S. Ambassador Horace 
Smith, was quick to intervene in the political turmoil and denounce the 
coup. In a message from the Congo, he advised King Savang Vatthana 
to restore political harmony and maintain a neutral foreign policy. He 
noted that the United Nations was now directing attention to Laos, and 
that the U.N. presence had helped to quiet Communist belligerence.55 
On the following day the coup leaders agreed to accept a caretaker 
government under Premier Kou Abhay, respectable President of the 
King's Council, until the forthcoming general elections; still they re-
tained control in Vientiane through Brigadiar General Phoumi 
Nosavan. 
But Peking and Hanoi reacted differently toward Kou Abhay's new 
government. While People's Daily (January 8) and Radio Peking 
(January 11) bitterly denounced it as a "fascist and military dictator-
ship" controlled by "warlords" and "warmongers," Premier Pham Van 
Dong sent a conciliatory message to Kou Abhay, expressing his hope 
that the new government would implement the Geneva agreements on 
Laos and take measures to improve good neighborly relations between 
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the two countries.56 As Phoumi Nosavan accelerated the mopping-up 
operations against the Pathet Lao forces, the Chinese warned against 
his policy. Not only did they condemn the "attempt" by Vientiane and 
Washington to eliminate the "patriotic and democratic forces" in Laos, 
they also declared their resolve to fight "U.S. imperialist adventures to 
extend the civil war in Laos."57 As the Chinese viewed Phoumi Nosa-
van's military campaign from the broad perspective of Sino-American 
strategic tensions, they must have been pessimistic about the relaxation 
of the Laotian situation and the value of the forthcoming general elec-
tions for the Pathet Lao's revolutionary strategy. 
Nevertheless, the Pathet Lao leaders, along with Moscow and Hanoi, 
expressed their willingness to abide by the elections. As soon as the 
royal order for the elections was issued, the NLH Central Committee 
proposed negotiations with the RLG to arrange for immediate release 
of political prisoners and free and democratic elections. It also appealed 
to the Geneva Co-chairmen to take effective measures guaranteeing the 
security and freedom of the elections.58 But the new electoral law was 
obviously directed against the Pathet Lao, and the fact that most of 
Pathet Lao's top leaders were imprisoned or considered "rebels" limited 
its candidates to 9 for 59 seats contested.59 Presumably the Pathet Lao 
took part in this unfair election only to demonstrate a conciliatory atti-
tude toward Vientiane and thus gain the release of certain Pathet Lao 
prisoners. In order to counter the RLG's propaganda that the Pathet 
Lao was an agent of foreign Communist countries, the NLH Central 
Committee pledged its loyalty to the Kingdom and promised not to 
obstruct a free election. These Pathet Lao efforts were consistently 
supported by North Vietnam and Russia, both of which used their 
diplomacy to guarantee fair elections.60 
The Chinese not only declined to join Moscow and Hanoi in support 
of the Pathet Lao's formal electoral participation but indirectly said the 
elections were a "political farce" manipulated by Vientiane and Wash-
ington. For example, Tseng Ho implied, in his People's Daily commen-
tary on March 23, that the Pathet Lao leaders had lost sight of the dual 
counter-revolutionary tactics of Washington and Vientiane in their 
preoccupation with the futile elections. He suggested that the United 
States assumed a number of peace tactics, including the elections, to 
retrieve its successive setbacks in Laos. Even though the United States 
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might pursue "peace tactics/' Tseng said, it had never slackened nor 
modified its "war tactics." His advice was: "As long as the patriotic 
forces close their ranks, heighten their vigilance, and persist in their 
struggle, they will certainly be able to turn Laos into a peaceful, inde-
pendent, unified, democratic, neutral and prosperous country." The 
accent on struggle and the rigid ideological approach to the Laotian 
problems undoubtedly reflected the Sino-Soviet ideological conflict 
developing at that time. 
The Chinese theoreticians, denying the Soviet contention that U.S. 
leaders could be persuaded to agree to peaceful coexistence in the 
common interest, maintained a rigid ideological posture that imperial-
ism was unchangeably aggressive. With an obvious polemical intention 
against the illusions of "modern revisionism," Yu Chao-li analyzed the 
dual tactics of the imperialists: 
It is absolutely impermissible for us to mistake certain tactical changes on the 
part of imperialism for changes in the very nature of imperialism. Imperialism 
may adopt this or that tactic at different periods, but it will not change its nature, 
nor will it alter its basic policies. As long as imperialism lasts, it will exert itself 
to the full to realize its object of plunder by alternately relying principally either 
on methods of war or "peace."61 
Once translated into the specific context of Laos, Yu's exposition simply 
reinforced Tseng Ho's analysis. 
In an election widely rigged by the RLG authorities with the overt 
support of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the candidates of the 
Pathet Lao and the Santiphab had no chance.62 Now Moscow and 
Hanoi joined Peking in attacking the CDNI, whose parliamentary 
wing won 35 seats, leaving 17 to Souvanna Phouma's Rally of the Lao-
tian People and 7 to independents. Hanoi's Nhan Dan (May 6) de-
nounced the election as part of the "perfidious scheme of the U.S. 
imperialists to use puppet 'national assemblies' in the realization of 
their aggressive designs." After the election proved the correctness of 
their ideological position, the Chinese reaffirmed the vicious nature of 
imperialist tactics and attempted to work out a common approach with 
North Vietnam toward post-election Laos. During his visit to Hanoi 
in May, Chou En-lai once again emphasized: "So long as there exists 
the threat of oppression, exploitation, plunder, and intervention of 
imperialism against the peoples of the world, the struggle of the peoples 
against imperialism and its stooges will never end." In a joint statement 
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on May 14, 1960, Chou and Pham Van Dong nevertheless expressed 
the hope of maintaining good-neighbor relations with Laos.63 Such 
relations, it told Vientiane, required four conditions: (1) the release 
of the NLH leaders headed by Souphanouvong, (2) the resumption 
of the International Commission's activities, (3) the termination of 
civil war, and (4) the scrupulous implementation of the Geneva agree-
ments. Compared with the earlier Chinese demands, the joint statement 
appeared less rigid and more precise, and avoided any provocative 
attacks on the American military "presence" in Laos. The convocation 
of another Geneva Conference, proposed by the Soviet Union and sup-
ported by China and North Vietnam in 1959, was not even mentioned 
in the statement, perhaps because both countries considered it unneces-
sary or impracticable at the time. 
The RLG soon had another problem in addition to the renewed 
policy coordination between Peking and Hanoi; on May 23, Prince 
Souphanouvong, with fifteen other NLH leaders, escaped from a Vien-
tiane prison.64 These sobering internal and external developments 
prompted new Premier Tiao Somsanith to assume a cautious and cir-
cumspect position toward Asian Communists. In his inaugural address 
at the National Assembly in June, 1960, he pledged to respect the "policy 
of neutrality" and good neighborliness. Above all he declared: "The 
Government will respect the principles of the United Nations Charter 
and the obligations entered into by the Royal Government, including 
the Geneva agreements."65 This officially reversed Phoui Sananikone's 
unilateral repudiation of the Geneva accords in February, 1959. But 
this declaration alone did not satisfy the Pathet Lao. Once its leaders 
regained freedom from prison, the NLH Central Committee issued its 
most acrimonious statement calling the "new reactionary government" 
of Tiao Somsanith an instrument of U.S. "imperialism." To hold new 
general elections and form a coalition government, the Committee pro-
posed negotiations with the RLG within the framework of the Geneva 
and Vientiane agreements.66 
On his part, however, Premier Tiao Somsanith learned two wise 
lessons: that Laos became defenseless when, as in July and August of 
1959, its two Communist neighbors directly supported the Pathet Lao's 
military offensive, and that Laos could not depend for its own survival 
only upon U.S. military support. The presence of the United Nations 
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Sub-Committee in Laos gave its Communist enemies second thoughts 
about exerting military pressure; but this effect was temporary and 
regressive despite Hammarskj old's constant efforts. In February, 1960, 
he appointed Edouard Zellweger, Swiss jurist and diplomat, to succeed 
Tuomioja as coordinator of U.N. activities in Laos. Although India 
had influenced Laos' foreign policy from 1954 to 1958, it probably lost 
much of its prestige in the eyes of Tiao Somsanith after its own help-
lessness shown in Sino-Indian confrontation. The RLG, assessing with 
prudence the internal and external circumstances of Laos, contributed 
to a relative political tranquility and military impasse for three 
months until another coup d'etat in August, 1960. 
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The Chinese Policy of Negotiations a t 
The Second Geneva Conference 
Section One: A Prelude to the Geneva Conference on Laos 
A sudden change in the balance of politics in Vientiane often pro-
foundly affected the direction of China's approach toward Laos. Just 
such a development took place in Vientiane on August 9, I960, when 
Captain Kong Le, an American-trained commander of the second para-
chute battalion, staged a successful coup d'etat overthrowing the pro-
U.S. government of Premier Tiao Somsanith and Gen. Phoumi Nosa-
van.1 As Kong Le's "Revolutionary Committee" announced his primary 
objectives to eliminate America's "increasingly intensified intervention" 
and to resume a neutral foreign policy, the Chinese seized this fortuitous 
opportunity in an attempt to realize their hitherto unsuccessful policy 
for restoration of the status quo prior to July, 1958, in Laos.2 They 
welcomed the anti-American position of the coup leaders and encour-
aged the Pathet Lao to organize a broad united front against the 
United States and the Laotian right-wing groups. 
In People's Daily of August 19, 1960, the Chinese defined the coup 
as the Laotian people's "forceful reply" to the U.S. "aggressors" and 
the Phoumi Nosavan forces. As soon as Prince Souvanna Phouma was 
reinstated as premier, Chou En-lai sent him a congratulatory message 
hoping that China and Laos would establish and develop friendly and 
peaceful relations.3 This initiative was obviously intended to revive the 
spirit of the Peking-Vientiane understanding, which had effectively 
been undermined by Phoui Sananikone and Phoumi Nosavan. The 
Neo Lao Haksat Central Committee proposed negotiations with Pre-
mier Souvanna Phouma to reestablish a coalition government composed 
of "representatives of various nationalities and of patriotic and progres-
sive political parties." This formulation excluded from the proposed 
coalition the "reactionaries," who were by definition neither "patriotic" 
nor "progressive." It was thus designed to discourage Souvanna 
Phouma's efforts to include Phoumi Nosavan in a new national govern-
ment.4 
After rejecting Souvanna Phouma's overtures for national unity, 
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Phoumi Nosavan organized a "New Revolutionary Committee" at 
Savannakhet under the titular leadership of Prince Boun Oum and 
pledged to fight against Kong Le. Even though the United States 
recognized Souvanna Phouma's government, it attached great impor-
tance to the Savannakhet movement. Acknowledging this beginning of 
a "revolution" at Savannakhet, the State Department warned that the 
United States would be immediately concerned by "the efforts of any 
other outside power, or the agents thereof, to take advantage of the 
disturbed conditions prevailing and to intervene directly or indirectly."5 
With this threat against the Pathet Lao leaders and their Communist 
supporters, the United States gave military assistance to Phoumi Nosa-
van's troops through channels in Thailand. And the Thai Prime Minis-
ter, Marshall Sarit Thanarat, instituted a blockade of the Mekong River 
against Vientiane and assisted Phoumi Nosavan in various ways. But 
the contradictions in U.S. policy increased Premier Souvanna Phouma's 
suspicions about Washington and in effect drove him toward the Com-
munist embrace. 
In early October, Souphanouvong further proposed that Souvanna 
Phouma should form a coalition government with NLH representatives 
and accept diplomatic relations with socialist countries. As soon as 
negotiations started between the RLG and the NLH in Vientiane, the 
United States sent Assistant Secretary of State Parsons to Laos to break 
up the negotiations and to bring about a reconciliation between Souvan-
na Phouma and Phoumi Nosavan. When Parsons' efforts proved futile, 
the United States openly opposed Souvanna Phouma, who was forced 
to receive support from the Communist side in the face of Phoumi 
Nosavan's growing military activities. In November, the RLG and the 
NLH agreed, among other things, to accept aid from Peking and 
Hanoi and to send an economic and cultural delegation to both capi-
tals.6 After their meetings in Sam Neua in November, 1960, Princes 
Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong pledged to pursue a neutral 
foreign policy without leaning toward either world camp and to form 
a coalition government represented by all minorities and patriotic par-
ties, including the NLH. These agreements in effect restored the 1957 
Vientiane formula, but without the consent of the Laotian right-wing 
organizations. Having sought rapport with Vientiane ever since the 
1954 Geneva Conference, the Chinese were no doubt pleased with these 
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rapid developmens in Laos and issued a Government statement on 
November 20, expressing their willingness to take "corresponding 
measures" for Sino-Laotian cooperation.7 
Shortly thereafter, the Chinese expectations for establishing friendly, 
diplomatic relations with Laos were dashed. In the middle of Decem-
ber, Gen. Phoumi Nosavan occupied Vientiane and set up a pro-Ameri-
can government under Premier Boun Oum. Thus Laos was again 
plunged into civil war, intensified and complicated this time by the 
military aid America and Russia were offering to each of the comba-
tants. The Chinese evidently regarded such power politics on their 
sensitive periphery as a potentially serious challenge to their own nation-
al interest; suddenly, they began taking a number of initiatives.8 As 
the United States further bolstered Phoumi Nosavan's northern march 
toward the Sino-Laotian border with military advisers and vital arma-
ments—including M-24 tanks and 105-mm howitzers, the Chinese 
Government promptly and repeatedly cautioned the United States 
against its "biggest armed intervention" in Indo-China since 1954, and 
bitterly condemned its "scheme" to turn Laos into a military base for 
attacking China and Vietnam. To safeguard its own security, Foreign 
Minister Chen Yi declared, the CPR might find it necessary to take 
"proper measures" against the United States.9 
The anticipated diplomatic contact between Peking and Vientiane 
was also disturbed by the disintegration of Souvanna Phouma's govern-
ment; his original plan to visit China was postponed indefinitely as he 
was forced to take refuge in Cambodia. Moreover, China's expectation 
of leading the Pathet Lao's national liberation movement was subtly 
undermined by effective policy coordination between Moscow and 
Hanoi. These two partners arranged, among other things, Russia's 
airlift of war materiel to the Pathet Lao-Kong Le allied forces, thus 
strengthening Moscow's political leverage in the management of Lao-
tian affairs. Indeed, Khrushchev assumed this difficult air operation 
in a remote country mainly to check China's growing influence there 
and to quiet criticisms of his "sell-out" to the United States.10 
The Chinese, we can imagine, conceived two possible responses to 
the crisis: either to compete with Moscow and Hanoi in rendering 
direct military assistance for the Pathet Lao's continuing armed cam-
paign (a measure likely to induce further American involvement in 
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Southeast Asia) or to help arrange a negotiated settlement of the esca-
lating conflict. Notwithstanding their prolific warnings and vitupera-
tions against the U.S., the Chinese manifested self-restraint in avoiding 
a risky adventure in Laos. They carefully refrained from making 
specific commitments that might force them into a direct military con-
frontation with the United States and other SEATO powers. They 
appeared particulary uneasy about the emergency sessions of the 
SEATO Council on Laos and American naval maneuvers, including 
the dispatch of the Seventh Fleet to the South China Sea. As the possi-
bility of wider military clashes loomed larger, the Chinese showed 
themselves receptive to the notion of an international conference on 
Laos. Only three months earlier they had dismissed a similar idea sug-
gested by Prince Souphanouvong and Cambodia's Prince Norodom 
Sihanouk. On December 19, 1960, however, they endorsed Hanoi's 
proposals for unconditional reconvocation of the 1954 Geneva Confer-
ence and for reactivation of the International Commission in Laos, 
which had been adjourned sine die since July, 1958.11 
But the Chinese tried to hamstring the revived Commission by in-
sisting that it work through Souvanna Phouma's government on practi-
cal measures relating to the Commission's activities. In a letter to the 
Geneva Co-chairmen, Chen Yi said that should the Commission with 
its Indian Chairman have any contact with the American-British spon-
sored government of Boun Oum, there would be "extremely serious" 
consequences.12 Aware of Indian Prime Minister Nehru's ambivalent 
attitude toward the two rival governments of Laos, Chen Yi undoubted-
ly intended to put off any peace-making attempt by the Commission 
until the Pathet Lao forces gained a military upper hand.13 Only this, 
the Chinese figured, could guarantee a favorable outcome in negotia-
tions with "reactionaries" and "imperialists" who would never give up 
their "butcher's knife" voluntarily.14 
At the same time, the Chinese evidently felt obliged to demonstrate 
that "united action" among Communist states was both an effective 
deterrent against America's encroachment in Southeast Asia and a 
strong diplomatic force for negotiations. Nowhere was this calculation 
more clearly reflected than in the People's Daily editorials of December 
25, 1960, and January 1, 1961. Noting that China, Russia, and North 
Vietnam were signatories and guarantors of the 1954 Geneva agree-
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ments as well as "true and loyal friends" of national liberation move-
ments, the Chinese asserted that the three countries should jointly 
assume the "inescapable responsibility to make common efforts for 
safeguarding the Geneva agreements and restoring peace in Laos." In 
January, 1961, the three Communist states accepted Sihanouk's proposal 
that the conference on Laos should be attended by fourteen countries— 
seven "signatories" of the 1954 Geneva agreements, three member-states 
of the International Commission, the United States, and three remain-
ing neighbors of Laos. On his part, Sihanouk reasoned that "in order 
to remain on good terms with my Communist friends, we prefer not 
to have a common frontier with them."15 
Fearing that all Southeast Asia might succumb if the Communists 
gained a foothold in Laos, President Eisenhower flatly rejected all pro-
posals for an international parley and promised to underwrite Phoumi 
Nosavan's illusory designs of destroying the Pathet Lao-Kong Le allied 
forces. In an attempt to deter Communist adventurism in Laos, he 
ordered the U.S. forces in the Pacific to combat readiness and issued a 
warning against "any intervention in Laos by the Chinese Communists 
or Viet Minh armed forces or others in support of the Communist 
Pathet Lao."16 In his talks with President-elect John F. Kennedy, 
Eisenhower said that the United States should be prepared to take uni-
lateral military action in Laos if necessary, but not to accept the formula 
of a Laotian coalition including Communists.17 
When Kennedy became president, he could do little, despite his 
comparatively balanced view of China and Laos, to change Eisen-
hower's hard-line Asian policy—at least for the first few months. In 
his first State of the Union message delivered in January, 1961, Kennedy 
observed that "the relentless pressures of the Chinese Communists 
menaced the security of the entire Asia down to the jungles of Laos."18 
Despite the change in leadership, the United States continued to oppose 
any conference which might be used against its position in Asia; in-
stead it supported the British proposal for reactivating the International 
Commission, which alone might be expected to stabilize the situation 
in Laos. 
Now that both Britain and America were trying to revive the Com-
mission, the Chinese stiffened their position; they argued that the 
Commission should not resume its functions until its terms of reference 
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were redefined by a new international conference. This position was 
subsequently adopted by Princes Sihanouk, Souphanouvong, and Sou-
vanna Phouma. It was revealed in China's secret military documents 
that the Chinese, aware that Phoumi Nosavan's forces held a "fairly 
favorable position" in military affairs, were seeking a "certain period 
of time" during which the Pathet Lao and neutral troops could increase 
their strength in preparation for a "long-drawn out, complicated, and 
devious" struggle.19 But the Russians, more flexible, even suggested in 
February that the Commission might meet first in New Delhi and 
report to the Geneva Co-chairmen. 
As their primary diplomatic objective was to open a conference on 
Laos, the Chinese vigorously opposed any other alternatives. On Feb-
ruary 19, King Savang Vatthana, after close consultations with Ameri-
can Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown, proposed that a Commission of 
Neutral Nations, composed of Burma, Cambodia, and Malaya, would 
protect Laos against the danger of external interference. He also asked 
the United Nations Secretary-General to inform all member-states of 
the U.N. of his adherence to peace and neutrality.20 To discredit the 
King's statement (which was in fact drafted by the U.S. State Depart-
ment), the Chinese opened a fierce propaganda campaign against what 
they labelled "nothing but an American intrigue." They argued: the 
United States invented this proposal to bury an international parley, to 
use the prestige of Burma and Cambodia for recognition of Boun Oum's 
government, and to pursue its interventionist policy through Malaya, 
which was not a "neutral" country but a "tool of imperialism."21 
China's strong objection was instrumental in pressuring both Burma 
and Cambodia to dissociate themselves from the proposed Commission 
which could otherwise have been a regional substitute for the Interna-
tional Commission in Laos. 
As the King's proposal thus collapsed, the United States persuaded 
Phoumi Nosavan to reach conciliation with Souvanna Phouma. In 
early March, Phoumi Nosavan met with Souvanna Phouma in Phnom 
Penh and invited him to return to Vientiane. Souvanna Phouma first 
proposed negotiations among the three Laotian groups, but his efforts 
failed in the face of the Pathet Lao's opposition. By late March, how-
ever, President Kennedy became well aware of the failure of his initia-
tives and of the vulnerability of Phoumi Nosavan's forces against the 
77 
reviving strength of the Pathet Lao. Indeed, the latter reestablished 
its revolutionary bases in the northern provinces and claimed to occupy 
more than half of Laos. In the process of reassessing U.S. policy, Ken-
nedy contemplated, then rejected, the unilateral use of limited Ameri-
can forces on Phoumi Nosavan's behalf. He decided not to escalate the 
local conflict into a major ground war in Asia but to seek its peaceful 
settlement. 
On March 23, while Britain proposed to Russia that after the Com-
mission's verification of de facto cease-fire throughout Laos the Geneva 
Co-chairmen should convene an enlarged Geneva Conference, Kennedy 
held a press conference to endorse the British proposal and to announce 
a reorientation of U.S. policy in favor of "peace, not war—a truly neutral 
government, not a cold war pawn—a settlement concluded at the con-
ference table, not on the battleground."22 To make his stand more effec-
tive and check the worsening military situation in Laos, he demanded 
that "externally supported Communists" immediately cease their ag-
gression. If the attacks did not stop, he warned, all SEATO members 
would undertake special treaty responsibilities toward the beleaguered 
Laos. A series of SEATO military maneuvers underlined Kennedy's 
determination to resist a Communist takeover of Laos—a position di-
rectly communicated to Peking through ambassadorial talks in War-
saw.23 
Against the complex background of U.S. diplomatic flexibility 
coupled with military warnings, China accepted the substance of the 
British proposal, at the same time calling America's "bluff" on military 
intervention in Laos. Responding to an American correspondent's 
question at his Djakarta press conference on April 2, Chen Yi made it 
clear that if SEATO members really sent their troops to take part in 
the civil war in Laos and if the Chinese were called upon by Souvanna 
Phouma's legal government, they would not remain idle.24 The ex-
change of these threats and maneuvers between China and America 
apparently checked each other and contributed to the process of their 
moderation. In a closed-door meeting with the U.S. Ambassador at 
Warsaw, Chinese Ambassador Wang Ping-nan informed him that 
China was serious about wishing to negotiate rather than fight and to 
work out an acceptable agreement for neutralization of Laos.25 
In the meantime Britain and Russia, as Co-chairmen of the Geneva 
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Conference, followed a more moderate path of mutual consultations. 
On April 24, the two Co-chairmen reached a complete agreement on 
three measures leading to the enlarged "International Conference for 
the Peaceful Settlement of the Laotian Question."26 First, they called 
on all military authorities, parties, and organizations in Laos to cease 
fire. Second, they requested the Indian Government to convene the 
International Commission in New Delhi so that it could carry out the 
work of controlling the cease-fire in Laos and present an appropriate 
report to the Co-chairmen. Finally, they invited fourteen states, as 
suggested by Sihanouk, to participate in the Conference, which was 
scheduled to open at Geneva on May 12,1961. 
These preliminary arrangements showed that the major world 
powers concerned with Laos were willing to make procedural conces-
sions for the sake of negotiations. While America and Britain accepted 
the Conference, the Communist side agreed to a cease-fire verified by 
the Commission. China also retreated from its previous insistence that 
the Conference should precede the Commission's resumption. Indeed, 
from December, 1960, to April, 1961, there gradually emerged a tacit 
understanding among the major powers with regard to the general 
formula for a negotiated settlement: first, an international neutraliza-
tion of Laos to be supervised by the International Commission; and, 
second, a coalition government to be composed of three rival Laotian 
groups under Souvanna Phouma's premiership. This international con-
sensus, combined with the Pathet Lao's improved military position, 
promised a number of practical advantages for the Chinese. 
For a truly neutral Laos—U.S. military personnel and Russian airlift 
eliminated—would protect Chinese security against the U.S. and in-
crease their influence over the Pathet Lao vis-a-vis Russia. The Chinese 
could also look forward to closer relations with a unified Laos, for, in 
a joint statement signed with Chou En-lai in April, 1961, Souvanna 
Phouma agreed to establish diplomatic relations and exchange economic 
and cultural missions.27 Recognizing the convergence of their own 
interest with Souvanna Phouma's anti-imperialist nationalism, they 
hoped that he would emulate Sihanouk's brand of neutral policy rather 
than Nehru's and would strengthen the united front with the Pathet 
Lao against the Phoumi Nosavan-Boun Oum group. But they were 
aware that the U.S. might misconstrue their acceptance of negotiations 
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as a sign of weakness or use the negotiations as a breathing-spell for 
further military actions. When they accepted the Co-chairmen's invi-
tation to the Geneva Conference on April 26, the Chinese particularly 
warned against U.S. "intentions" to resume intervention in Laos fol-
lowing the cease-fire.28 A similar warning was reiterated by Chou En-lai 
on May 8, when he exchanged views with the representatives of Sou-
vanna Phouma, Souphanouvong, and Ho Chi Minh.29 
Section Two: Chinese Positions and Tactics at Geneva 
The opening of the Conference was delayed four days by disputes 
over verification of the cease-fire and representation of Laos at Geneva. 
The United States delegation, recalling how the Viet Minh had 
strengthened its negotiating position by continuing to fight even while 
the 1954 Conference was in session, refused to start negotiations this 
time unless the Pathet Lao forces stopped all military activities. The 
issue was at least temporarily resolved by the International Commis-
sion's report verifying a de facto truce throughout Laos. But the repre-
sentation question, involving a decision on the relative status of two 
rival Laotian governments (those of Souvanna Phouma and Boun 
Oum) and of the Pathet Lao, proved more complicated. Whereas 
Chou En-lai, in 1954, had compromised the Pathet Lao's representation 
to achieve an Indochinese settlement, the Communists believed in 1961 
that the Pathet Lao's increase in power since 1954 should be fully re-
flected in any new Laotian arrangement. After British Foreign Secre-
tary Lord Home and French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville had 
softened Secretary Dean Rusk's opposition to the Pathet Lao's partici-
pation, the Geneva Co-chairmen agreed that any Laotian group could 
be represented at Geneva if it was sponsored by a participating country. 
This enabled China to sponsor the Pathet Lao delegation, and Russia, 
Souvanna Phouma's delegation at the Conference. Nevertheless Boun 
Oum decided to boycott the Geneva Conference but to participate in 
the meetings of the three Laotian groups.30 While the tripartite talks 
were intended to resolve such "internal" questions as coalition govern-
ment, cease-fire agreements, general elections, democratic freedoms, 
and foreign relations, the Geneva Conference was confined to the "in-
ternational" aspect of defining and guaranteeing Laos' neutrality. 
At the Conference the Chinese sought more than a peaceful settle-
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ment of the Laotian question. Intent on demonstrating their growing 
power and status, they came to Geneva with the largest delegation, en-
gaged in expensive social activities, and carried on extensive public re-
lations efforts and a militant anti-American campaign.31 On May 16, in 
his first speech, Chen Yi charged that the American policy of interven-
tion and aggression in violation of the 1954 Geneva agreements had 
caused prolonged instability in Laos and that SEATO, the principal 
tool of such an American policy, had brought about the tense situation 
in Southeast Asia.82 He demanded that SEATO be abolished and that 
U.S. and allied military personnel, including the KMT irregular troops 
remaining along the Laotian-Burmese border, be withdrawn from Laos. 
In order to replace SEATO and guarantee Laotian neutrality, Chen Yi 
advocated the establishment of a "peace zone" in Southeast Asia first 
and then in other parts of Asia. By attacking U.S. military commit-
ments in the entire region, he sought to broaden the scope of discussion 
at Geneva. On May 24, he presented five principles to be applied in any 
solution of the Laotian problem: (1) adherence to the 1954 Geneva 
agreements, (2) respect for the independence and sovereignty of Laos, 
(3) strict insurance of Laotian neutrality, (4) sharp distinction be-
tween Laos' internal problems to be resolved by the Laotians them-
selves and external problems to be discussed at Geneva, and (5) ac-
ceptance of the common agreements by all Geneva participants.33 
Concept of Neutrality: The fundamental task facing the Geneva 
Conference was to define the nature of international neutralization in 
the cold-war context and to stipulate the responsibilities of a neutralized 
state, the guaranteeing countries and the international control machin-
ery. The participants at first discussed intensely the various interpreta-
tions and implications of the concept of neutrality, crucial to the nego-
tiations for a Laotian settlement. 
In his opening address Dean Rusk first advanced a definition of 
neutrality which he argued should "go beyond the classical concept of 
nonalignment and include positive assurance of the integrity of the 
elements of national life."34 A truly neutral Laos, he said, should have 
the right to choose its own way of life in accordance with its own tradi-
tions and aspirations but must be safeguarded by the effective control 
machinery against subversive activities organized and assisted beyond 
its borders. After characterizing Rusk's thesis as an attempt to place 
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Laos under "international condominium" through the powerful con-
trol instrument, Chen Yi presented both a refutation and an alternative. 
The real motive of Rusk's definition, he asserted, was to deny the Lao-
tian people's right to assume a neutral status of their own choosing; 
for the ideas of "positive assurance" and "protection of neutrality" were 
an extension of the "logic" of SEATO, which outwardly professed to 
protect the neutrality of Laos but actually intended to interfere in its 
internal affairs. 
The Chinese did not bind their hands by a legalistic approach to 
neutrality which would require only that belligerent countries not inter-
fere in Laos and that Laos be impartial toward the actions of belligerent 
countries. Their arguments at Geneva revealed a concept of neutrality 
for Laos based on three major elements. First, Laos must refrain from 
accepting any military alliance or protection and from allowing any 
foreign military personnel or base on its territory. Second, she was to 
have absolute political independence. Finally, she would pursue a neu-
tral foreign policy, establishing "friendly relations" with all countries. 
The Chinese were in effect suggesting that to be genuinely neutral and 
impartial, Laos must be friendly toward the CPR; indeed, they gave 
this requirement high priority among what People's Daily (May 20, 
1961) called the "practical conditions" for Laos' neutrality. Even more 
significant was the second element—that no foreign country (this 
meant the Geneva Co-chairmen too) or outside machinery (the Inter-
national Commission!) should be permitted to intervene in the "domes-
tic" affairs of an independent sovereign country, especially in the 
formation of a coalition government and the integration of armed 
forces and administrative units. The Chinese emphasized the notions 
of "independence" and "sovereignty" of Laos not so much because they 
considered these notions inherent in neutralization as because they 
could use them to maximize the Pathet Lao's political freedom and to 
reduce the Commission's function as much as possible. 
International Commission: The Commission, said the Chinese, was 
meant to supervise the cease-fire and withdrawal of foreign forces from 
Laos and to investigate the introduction of new foreign contingents 
with the RLG's prior consent. They tried to minimize the Commis-
sion's authority mainly because India's attitude since the 1954-58 period 
had seemed to grow increasingly unfriendly. More realistically, they 
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were profoundly skeptical about the Commission's role in a milieu of 
power politics. Chen Yi once said: "Isn't there also an international 
control commission in the southern part of Vietnam, but has it stopped 
the increasingly serious armed U.S. intervention in South Vietnam?"35 
But the Chinese did not take an extreme initiative to change the Com-
mission's membership or chairmanship as their political realism fore-
saw the unpopularity of such a move. 
It was thus their "essential struggle" at Geneva to oppose the West-
ern argument that the Commission exercised broad, free, and automatic 
functions to guarantee strict implementation of the agreed provisions 
against the likelihood of Communist subversion. At the outset Dean 
Rusk proposed a veto-free control machinery empowered to protect 
Laos against subversion, to have free access to all parts of the country, 
and to investigate any complaints presented by "responsible sources" 
ranging from the Commission's members and the Geneva Conference 
participants to Laotian civil and military officials. On the basis of the 
1954 provisions, which had provided a wide range of responsibilities 
for the Commission, France's Jean Chauvel further suggested that the 
Commission should have the freedom to inspect "all aerodromes, in-
stallations or establishments and all units, organizations and activities 
which are or might be of a military nature." In ten articles supplement-
ing the French proposal Ambassador W. Averell Harriman specified 
that all Laotian groups must regularly report to the Commission re-
garding the location, organization, strength, and nationality of their 
forces and the location, types, and quantity of their armaments. The 
Commission, he added, should establish procedures for disposing all 
arms and equipment beyond the national need.36 In short, the Western 
powers intended to equip the Commission with comprehensive and 
unrestricted supervisory and investigative power in Laos. 
The Chinese categorically dismissed these Franco-American pro-
posals as an attempt to set up an international trusteeship over Laos. 
They also argued against an automatic extension of the Commission's 
1954 terms on the ground that the present civil war in Laos was different 
from the international war in Indo-China in 1954.37 Arguing that the 
status of a country's armed forces was a matter of domestic jurisdiction, 
the Chinese opposed most vigorously the Western proposal that the 
Commission supervise all questions of Laos' internal military arrange-
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ments, including the integration of three armed forces. This proposal, 
the Chinese asserted, was intended to interfere in the strictly internal 
affairs of an independent country and to wipe out the Pathet Lao and 
neutral forces. In this regard they must have remembered that the 
Pathet Lao's acceptance of military integration in November, 1957, had 
led to tragic failure by May, 1959. The Western position, however, was 
substantially weakened by an agreement reached among Princes Sou-
vanna Phouma, Souphanouvong, and Boun Oum, who decided in June, 
1961, to realize the unification of separate armed forces into a single 
National Army, according to a program agreed upon by three sides. 
The Chinese objected likewise to Harriman's earlier proposal, whose 
purpose, they charged, was to fix the type and quantity of Laotian armed 
forces and to get all defense secrets of Laos. Neutrality, Chen Yi main-
tained, was not synonymous with disarmament; in order to preserve 
its sovereign independence, even a neutral nation must control its own 
defense requirements. The Chinese also opposed the Western and 
Indian proposals that the Commission control the introduction of mili-
tary supplies into Laos. Although they defeated most of the Western 
proposals on military affairs, the Chinese accepted a compromise on 
the last one: the Commission should "assist" the Royal Laotian Gov-
ernment in cases where introduction of military supplies exceeded the 
requirements of national defense, but this assistance should be rendered 
only at the RLG's request. 
To make the Commission's operations flexible and efficient, both 
America and France proposed that decisions be taken by majority vote. 
When Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko proposed the principle of 
unanimous agreement except in decisions of a purely procedural nature, 
Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Chang Han-fu explained that the 
"principle of unanimity through consultations" simply reflected the 
cooperation among three political persuasions—socialist, neutral, and 
pro-Western—without which no international issue could properly be 
resolved in contemporary world politics.38 Though the majority rule 
appeared effective and democratic in domestic politics, Chang added, it 
should not always apply to multi-national relations as it amounted to 
imposing one state's will upon others. In their external affairs the 
Chinese were indeed unwilling to accept majority rule, even in inter-
national Communist meetings, perhaps because the pattern of China's 
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traditional political processes, both domestic and external, was basically 
consensus-oriented. But a more practical calculation behind the Chinese 
argument for unanimity was to equip the Polish member of the Com-
mission with a veto power and thus prevent the possibility of Indian-
Canadian majority control. As a compromise, however, the Western 
powers accepted the unanimous rule in substantive issues while the 
Communist side agreed to the majority rule in initiating and carrying 
out investigations (as well as in purely procedural cases). 
The compromise was made possible by the persuasive diplomacy of 
Moscow, which, lacking China's mistrust of the Indian Chairmanship, 
took a more pragmatic attitude on the Commission and recognized the 
importance of its effective peacekeeping activities in Laos. Compared 
with the 1954 provisions the Commission's overall authority was con-
siderably weakened; its terms of reference were more limited and its 
voting procedures were more restrained. For all practical purposes the 
Commission could act only to the extent that the mutuality of interests 
and the reality of power relations, both within and without Laos, would 
permit.39 
Co-chairmen: In an attempt to extend the Geneva Co-chairmen's 
authority over the Commission, Gromyko proposed that the Commis-
sion conduct its activities on the instructions of and under the general 
supervision of the Co-chairmen. The United States, encouraging the 
moderating influence of Moscow in Laos vis-a-vis Peking and Hanoi, 
gave the proposal prompt support. But the proposal failed to win the 
consent of Peking, which was frankly opposed to additional Russian 
influence in Laos, and so was soon given up. As a kind of review author-
ity, however, the Co-chairmen assumed responsibilities for exercising 
general guidance over the Commission and for making recommenda-
tions to and receiving reports from it. And as a channel of diplomatic 
accommodation and communication they would supervise observance 
of the agreements, keep the Geneva Conference participants constantly 
informed, and consult with them whenever appropriate. 
Military Provisions: It was not difficult for the guaranteeing coun-
tries to agree on the military requirements of Laos' neutrality: all 
foreign military personnel would be withdrawn, no new forces would 
be introduced, no alliance would be formed, and no military pressure 
would be used against Laos. In accordance with the 1954 agreements 
85 
an exception was made that France would for a limited period of time 
leave a specified number of military instructors to train the Royal Army 
and would maintain two military installations, pending their transfer 
to Laos. This was first opposed but later accepted by the Chinese, who 
expected France to respect the principle of Laos' military neutralization. 
At Geneva the Chinese delegation was most vociferous about the 
"several thousand" Kuomintang irregulars, whom, it claimed, the 
United States had instigated to join Phoumi Nosavan's campaign near 
the Sino-Laotian border. Denouncing this "root cause of evil" in 
Mekong River countries, Chang Han-fu accused the United States of 
avoiding the problem of disarmament and evacuation of these forces 
from Laos. Curiously, the Russians were largely indifferent to this 
"Chinese" issue, perhaps because they were reluctant to justify China's 
deeper involvement in Laos and thus complicate the process of nego-
tiations.40 Even though Harriman denied American responsibility for 
the Kuomintang irregulars, he suggested that the Commission insure 
their evacuation if necessary. While the combination of Harriman's 
reasonable response and Moscow's indifference minimized the impact 
of the Kuomintang question on negotiations, the Chinese could not but 
rely upon a general provision requiring the withdrawal of all foreign 
military personnel from Laos. 
South Vietnam embarrassed both Hanoi and Peking by proposing to 
ban the use of Laotian territory and resources for the purpose of aggres-
sion against other countries. Obviously intended to deny Hanoi use of 
the Pathet Lao-controlled area as a corridor of infiltration into South 
Vietnam, the proposal implied a denunciation of Hanoi's efforts at 
national unification.41 The Chinese argued that the proposal could even 
undermine Laos' independence and sovereignty by empowering the 
Commission to investigate cases of violation and by placing all of Laos' 
borderlands under U.S. control through the Commission. Nevertheless, 
as they could not continue to refuse this legitimate proposal supported 
by Souvanna Phouma, the Communist delegations accepted it with a 
face-saving quid pro quo: the guaranteeing states should not use Laos' 
territory for interference in other countries, nor should they use other 
countries' territory for interference in Laos.42 
SEATO: The relationship between SEATO and Laos was a source 
of persistent controversy among the major powers at Geneva. Chen Yi 
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endorsed Gromyko's proposal for abrogation of SEATO's protective 
role over Laos, but took a more radical step in demanding the total 
abolition of SEATO itself. He said that SEATO, by placing Laos, 
Cambodia, and South Vietnam under its protective umbrella, had 
interfered in their internal affairs and had disturbed the conditions of 
peace in Southeast Asia. But the Western powers claimed that Laos' 
neutrality was compatible with SEATO, as SEATO aid could be ex-
tended only at Laos' request. It was Harriman's opinion that the re-
moval of SEATO's protection from Laos required an amendment of 
the Treaty, but four of its member-states were absent from the Geneva 
Conference. 
When the three Laotian Princes agreed in June, 1961, not to recog-
nize the "protection of any military alliance or coalition," the Chinese 
promptly seized upon it and intensified their anti-SEATO campaign. 
In accordance with the "national aspirations" of Laos, Chang Han-fu 
insisted, SEATO's protective terms over that country should be com-
pletely abrogated. In spite of this unsettled question, the Conference 
was able in December, 1961, to achieve provisional agreements on the 
international aspect of Laos' neutrality.43 
Meanwhile, negotiations among the three Laotian groups reached 
an impasse, thus keeping the Geneva Conference from further progress. 
On December 27, after a brief meeting with Souvanna Phouma and 
Souphanouvong at Vientiane, Boun Oum suddenly called their earlier 
agreements on coalition government invalid and demanded the port-
folios of defense and interior for his right-wing group. This represented 
Boun Oum's and Phoumi Nosavan's dissatisfaction with the progress 
made at Geneva and their lingering illusions of total military victory 
against the Pathet Lao-King Le forces. When, in early 1962, Boun Oum 
and Phoumi Nosavan still resisted pleas for moderation from Home 
and Harriman, the Chinese ridiculed U.S. inability to control the Lao-
tian right wing and condemned U.S. tactics of "political blackmail" at 
Geneva and "military adventurism" in Laos. 
In a direct polemical confrontation on January 23, 1962, U.S. dele-
gate William H. Sullivan, challenged by Chang Han-fu's accusation of 
America's "double-faced" policy, replied that although China was try-
ing to provoke a war between America and Russia, neither country 
would fight over Laos to China's advantage. In the middle of heated 
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debates, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi M. Pushkin objected 
to Sullivan's intention to place Russia against China and said both 
Communist countries had the identical objective of a peaceful settle-
ment in Laos.44 But the Chinese directed more serious attention to the 
aggravating military situation within Laos. They denounced Phoumi 
Nosavan's large-scale offensive in Nam Tha (Houa Khong) province 
and U.S. jet-fighters' alleged bombing in northern Laos. They also 
noted that the United States had increased its military advisers in Laos 
from 1,000 in July, 1961, to 1,300 in March, 1962, and had used more 
than 3,000 Kuomintang troops to support Phoumi Nosavan.45 
The Geneva Conference reached its most critical stage in the middle 
of May, 1962. With the Pathet Lao's decisive victory at Nam Tha— 
almost equal to Dien Bien Phu in its psychological impact on the West-
ern powers—President Kennedy on May 17 ordered more than 5,000 
marines and military personnel to proceed to the Thai-Lao border. 
Following a SEATO Council meeting which justified the U.S. move 
as "entirely precautionary and defensive," Britain, Australia, and New 
Zealand dispatched their air forces to Thailand.46 The Chinese immedi-
ately responded to this threat by warning that they would not remain 
indifferent toward an American policy of "direct military intervention" 
in Laos threatening "Chinese security."47 Unlike Moscow's rather mild 
reaction to these "complications" in the region bordering Laos, both 
Peking and Hanoi took an extremely tough attitude at the Geneva Con-
ference. While Peking demanded immediate and complete withdrawal 
of U.S. and allied forces from the Thai-Lao border, Hanoi threatened 
that it would not sign any agreement on Laos unless those foreign forces 
were completely withdrawn from Thailand. Even when the Pathet 
Lao obtained the best opportunity to conquer Laos, there was little 
evidence to suggest that the Chinese encouraged the Pathet Lao leaders 
to take an extreme military step. Probably they advised the Pathet Lao 
leaders to use their military advantage not for conquest but as a strong 
negotiating point. 
Indeed, the high tension brought about vigorous diplomatic activities 
by the Geneva Co-chairmen and expedited the negotiations among the 
three Laotian groups. On June 12, the three Princes concluded the 
Plain of Jars agreements, setting up the organization and operational 
principles of a provisional coalition government. Souvanna Phouma's 
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neutral group took seven portfolios, including defense, interior, and 
foreign affairs, while the Pathet Lao, the right-wing group, and the 
Vientiane "neutralist" group each received four seats.48 Premier Sou-
vanna Phouma and Vice-Premiers Phoumi Nosavan and Souphanou-
vong were respectively to hold the posts of defense, finance, and 
economic planning. Finally, the coalition would apply the unanimous 
rule in decisions on all important questions, while decisions in the 
ministries of defense, interior, and foreign affairs were to be made by 
the highest representatives of the three political groups. As soon as 
a new Laotian Government was sworn in, the Chinese Government ex-
tended its recognition and proposed an exchange of Ambassadors.49 
The ultimate solution of the remaining issue of SEATO lay with 
the new Laotian Government, whose declaration on neutrality specifi-
cally repudiated the "protection of any alliance or military coalition, 
including SEATO." After long consultations among themselves, the 
SEATO powers expressed their acceptance of the Laotian declaration. 
Contrary to Harriman's earlier interpretation, the SEATO powers con-
sidered an amendment to the Treaty unnecessary. As Professor Model-
ski observed, this loss of nerve by the United States amounted to a 
public "censure" of SEATO and damaged its prestige in Southeast 
Asia.50 
On July 23, 1962, the fourteen-month Conference ended with the 
fourteen participating countries signing a Declaration on the Neutrality 
of Laos and an accompanying explanatory protocol. Compared with 
the 1954 Geneva agreements, the RLG in 1962 assumed more precise 
and varied responsibilities to build a "peaceful, neutral, independent, 
democratic, unified and prosperous Laos."51 In a statement incorpor-
ated into the Geneva agreements and promulgated constitutionally, the 
Royal Laotian Government pledged to apply the five principles of 
peaceful coexistence in foreign relations and to develop friendly rela-
tions and establish diplomatic relations with all countries, the neighbor-
ing countries first and foremost. It also declared: 
It [the RLG] will not enter into any military alliance or into any agreement, 
whether military or otherwise, which is inconsistent with the neutrality of the 
Kingdom of Laos; it will not allow the establishment of any foreign military base 
on Laotian territory, nor allow any country to use Laotian territory for military 
purposes or for the purposes of interference in the internal affairs of other 
countries, nor recognize the protection of any alliance or military coalition, in-
cluding SEATO. 
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To respect and assist these Laotion intentions, the guaranteeing 
countries promised to observe in every way the sovereignty, neutrality, 
unity, and territorial integrity of Laos and undertook a multitude of 
specific obligations. Whenever appropriate, the guarantors might jointly 
consult with the RLG and among themselves to consider measures for 
insurance of the agreements. This joint consultation signified the inade-
quate provision for enforcement action; for it could nullify the legality 
of any partial consultations or could foreclose any other effective en-
forcement measures, such as a Locarno model, where the guarantors 
had the right to act without unanimous agreement among themselves. 
The Geneva Conference rejected the French proposal for periodic am-
bassadorial meetings among the guarantors to consider the International 
Commission's work. 
Section Three: Evaluation of the Second Geneva Formula 
In a sense the Geneva Conference marked an attempt to resolve one 
aspect of the Sino-American conflict in Southeast Asia. Other powers— 
especially, Britain, Russia, France, and India—seemed to have made 
efforts to bridge the positions of those two extreme antagonists. Despite 
these moderating influences the Chinese scored a considerable diplo-
matic victory at America's expense. They forced the United States to 
accept the withdrawal of its military advisers and SEATO's protective 
umbrella from Laos, to agree to the reduction of the Commission's 
power, and to acknowledge the coalition government with Pathet Lao 
representation. In the general tone of their statements and arguments 
at Geneva, the Chinese radiated confidence in their ideological commit-
ments. This does not mean that the Chinese were so obsessed with 
revolutionary convictions and abstract dogmas that they would not 
negotiate realistically. On the contrary they were conciliatory and 
business-like in small, informal, and less publicized meetings—such as 
the restricted sessions of the Geneva Conference, the Drafting Commit-
tee discussions, and some twenty informal consultations at which crucial 
negotiations took place among six core delegations (Britain, Russia, 
America, China, France, and India) or among four (without France 
and India).52 
In the process of compromise the Chinese made a number of impor-
tant procedural concessions and accepted the "corridor" provision, the 
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Commission's limited control over the introduction of military supplies, 
and the majority rule in investigative decisions of the Commission. 
Their ambition of wrecking SEATO was also abandoned. This nego-
tiating pattern suggests that in spite of their ideological commitments 
and self-centered world outlook, the Chinese were capable of conduct-
ing pragmatic negotiations as long as their status and interest were duly 
recognized. It also shows that they were willing to accept a negotiated 
settlement of a conflict if they were convinced either by the threat of 
force or by the logic of a situation that a negotiation was more advan-
tageous to their own national interest than any other available option 
and if they were reasonably assured of its likely outcome. 
At Geneva the Chinese maintained a remarkable degree of outward 
unity and coordination with Moscow and Hanoi in order to defend 
common interests and denounce Western proposals. But they could 
not always conceal their subtle differences with Moscow in diplomatic 
tactics and strategic calculations toward Laos and America. Moscow 
showed a lukewarm interest in the questions of China's security and 
Kuomintang troops, appeared more willing to expedite a peaceful 
settlement in Laos, and preserved a basic communication with the 
United States. While Gromyko attributed the successful negotiations 
to the Kennedy-Khrushchev joint statement of June 4, 1961, in which 
both leaders pledged to support a neutral Laos, Chen Yi studiously 
failed to give any credit to it.53 Compared to China and Russia, North 
Vietnam played a minor role at Geneva—much less influential than at 
the 1954 Conference, where it had directly represented the Pathet Lao 
in negotiating the cease-fire agreement with France. North Vietnam 
was excluded from the Drafting Committee and the crucial informal 
meetings among major powers. 
It was a vital part of China's negotiating tactics that, being aware of 
the intrinsic relationship between the Geneva Conference and the tri-
partite talks and between negotiations and hostilities, the Chinese dele-
gation exploited the military and political development of Laos as an 
important instrument of its diplomacy at Geneva. To solve such diffi-
cult issues as SEATO's role and military integration, the Chinese relied 
on the decisions among the Laotian groups, which they could manipu-
late more confidently than the Geneva Conference itself. For this pur-
pose the Chinese kept close contacts with Princes Souvanna Phouma 
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and Souphanouvong and gave them unreserved support in the face of 
Boun Oum, whose relationship with the United States was often con-
fused. As the cease-fire was never effective throughout the Conference, 
the Chinese assisted the Pathet Lao's intermittent military efforts to 
gain a favorable position, which they used to compel the reluctant 
adversaries to make concessions. They indeed said that negotiations did 
not decide anything but recorded historic forces and that no one could 
get at the conference what was lost at the battle ground. 
With the needs of a policy for the future in mind, the Chinese im-
mediately undertook a systematic evaluation of the Geneva settlement 
in the context of their double-edged struggle against "imperialism" and 
"modern revisionism." Perhaps they wished to measure the practical 
compromise against their ideological standards and redefine their posi-
tions in historical perspective. From their Geneva experiences the Chi-
nese extracted another "proof" to justify their ideological argument 
that the support for national liberation struggles was an imporant com-
ponent of the world peace movement and that the peaceful solution of 
the Laotian questions was secured by the Laotian people's "serious, 
complex, and principled" struggle.54 
In their theory of anti-imperialist struggle the Chinese preached a 
simultaneous military and political struggle. Consistent with their his-
torical experience, however, they gave priority to the military struggle 
as prerequisite to attaining political objecives. They explained that 
only when the American "imperialists" and Laotian "reactionaries" 
suffered military failures were they forced to attend the negotiations 
and accept the agreements. This was a clear warning against any illu-
sions of the "modern revisionists" who might simply place the ultimate 
hope for world peace on negotiations alone. In the context of China's 
domestic revolutionary struggle Mao Tse-tung once explained: 
Everything reactionary is the same; if you don't hit it, it won't fall. This is also 
like sweeping the floor; as a rule, the dust will not vanish of itself . . . . Broom 
in hand, you must learn to sweep; don't lie in bed, fancying that a gust of wind 
will somehow rise and blow all the dust away. We Marxists are revolutionary 
realists and never indulge in idle dreams.55 
Accordingly, the Chinese said that as the imperialists and reactionaries 
would never give up dieir aggressive intentions but would always stand 
ready to destroy the agreements which they were forced to accept, con-
tinuing vigilance and preparedness were required in defense of such 
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agreements and in the "tit-for-tat struggle" against the revival of im-
perialist aggression. 
Although the Geneva Conference broke a "link in the chain of ten-
sions" which the United States had forged around China's periphery, 
the Chinese emphasized that this achievement was merely temporary. In 
an authoritative article in Hung-ch'i, "Yu Chao-li" analyzed the "real" 
calculations of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia: first, by signing the 
Geneva agreements, the United States temporarily turned the military 
struggle in Laos into a political one so as to avert complete military 
defeat and maintain its control over Lower Laos and areas along the 
Mekong River, while awaiting opportunities to regain control over the 
whole of Laos; second, the U.S. retained its aggressive forces in Thailand 
in order to suppress the Thai people and support its eventual invasion 
into Laos and South Vietnam; and, third, the U.S. concentrated its 
efforts on accelerating the undeclared war in South Vietnam.56 
Yu predicted that the United States would surely adopt various 
forms of political conspiracies in Laos in violation of the Geneva agree-
ments: the U.S. would destroy the unity of the patriotic Laotian forces, 
strengthen the right-wing military power, produce a pretext for creating 
a pro-American government in Vientiane, limit the Pathet Lao's politi-
cal freedom, and instigate armed disturbances in the "liberated areas." 
If these conspiracies failed, he added, the United States would "openly 
destroy the Geneva agreements, rekindle Laotian civil war, and even 
dispatch, directly, an army into Laos." The publication of these de-
tailed prognoses was apparently intended to dispel any wishful thinking 
about the viability of negotiated settlements with the United States, 
and also to provide the Pathet Lao leaders with a policy guideline in 
the wake of the Geneva accords. Likewise, at a reception for Phoumi 
Vongvichit (the Pathet Lao's chief negotiator at Geneva), Chou En-lai 
said that the Laotian people should prepare themselves for the begin-
ning of a new struggle against American "imperialists" and Laotian 
"reactionaries."57 This advice undoubtedly reflected Chou's own experi-
ence of negotiations with the Kuomintang and the United States, full 
of turns and twists and violations and breaches of confidence. 
For a while some observers considered the negotiated settlement of 
Laos applicable in other troubled countries in Asia. In August, 1962, 
Prince Sihanouk asked the signatories of the Laos agreements to hold 
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a similar international conference on Cambodia and guarantee its neu-
tral status and territorial integrity. In his immediate reply to Sihanouk, 
Chou En-lai supported such a proposal.58 And, in July and August, the 
National Liberation Front of South Vietnam made it clear that it was 
ready to include South Vietnam in a "peaceful and neutral zone" with 
Laos and Cambodia. "Following signature of the Geneva agreement 
on Laos," Edgar Snow observed, "it became obvious that China as well 
as Hanoi had begun to place greater credence in possibilities of a similar 
solution in Vietnam."59 
But it was evident that at the conclusion of the Geneva Conference 
the Chinese had already made the worst possible assessment about the 
future of the agreements. So long as the United States continued to 
preserve its military commitments in South Vietnam and Thailand and 
pursued its containment policy in Southeast Asia, they had no reason to 
assume that the Geneva formula would work or that their own interests 
would be greatly promoted. Nor did they find any reason to think that 
the precarious structure of the Laotian coalition would function well, 
especially in such complicated areas as the integration of military and 
administrative units, the development of democratic practices, and the 
maintenance of a genuine neutral policy. In the meantime the Chinese 
devoted their main attention to effecting complete withdrawal of U.S. 
military personnel from Laos and to concluding diplomatic relations 
with Vientiane. And they were apparently in the process of making 
proper preparations for all contingencies that might arise from the 
possible failure of the 1962 modus vivendi. 
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Chapter V 
The Chinese Policy of Reappraisal After 
The Geneva Conference 
Section One: Development of the Second Geneva Formula 
In the aftermath of the second Geneva Conference the Chinese were 
most deeply concerned with two crucial issues—the withdrawal of U.S. 
forces from Laos and the establishment of diplomatic relations with 
Vientiane. The first logical step toward international neutralization of 
Laos was the withdrawal of all foreign military personnel within the 
75-day time limit (October 7, 1962) under the control and supervision 
of the International Control Commission. The Chinese were especially 
anxious to see the withdrawal go as planned in order to establish a 
precedent for eventually urging the voluntary pull-out of foreign units 
from Thailand and South Vietnam. They thought that so long as the 
United States maintained its military forces in these two countries with 
the manifest purpose of containing Asian Communism, neither the 
peaceful settlement of Laos nor the national security of China could 
effectively be guaranteed. 
In accordance with this military analysis the Chinese promptly 
started a verbal attack against the continued presence of U.S. forces in 
Southeast Asia. On August 1,1962, Foreign Minister Chen Yi reiterated 
his Geneva demand that the United States withdraw its armed forces 
from Thailand and South Vietnam to ease tension in Southeast Asia 
and to allow Asians to solve their own problems.1 U.S. forces in these 
countries, argued a "Commentator" in People's Daily (August 21, 
1962), were intended to hem Laos in, thus threatening its neutral status. 
With the approach of the withdrawal deadline the Chinese stepped up 
their campaign to impress Washington with how seriously they re-
garded complete military evacuation and to arouse international public 
opinion in favor of their position. At diplomatic receptions held in 
Peking in August, by the Indonesian Ambassador and by the Ruman-
ian Ambassador, Chen Yi repeatedly warned against the possibility that 
the United States and its "vassal countries" would evade the obligation 
to withdraw their troops from Laos. He also accused the United States 
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of instigating General Phoumi Nosavan to sabotage the coalition gov-
ernment and to disturb the Pathet Lao's "liberated areas."2 
Meanwhile, the Chinese were vigorously working to establish per-
manent diplomatic relations with Laos. Since 1954, their efforts in 
this direction had proved difficult. Only in the second Sino-Laotian 
joint statement signed in April, 1961—during the civil war in Laos—did 
Chou En-lai and Souvanna Phouma agree to establish diplomatic rela-
tions and to exchange diplomatic missions of the rank of ambassadors. 
The Chinese interpreted this agreement not merely as a "solid founda-
tion" for furthering Sino-Laotian cooperation, but as a "heavy blow to 
the U.S. imperialist scheme to sow discord and undermine friendship 
and solidarity among the Asian peoples."3 Moreover, the two Govern-
ments took steps toward exchanging economic and cultural missions. 
In October, 1961, they agreed to set up consulates-general at Phong Saly 
in Laos and at Kunming in China's Yunnan Province, thus counter-
balancing the earlier Taipei-Vientiane consular agreement of 1958. As 
the new Chinese Consul, General Ting Yung-cheng (ex-commander 
of the Kunming Military District) arrived at Phong Saly with his staff 
on October 17; two months later, the Lao Consul reached Kunming. 
And in November, the Chinese Economic and Cultural Mission 
headed by Ho Wei (ex-Ambassador to Hanoi and veteran of the Long 
March) and Liu Ch'un was welcomed by Souvanna Phouma and 
Souphanouvong in Xieng Khouang. This Mission carried on semi-
diplomatic functions in the "liberated areas" until September, 1962. For 
example, on behalf of the CPR, it signed agreements concerning the 
construction of a highway and the opening of a civil air route between 
China and Laos. 
As soon as a new coalition government was formed in Laos on June 
23, 1962, Chen Yi announced Chinese recognition and proposed to ex-
change ambassadors; new Lao Foreign Minister Quinim Pholsena 
promptly accepted this proposal. But a few days later the Boun Oum-
Phoumi Nosavan group belatedly announced a royal edict of June 18, 
1962, appointing a Laotian Ambassador to Taiwan. Such a move was 
intended to legalize the appointment technically made five days prior 
to the inauguration of the coalition government. As a result of the 
visit of Boun Oum and Phoumi Nosavan to Taipei in May, 1962, they 
had concluded an agreement with Nationalist China for exchanging 
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ambassadors. Accordingly, on June 28, Chiang Kai-shek announced 
the appointment of Dr. Hang Li-wu as Nationalist Chinese Ambassador 
to Laos. When Hang presented his credentials to King Savang 
Vatthana in July, the CPR was faced with the difficult question of what 
to do with its own diplomatic representative, Liu Ch'un, who had 
arrived in Vientiane on July 11. 
Thereupon the CPR, as a precondition of full diplomatic relations 
between Peking and Vientiane, asked the RLG to remove the Nation-
alist Chinese Ambassador from Laos and to terminate all ties with 
Taiwan. At a press conference held in Vientiane Liu Ch'un made it 
clear that "any mission established by the Chiang Kai-shek clique, 
usurping the name of China, and any activities undertaken by it are 
absolutely illegal."4 Even a personal confrontation took place between 
Liu and Hang in August, when Premier Souvanna Phouma arrived 
at the airport from his trip abroad. As Souvanna Phouma approached 
Hang in the diplomats' line, Liu abruptly stood between the two and 
claimed that he, not Hang, was representing 650 million Chinese people. 
After this embarrassing episode, Taiwan, under intense pressure from 
Quinim Pholsena, finally decided on September 7 to sever diplomatic 
relations with Laos. On the same day the CPR, in a joint statement 
with the RLG, formally announced the exchange of diplomatic mis-
sions between the two Governments.5 
This major diplomatic breakthrough, the result of the 1962 Geneva 
settlements, left Bhutan as the only independent state on China's 
border that did not extend de jure recognition to the CPR. As Peking's 
first Ambassador, Liu was a Deputy Director of the United Front Work 
Department of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, pre-
sumably with experience in working with united fronts such as the one 
involved in Laos. He had also held a number of important positions: 
Vice-Chairman of the Nationalities Affairs Committee of the State 
Council, member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Peasants' 
and Workers' Party, member of the Nationalities Committee of the 
third National People's Congress, and President of the Central Nation-
alities College in Peking. As an expert in minority problems, he was 
evidently chosen with an eye to the problems of multi-ethnic relations 
in Laotian politics. The attention which the Chinese accorded to the 
strategic aspect of minorities was also reflected in the selection of other 
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Chinese personnel for Laos; Han Chinese occupied the key posts in the 
Embassy while the Chinese advisers in the Plain of Jars area were 
selected from among those Chinese cadres of the same ethnic stock as 
the several Laotian minorities. The initial diplomatic harmony between 
Peking and Vientiane led to the visits to China of Vice-Premier Phoumi 
Nosavan in December, 1962, and of King Savang Vatthana and Premier 
Souvanna Phouma in March, 1963.6 
After the final date for the withdrawal of foreign forces, the Inter-
national Commission reported in October, 1962, that its checkpoints had 
verified the evacuation of 40 North Vietnamese, 666 Americans, and 
403 Filipinos.7 The report failed to quiet Peking's obsession with the 
presence of Kuomintang irregular forces but the CPR refrained from 
challenging either the Commission's statistics or the omission of any 
reference to the Kuomintang forces. However, Peking's dissatisfaction 
was indirectly expressed by General Singkapo Chounlamany, the Pathet 
Lao's spokesman, who said that about 3,000 Kuomintang troops and 
some of Thai, South Vietnamese, and Japanese military personnel still 
remained in Laos in contravention of the Geneva provisions.8 While 
the CPR and the NLH were disillusioned about the complete with-
drawal of pro-U.S. foreign forces, both America and Britain were in 
their turn suspicious of Hanoi's assertion that North Vietnamese per-
sonnel formerly in Laos at the request of the RLG had been completely 
evacuated. On October 11, the United States declared that it would not 
passively accept the continued presence in Laos of North Vietnamese 
soldiers—estimated by U.S. intelligence to number several thousands.9 
The dispute over military evacuation only served to exacerbate the 
profound and long-standing suspicions between Peking and Washing-
ton. Indeed the issue revealed that the minimum degree of good faith 
essential to ensure a lasting peace in Laos was lacking. The mutual 
dissatisfaction with the execution of the Geneva provisions on other 
military questions led to a further Sino-American exchange of accusa-
tions and recriminations. Both Washington and Peking viewed with 
serious concern the question of how to integrate the separate armed 
forces of the three Laotian factions, thus terminating de facto military 
division of the country. Although the presence of these forces was more 
a symptom than an intrinsic cause of the conflict in Laos, their unifica-
tion within a single command structure was a sine qua non to Laos' 
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unification and neutralization. But early records of the tripartite coali-
tion experiment proved irrefutably that the requirement of unanimity 
among the three factions precluded effective policy formulation, includ-
ing military integration. Any unity of purpose or resolution which the 
coalition might have had was from the first undermined by the pre-
vailing suspicions and the clash of interests, ideologies, and personalities 
which inevitably smoldered in the aftermath of a long and bitter fratri-
cidal conflict. Each party remained in control over its own army and 
area; Phoumi Nosavan continued to prevail in the administrative capi-
tal and the Pathet Lao in the "liberated areas." Later, in September, 
1963, Souvanna Phouma complained at the United Nations that "a very 
reticent collaboration between members renders the coalition most pre-
carious. Bitter and constant criticism prevents full cooperation. Very 
often some elements remain stubbornly set in a suspicious attitude and 
others try to prevent negotiation by creating and multiplying obsta-
cles along the way."10 
In order to block any Western attempt to consider the question, the 
Chinese, in cooperation with Hanoi and Moscow, had argued that mili-
tary integration was a purely domestic problem. Only in the Zurich 
agreement had the three Laotian leaders agreed in principle to unify 
their armed forces into a single National Army according to a program 
to be approved by the parties concerned. In November, 1962, the three 
parties agreed to form a unified National Army of 30,000 men, a Na-
tional Police of 6,000, and a Vientiane Police of 1,200. These forces 
would be drawn equally from the three parties, which, in turn, would 
substantially reduce their respective forces. At the time of the Laotian 
cease-fire the number of right-wing forces was estimated at about 55,000, 
the Pathet Lao forces at 18,000, and the neutralist forces at 12,000.n 
In January, 1963, the Laotian leaders instructed the Joint Commis-
sion of Military Unification to hasten the discussions for setting up the 
program and conditions of demobilization; they also told the Joint 
Commission of Administrative Unification to expedite the organization 
of the joint police in Vientiane. They also reaffirmed the principle of 
unanimous agreement in all important questions concerning the Minis-
tries of Defense, Interior, and Foreign Affairs. Finally they decided to 
eliminate all derogatory and rude expressions or accusations aimed at 
members of the National Union Government.12 While these develop-
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ments were occuring in Laos, the Chinese remained aloof but kept a 
vigilant eye on questions vital to the future of the Pathet Lao revolu-
tionary struggle. If the Pathet Lao sought their advice on military 
matters, the Chinese either discouraged the unrealistic hope of military 
integration or counseled extreme caution against being maneuvered 
into a trap like that of 1959. For it is unlikely that the Chinese would 
have forgotten Mao's dictum, "political power grows out of the barrel 
of a gun," or the failure of the Pathet Lao's first integration experi-
ment.13 
When the two military problems crucial to the neutralization of 
Laos continued unsolved into early 1963, the Chinese, abandoning their 
policy of relative silence, started to attack the U.S. policy toward Laos. 
Following the evacuation of military advisers, the United States cut 
back its financial support of Laos as well. But it soon decided, at the 
Premier's request, to supply maintenance material for the armed forces 
of Kong Le and Phoumi Nosavan. The Chinese responded by charging 
that the United States, in complete violation of the Geneva provisions, 
had continued to pour military supplies into Laos and expanded 
Phuomi Nosavan's army from 54,000 in July, 1962, to 63,000 in January, 
1963. Going on to further "crimes," they charged that the United States 
had constructed secret military bases in Laos, flown reconnaissance mis-
sions over the "liberated areas," maintained 900 of its military personnel 
in the country, and conducted through the C.I.A. the Air America 
operation—a "paramilitary organization" which dropped weapons and 
munitions to the anti-Communist Meo tribesmen.14 In an article in 
Peking Review (February 8, 1963), Fang Ming further accused the 
United States of switching a considerable number of its military per-
sonnel into mufti to serve as "non-military" members of its Embassy 
at Vientiane and of other "economic and cultural" agencies. He as-
serted that the U.S. missions in Laos, such as the Agency for Interna-
tional Development (USAID), the United States Information Service 
(USIS), the Organization of Medical Services, and Air America, were 
serving as "American Trojan horses," all operating for subversive pur-
poses.15 By early 1963, therefore, the Chinese had accumulated enough 
"evidences" to substantiate Yu Chao-li's earlier prediction and to con-
clude that the military preconditions for neutralization of Laos could 
not be achieved in the face of the relentless U.S. policy there. 
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Section Two: Gradual Erosion of a "Neutralized" Laos 
Laos' neutrality was based upon a number of assumptions concern-
ing its future domestic political configuration. These included the 
emergence of a viable coalition government of three distinctive political 
groups, the tactful use of balancing power by the neutral group of 
Souvanna Phouma, and the recognition by the major states concerned 
of the legality of the RLG. In less than a year, however, these domestic 
prerequisites of the Geneva agreements were being eroded by a combi-
nation of forces—especially, a resurgence of the anti-Communist feeling 
of the kind that led to Phoui Sananikone's systematic anti-Communist 
measures of 1959. The deterioration in relations among the three 
groups, hastened by the assassination in April, 1963, of Foreign Minister 
Quinim Pholsena, reached a point of no return in the coup d'etat of the 
right-wing generals in April, 1964. Thus, the internal foundation of 
the second Geneva modus vivendi was gradually but irrevocably de-
stroyed. 
The death of the ostensibly neutral but, in reality, pro-Peking 
Quinim Pholsena and its subsequent repercussions held some important 
political implications.16 For Peking it meant the loss of a very useful 
and influential leader in the RLG, a man instrumental in building dip-
lomatic cooperation between the two countries. Domestically, his 
death deepened the schism between Quinim Pholsena's "progressives" 
and Souvanna Phouma's "conservatives" within the neutralist group 
and shifted the inter-factional balance in favor of the conservative fac-
tion. This intensified the military conflict between Kong Le's conserva-
tive neutralist forces and Col. Deuane Siphaseuth's progressive neutralist 
dissidents in the Plain of Jars and produced a tendency towards a 
bipolarization of Laotian politics in the formation of two antagonistic 
military alliances—one between Kong Le and Phoumi Nosavan and 
the other between Col. Deuane and the Pathet Lao. 
This bipolarization—splitting the neutralist group into two hostile 
factions which then each merged with one of the extreme groups—ran 
counter to a basic political assumption of the Geneva settlement. The 
disappearance of an independent, viable, and unified third group seri-
ously undermined Premier Souvanna Phouma's leadership and made 
the tripartite coalition unthinkable. After a series of political assassina-
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tions and armed clashes Vice-Premier Souphanouvong and Phoumi 
Vongvichit (Minister of Information, Publicity, and Tourism), perhaps 
mindful of their arrest in Vientiane in 1959 by Phoui Sananikone, left 
the capital to set up their NLH headquarters at Khang Khay. The two 
NLH Secretaries of State, Souk Vongsak and Khampheuane Touna-
lom, remained in Vientiane for a while to represent the NLH at the 
coalition. 
The assassination of Quinim Pholsena, the cleavage of the neutralist 
group, the breakdown of the coalition, and the violation of the cease-fire 
agreement—all of these developments in Laos affected the Chinese 
task of guaranteeing the Geneva agreements and defending the Pathet 
Lao's revolutionary interests. After Chou En-lai sent condolences to 
Premier Souvanna Phouma on Quinim Pholsena's death, China charged 
that the United States had provoked the recent political murders and 
military conflicts to subvert the coalition and rekindle civil war in Laos. 
When the Laotian Ambassador to Thailand countercharged that two 
Chinese Communist regiments had occupied the northern town of 
Muong Sing since March, 1963, the Chinese Government issued a state-
ment on April 16, attacking U.S. "aggression" and "intervention" in the 
domestic affairs of Laos. It said: 
U.S. imperialism had never ceased its scheming activities of infringing on 
Laotian sovereignty, interfering in Laotian internal affairs and undermining 
Laotian peace and neutrality ever since the formation of the Laotian Government 
of National Union and the conclusion of the Geneva agreements . . . . The 
purpose of U.S. imperialism is precisely to intimidate and disintegrate the 
Laotian neutralist forces, and sow dissension in the relations of unity and coopera-
tion between the neutralist group and the Neo Lao Haksat.17 
In order to arrest the downward trend of Laotian events, the Chinese 
requested the Geneva Co-chairmen to take "necessary measures" 
against the increased American intervention in Laos. This tactic—a 
common one in Chinese Laotian policy—was meant to achieve one of 
two objectives: either to restrain further American involvement in 
Laos or to shift to the Co-chairmen partial responsibility for the deteri-
orating situation. China also suggested that the Co-chairmen call the 
Conference if the United States persisted in its aggressive policy in 
Laos. By this proposal the Chinese acknowledged that the 1962 Geneva 
formula could not operate without being substantially recast at another 
international parley. Their proposal also showed that they considered 
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a Geneva type of conference a useful platform in their campaign against 
the United States. As early as April 11, United Nations Secretary-Gen-
eral U Thant had made a similar proposal. But, unlike Dag Hammar-
skjold, U Thant showed himself reluctant to get the United Nations 
involved in Laos. Noting that neither China nor North Vietnam were 
members of the United Nations, he said he did not see how the U.N. 
could be usefully and effectively involved in finding a solution to the 
Laotian problem.18 
While the Chinese strengthened their diplomatic offensive, they 
were increasingly alarmed by overt military measures undertaken by 
the United States in Laos. The U.S. had already supplied Kong Le's 
army with arms and war materials to help him maintain his "defensive 
capacity." The Chinese claimed that the United States had, in addition, 
granted more than $30 million military aid to Phoumi Nosavan and 
expanded his armed forces. They devoted considerable attention to a 
series of military maneuvers conducted by the U.S. and its allies around 
Laos. These included the Thai-South Vietnam joint military demon-
stration along the Laotian border, the dispatch of the U.S. Seventh Fleet 
to the Gulf of Siam, and other exercises involving SEATO powers in 
the South China Sea and U.S. airplanes in the Philippines. 
Deeply conscious of the growing American encroachment upon 
Laos and Vietnam, the Chinese attempted to coordinate an anti-Ameri-
can policy with North Vietnam and to compete with Russia's moderate 
Indo-China policy. During May, Chairman Liu Shao-ch'i conferred 
with Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi and signed a joint declaration of "intense 
concern" over the grave situation in Laos.19 The Chinese demanded 
once again that the Geneva Co-chairmen take "effective emergency 
measures" to check U.S. imperialist aggression in Laos and to remove 
the threat to Laos' neutrality. They made their diagnosis clear, but— 
except for a reference to the Co-chairmen's desired role—left their 
remedy vague. The Liu-Ho statement failed to discuss the possibility 
of further negotiations, including Chen Yi's previous suggestion for 
another international conference. It was doubtless feared that a strong 
call for negotiations would be construed as a sign of weakness in the 
face of the increasing tension in Laos. Moreover, in early May, Souvan-
na Phouma and Souphanouvong, unable to reach any constructive 
agreement in their three-day negotiations at Khang Khay, only traded 
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mutual accusations.20 In reality the Chinese had already recognized 
the failure of their initial diplomatic maneuvers; therefore, they decided 
to assist the Pathet Lao's limited armed operations unobtrusively. 
With civil war renewed in Laos, Souvanna Phouma was forced to 
rely on the International Commission's peacekeeping authority. When 
he requested the Commission's assistance in arranging a cease-fire in 
the strategically important Plain of Jars in April, 1963, the Indian 
Chairman Avtar Singh joined the Canadian delegation in sending a 
permanent inspection team to Kong Le's headquarters in the Plain 
despite the protests of the NLH and the Polish member of the Commis-
sion. This was the first time the Polish delegation boycotted the Com-
mission's important operation, thereby showing the intrinsic weakness 
of the international control mechanism. Except for supervising the 
withdrawal of foreign forces, the Commission had indeed done little 
since the conclusion of the second Geneva Conference. As a Western 
observer aptly said, "With limited men, and even more limited means 
of communication, divided ideologically, and lacking any authority its 
task is hopeless."21 
The Commission's permanent team became a convenient object of 
strong Chinese opposition. They called it illegal on the ground that it 
overstepped the Commission's terms of reference and lacked the re-
quired full cooperation of the Polish member and of the coalition gov-
ernment. In a Foreign Ministry statement the CPR called upon the 
Geneva Co-chairmen to dissolve the team immediately.22 The Soviet 
Union, too, pointed out the illegality of the Commission's team in the 
Plain of Jars, but avoided any outright denunciation of the Commission 
or its Indian and Canadian members. Foreign Minister Gromyko, evi-
dently unhappy with the renewed fighting in Laos, issued a joint appeal 
with the British Co-chairman on May 29, asking the warring factions 
in Laos to effect an immediate truce and thus allow the Commission to 
initiate its activities. Both Co-chairmen, clearly intending to use the 
Commission to settle the armed conflict, endorsed its proposal for restor-
ing what had been the status quo prior to June, 1962. As the proposal 
required the Pathet Lao to give up all the territory won since that time, 
it was certainly unacceptable to Souphanouvong as well as to his Asian 
Communist supporters. 
The relationship between the CPR and the Commission declined 
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to a new low when the direct conflict of interests between China and 
India intensified in Laos and elsewhere. For example, in a note to the 
RLG, the Indian and Canadian members of the Commission proposed 
to investigate a report that some Chinese troops had been found in 
northern Laos. The Chinese responded with an "authorized" statement 
by the Hsinhua News Agency (June 6) that such an allegation was 
simply an out-and-out lie. The Indian and Canadian members, they 
said, had been "willing tools of U.S. imperialism in its aggression and 
intervention in Laos." The Commission, they further asserted, had 
repeatedly submitted to the Co-chairmen reports distorting the Laotian 
situation and slandering the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the 
Chinese People's Republic.28 This severe criticism also challenged the 
qualifications of Commission Chairman Avtar Singh. The Chinese 
bluntly argued that he had failed to carry out his responsibilities in a 
fair, impartial way. In line with Chinese moves, the Pathet Lao frus-
trated the Commission's efforts for inspection and investigation, even 
shooting at the Commission's helicopters flying over the "liberated 
areas." 
Both China and North Vietnam refused to help the Commission 
solve its financial difficulties. At the second Geneva Conference the five 
principal powers—America, Britain, China, France, and Russia—had 
assumed all of the pre-accord expenditures of the Commission (April, 
1961-July, 1962) and most of its post-accord expenditures (July, 1962-
June, 1963). As Table 5 shows, China was the only principal power 
which did not pay in full its share of the pre-accord and post-accord 
expenditures. North Vietnam did not fulfill its financial responsibility 
at all, while both Russia and Poland paid their shares in full.24 By 
withholding these funds, both China and North Vietnam expressed 
their dissatisfaction with the way the Commission had been "mis-
guided" by the Indian Chairman and hindered the Commission from 
replacing its two damaged helicopters. 
This systematic challenge to the Commission embarrassed both the 
United States and the Soviet Union, both of which attempted to pre-
serve the Commission's normal supervisory and investigative function 
as the only possible way within the framework of the Geneva accords 
of helping keep the peace. The United States in particular was satisfied 
to see the Commission's "demonstrable value" and "important effect" 
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in confining the Communists to minor military actions in Laos. As 
Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman later testified at the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, the United States acknowledged that the 
Commission's very presence had played an "essential role" in keeping 
the lid on in Laos and that the Commission's reports to expose Commu-
nist bad faith had contributed to increased free world support for Pre-
mier Souvanna Phouma.25 In fact, the Asian Communists were irritated 
by Souvanna Phouma's use of the Commission to protect his shaky 
authority and precarious government. In his notes to Chairman Avtar 
Singh and Lord Home during June, Souvanna Phouma charged that 
military operations of the Pathet Lao and its external allies, especially 
"Vietminh troops" within Laos, had made the cease-fire agreements 
practically null, and requested the Commission to investigate the matter 
closely.26 
Meanwhile Pathet Lao representatives had maintained an uncertain 
life in a Vientiane under the control of General Siho Lamphoutacoul, 
a young protege of Phoumi Nosavan and a powerful Chief of the Vien-
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tiane Bureau of National Security. Siho made even further attempts to 
strengthen his anti-Communist position in September, 1963. Taking 
advantage of a firing incident in Vientiane on September 9, his right-
wing troops surrounded the residences of Pathet Lao representatives 
and fired at their security-guards. They also allegedly encircled the 
Embassy of North Vietnam and placed the personnel of the Chinese 
Embassy under surveillance.27 
The Chinese viewed this episode as a premeditated attempt to force 
the remaining Pathet Lao representatives and their guards out of the 
tripartite coalition. Ambassador Liu Ch'un conveyed to Souvanna 
Phouma China's serious concern with the situation, one "extremely 
unfavorable" to the implementation of the Geneva agreements. But 
Liu's efforts proved fruitless and the conference among the three Lao-
tian groups which was arranged by the Commission and the Co-chair-
men broke down as well. After the disappointed Souvanna Phouma 
left the conference for the United Nations, Phoumi Vongvichit bitterly 
accused him of opportunistic politics and said he had moved so close to 
Phoumi Nosavan and away from the NLH that he was no longer 
neutral. In a series of comments and statements the Chinese endorsed 
Souphanouvong's proposal for neutralizing Vientiane and urged the 
Co-chairmen and the Commission to guarantee the freedom and safety 
of Pathet Lao personnel in Vientiane. Given the failure of the tripartite 
negotiations, the NLH organized a number of limited military maneu-
vers against the outposts held by Phoumi Nosavan and Kong Le. In 
October, the NLH Central Committee adopted a militant manifesto 
asking the Laotian people to increase their unity and alertness and to 
wage a resolute struggle against the United States and the Laotian 
"reactionaries."28 At the same time the United States warned against 
a significant increase in truck convoys carrying rice, fuel, ammunition, 
and arms from North Vietnam to the Pathet Lao forces. It was also 
noted with alarm that there were about 2,000-5,000 North Vietnamese 
soldiers within Laos.29 
The tense political turmoil in Laos inevitably aggravated the rela-
tionship between the CPR and the Laotian right wing; as an exponent 
of the "two Chinas" idea, the right wing was regarded with hostility 
by Peking. Whenever the Chinese saw the slightest possibility that their 
diplomatic position might be compromised, they launched a forceful 
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attack. They also utilized the "two Chinas" issue indirectly to secure 
the political influence necessary to check an anti-Communist upsurge 
in Vientiane. In October, 1963, when Phoumi Nosavan attended a 
Chinese National Day reception sponsored by pro-Chiang elements in 
Vientiane and when the RLG permitted some Overseas Chinese to 
visit Taiwan, Liu Ch'un protested these "incidents," calling them part 
of a U.S. scheme to create a "two Chinas" situation in Laos.30 Again in 
November, 1963, Liu Ch'un delivered a note to the Laotian Foreign 
Ministry protesting the "defamatory and slanderous" attack of Phoumi 
Nosavan, who said the CPR lacked sincerity in implementing the 
Geneva agreements and disrespected the sovereignty of Laos. Liu also 
protested the rightists' publication of a "forged document" maligning 
him personnally and accusing Peking of interfering in the internal 
affairs of Laos.31 Such "absolutely groundless" cases, he said, would 
not impair the CPR's prestige nor cause a change in its "impartial 
policy" toward Laos; they would merely show how the anti-Peking 
slanderers were serving the U.S. campaign against Peking. After re-
affirming China's respect for the Geneva agreements and the principle 
of noninterference in the domestic affairs of Laos, Liu urged the RLG 
to respect in return the importance of the Sino-Laotian friendship and 
to take effective measures against the "mudslinging campaign" con-
ducted by the right wing. 
As the monsoon season (March-October) had permitted the Pathet 
Lao to secure some military gains, the Chinese, apparently hoping to 
preserve the military status quo during the dry season (November-
February), sent out peace feelers on the Laotian question. This was 
intended to forestall a possible counter-offensive by the right-wing 
forces who could use the dry weather to subject the Pathet Lao to air 
and artillery attacks. The Chinese were also apprehensive of the grad-
ual American involvement in the "special war" against the National 
Liberation Front of South Vietnam (or "Vietcong") during 1963, and 
realized that any excessive military provocation by the Pathet Lao 
might precipitate a similar U.S. intervention in Laos. Thus, a com-
mentator in People's Daily (November 15, 1963) suggested that the 
three parties in Laos could solve their own problems through negotia-
tions provided the United States withdrew. Anxious to prevent a mili-
tary escalation during the dry season, he also warned that the United 
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States was plotting yet another "large-scale military venture" in that 
war-torn country. In spite of these predictions and warnings, China's 
policy at this time was clearly shifting from armed campaign to peace-
ful negotiations. 
At the same time the Soviet Union was eager to bring about a peace-
ful condition in Laos. During Premier Souvanna Phouma's visit to 
Moscow from October to November, 1963, Khrushchev reportedly prom-
ised to persuade the NLH to cooperate with Souvanna Phouma, agreed 
to terminate the Russian oil supply to the NLH, and supported a pro-
posal for moving the administrative capital from Vientiane to Luang 
Prabang. In late November, the Soviet Government officially, stopped 
its military assistance program to the Pathet Lao and actively partici-
pated in the arrangements for a negotiated settlement in Laos.32 
A month later the NLH Secretary-General Phoumi Vongvichit and 
Souvanna Phouma's representative, Sisoumang Sisaleusak, could meet 
and reach an important agreement. They decided to demilitarize Luang 
Prabang, create a tripartite mixed police force there, and transfer the 
administrative capital from Vientiane to Luang Prabang.38 Accom-
panied by the Soviet and British Ambassadors and the Commission 
representatives, Souvanna Phouma himself went to Sam Neua for dis-
cussions with Souphanouvong. Both leaders agreed to endorse the 
Phoumi-Sisoumang accords and to hold tripartite summit talks with 
Phoumi Nosavan. Souphanouvong said all four NLH Ministers and 
Secretaries of State would join the coalition in the neutralized Luang 
Prabang.34 Only at the end of March, 1964, did the three Laotian 
groups agree on the meticulous details of security measures to be taken 
for the forthcoming tripartite negotiations. 
Although Souvana Phouma obtained Khrushchev's personal assur-
ances, he no doubt realized that the tripartite negotiations could hardly 
succeed without Chinese and North Vietnamese support, especially in 
view of their growing influence over the NLH leaders. This considera-
tion inspired Souvanna Phouma's "good-will" visit to Peking and Hanoi 
in April, 1964. For China, however, it seemed clear that Souvanna 
Phouma had lost much of his previous usefulness relative to Chinese 
objectives in Laos and had shown overt anti-Communist inclinations 
since April, 1963. If, however, he could be persuaded to resume a 
stance conducive to their interests, the Chinese might again attempt to 
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exploit his premiership. Given this prospect, the Chinese had prudently 
refrained from attacking Souvanna Phouma in person, thus keeping 
the door open for a reconciliation with him. For this reason, even 
when the NLH bitterly accused Souvanna Phouma of opportunistic 
behavior, the Chinese had publicly contended that he had only bowed 
to American "coercion." 
As a result Souvanna Phouma's visit to China in 1964 took place in 
circumstances vastly different from those of his previous official visits. 
This time the Chinese received him with a mixture of suspicion and 
expectation and without the enthusiastic fanfare that had been accorded 
him in the past. At a Peking banquet Chou En-lai, mindful of the 
visitor's recent pro-American tendency, emphasized the "common 
wishes and interests" between China and Laos in fighting imperialism 
and safeguarding peace in Indo-China.35 He charged the U.S. "im-
perialists" with violating the Geneva agreements and creating all the 
trouble in Laos. It was essential for Chou that a peaceful settlement in 
Laos be achieved without external interference and with the coopera-
tion of "patriotic forces." In the context of Laotian politics Chou 
meant to encourage a common front composed of Souphanouvong's 
NLH, Deuane's progressive neutralists, and Souvanna Phouma's con-
servative neutralists. But, in the Sino-Laotian joint statement, he voiced 
a hope that the "three political forces"—not only the "patriotic forces" 
but also the right-wing group—would join together and settle their own 
problems without foreign interference.36 He also pledged Chinese 
support to Souvanna Phouma's government in "pursuing a policy of 
peace and neutrality," inferring that China might not support it if it 
did not follow such a policy. If Chou indeed meant this, his conditional 
support could have been just another manifestation of his doubts regard-
ing Souvanna Phouma's political orientation. At any rate the Chinese 
gave the visitor a formal blessing for the tripartite negotiations. 
It seems likely that the Chinese expressed to Souvanna Phouma their 
dissatisfaction over the understanding reached between Phoumi Nosa-
van and South Vietnamese Premier Nguyen Khanh in March, 1964, 
according to which Laos agreed to the reopening of Saigon's Embassy 
to Vientiane and permitted South Vietnamese soldiers to enter Laos in 
hot pursuit of the "Vietcong." Such a protest would account for Sou-
vanna Phouma's declaration that he was pleased with the Chinese 
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decision not to link the solution of Laotian problems with that of the 
conflict in South Vietnam. Earlier, on his way to China, Souvanna 
Phouma met with Premier Pham Van Dong in Hanoi, and their joint 
statement reaffirmed the principle of noninterference in the domestic 
affairs of each other. During Souvanna Phouma's stay in China, 227 
delegates of the Neo Lao Haksat opened the second National Congress 
in Sam Neua province, elected the central leadership, and adopted a 
ten-point political manifesto.87 Although the manifesto continued to 
call for negotiations among three Laotian groups, it nevertheless em-
phasized the importance of fighting U.S. "imperialism" and defending 
the "liberated areas/' In these revolutionary base areas the NLH had 
indeed consolidated its control. It had, for example, undertaken agrar-
ian reforms, abolished various taxes, opened new primary schools, and 
introduced collective work systems into some villages. 
Section Three: Reorientation of Chinese Policy in Laos 
On April 17, 1964, Souvanna Phouma, with formal support from 
Peking and Hanoi, held negotiations with Souphanouvong and Phoumi 
Nosavan in the Plain of Jars but failed to bridge the conflicting posi-
tions of his two counterparts. Two days later any remaining hope for 
further tripartite talks was completely shattered by the right-wing 
generals' coup d'etat in Vientiane. Generals Kouprasit Abhay and Siho 
Lamphoutacoul placed Souvanna Phouma under house arrest and de-
clared their intention to reorganize his already paralyzed government 
without NLH Ministers. The coup was immediately confronted with 
repudiations not only by the Communist countries but also from the 
United States and Great Britain. 
As the coup threatened to eliminate even a semblance of the coalition 
formula in Laos, the Chinese predictably responded with accusations 
and demands. They charged that the coup was a "premeditated action" 
jointly engineered by the United States and the right-wing generals in 
violation of the Geneva settlement.38 Though they said the coup's im-
mediate objective was to prevent further tripartite summit talks, they 
viewed its significance in the broad context of U.S. policy throughout 
Indo-China. The coup, they insisted, was only one step in U.S. plans 
to "tighten its control over Laos, expand its war of aggression in South 
Vietnam, and aggravate the tension in Indo-China and Southeast Asia." 
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In a propaganda offensive closely coordinated with the NLH and 
North Vietnam, the Chinese demanded the release of Souvanna 
Phouma and the punishment of the coup leaders. They also suggested 
that the three Laotian groups should meet and adopt measures to ensure 
that the coalition government could function. In spite of their deep 
suspicion toward Souvanna Phouma, the Chinese backed up his pre-
miership hoping that he would form the united front with the NLH 
against the right-wing generals and repeat the earlier Souvanna 
Phouma-Souphanouvong alliance forged in the wake of Phoumi Nosa-
van's 1960 rebellion. At that time President Eisenhower's endorsement 
of Phoumi Nosavan's armed revolt had so antagonized Souvanna 
Phouma that the latter had established an alliance with the Pathet Lao. 
But this time President Johnson denounced the coup d'etat and sent 
to Vientiane Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy as a trouble-
shooter. Unlike Parsons in October, 1960, Bundy, together with Am-
bassador Leonard Unger, worked out a compromise between Souvanna 
Phouma and the right-wing generals: while Souvanna Phouma re-
gained his political freedom, he agreed to reorganize the government 
with people recommended by the coup leaders. Furthermore, Souvanna 
Phouma, having announced the merger of right-wing and neutralist 
forces under his leadership, asked the Pathet Lao to put its troops under 
his control for the sake of national unity. He in fact met with his half-
brother Souphanouvong in Khang Khay but failed to produce any 
constructive result. In an obvious rebuttal to the Chinese contention 
that he illegally promised to reorganize the coalition under U.S. "coer-
cion," Souvanna Phouma declared that his exercise of power as a leader 
of the combined right-wing-neutralist forces was "free" and "legal." 
The Chinese, however, insisted that America's mediation between 
Souvanna Phouma and the right-wing generals was part of an attempt 
to absorb the neutralists and set up an openly pro-U.S. government in 
Vientiane. When the Pathet Lao forces, in cooperation with Col. 
Deuane's progressive neutralist dissidents, drove Kong Le's forces out 
of the strategically vital Plain of Jars in the middle of May, the Chi-
nese promptly called the action self-defensive. Aware that only a 
drastic off ensive would upset the cooperation between Souvanna Phouma 
and Kouprasit Abhay, the Chinese flatly refused the British request 
that they help restrain the Pathet Lao's military activities.39 The suc-
114 
cessful Pathet Lao forces, it was estimated, were assisted by more than 
one dozen battalions of North Vietnamese regulars whose main func-
tion was to protect the supply trails through Laos; in addition each 
Pathet Lao unit contained a group of North Vietnamese cadres—esti-
mated to number one for every ten Pathet Lao soldiers—who trained 
troops, conducted political indoctrination, and handled certain techni-
cal work.40 At the urgent request of Souvanna Phouma the United 
States increased its military and personnel assistance to Vientiane, and 
announced the dispatch of jet planes over the Plain of Jars. Souvanna 
Phouma also asked for military aid from Moscow in his letter to Soviet 
Ambassador Afanasyev; in refusing the request, the Soviet Government 
appealed for the resumption of negotiations among the three Laotian 
groups.41 
In the controversy over foreign military interference in Laos the Chi-
nese found themselves directly involved. When the Laotian Ministry of 
National Defense charged in May, 1964, that two Chinese battalions 
had long been in Muong Sing and that two additional companies had 
fought the Royal Army in Long Ya, the Chinese denied the "slanders" 
through the Hsinhua News Agency, just as they had denied a similar 
allegation a year earlier.42 After declaring that "Chinese troops have 
never entered any place in Laos," the Hsinhua statement said those 
fabricated allegations were meant to confuse international public opin-
ion and to cover up U.S. military maneuvers. In response to proposals 
by Prince Sihanouk and by President Charles de Gaulle for another 
Geneva Conference, Chen Yi suggested on May 26 that it was "urgent" 
and "imperative" for the Co-chairmen to reconvene, without any pre-
conditions, a fourteen-nation conference at Phnom Penh in June, 
1964.43 He also asked them to instruct the three Laotian groups to send 
a single Laotian delegation to the proposed Phnom Penh parley. Had 
that conference ever been held, he would, we can assume, have proposed 
discussion of such region-wide issues as Cambodia and South Vietnam. 
Souvanna Phouma, however, refused to accept the call for an un-
conditional conference outright. Although he acknowledged the need 
for a conference, he presented two preconditions—a cease-fire and the 
withdrawal of Pathet Lao forces to their positions of mid-May, 1964. 
His stand, unacceptable to the Pathet Lao, strengthened U.S. opposition 
to any conference on Laos; a State Department statement simply indi-
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cated that a conference should be held only if Souvanna Phouma's con-
ditions were met.44 
To gain a diplomatic objective, the Chinese exploited an incident 
during June, 1964, involving an attack by alleged U.S. fighter-bombers 
on the Chinese Economic and Cultural Mission in Khang Khay, which 
killed one Chinese and wounded five others. They bitterly denounced 
this "new debt of blood" the United States owed China, but held back 
from making it a casus belli. Neither did they offer any specific threat 
of retaliation in case of a second provocation by the United States. 
Rather, they used the incident to promote their diplomatic interest. 
Since the bombing episode made the Laotian situation all the more 
critical, they argued, the Geneva Co-chairmen should immediately hold 
"emergency discussions" and call the fourteen-nation conference with-
out further delay.45 
But the United States dismissed the Chinese protest and continued to 
reject any new international conference on Laos. Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk simply suggested: "No new agreements are required. All 
that is needed is compliance with the agreements already made."46 De-
claring that a Communist takeover in Laos would be as unacceptable 
as one in South Vietnam, he emphasized the broad stakes involved in 
the question of Laos: 
It is in the vital interest of the free world that Peiping and Hanoi—and all Com-
munists everywhere—learn, once and for all, that they cannot reap rewards from 
militancy, aggression by seepage, and duplicity. For our part, we certainly do not 
intend to abandon the peoples of Laos or Vietnam or other countries who are 
trying to remain free from Communist domination. 
This statement clearly shows that Washington was just as ready to 
defend Laos and South Vietnam as Peking and Hanoi were to prove the 
invincibility of "people's war" in these same countries. 
In the meantime the Chinese, stubbornly reiterating their own dip-
lomatic preference, rejected all other alternatives for peaceful solution 
of the Laotian crisis. They were especially opposed to the British pro-
posal for fourteen-nation ambassadorial consultations at Vientiane. 
They thought this merely a scheme to obstruct the proposed Phnom 
Penh conference. When the month-long consultations among only six 
countries—America, Britain, India, Canada, South Vietnam, and Thai-
land—adopted a final communique upholding Souvanna Phouma's 
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preconditions for the conference and deploring North Vietnam's inter-
vention into Laos, the Chinese simply called it "null and void." They 
argued that the Geneva accords did not authorize any meeting short of 
all fourteen nations.47 
By the same legal argument the Chinese also opposed the Moscow-
endorsed Polish proposal for a meeting of six countries—the Co-chair-
men (Britain and Russia), the Commission member-states (India, 
Canada, Poland), and Laos. The special importance accorded these 
five countries angered the Chinese, with their self-assumed responsibility 
for solving Asian problems. Thus, they attacked the Russian support 
for such an arrangement on the ground that any consultation among 
part of the Geneva Conference participants—even including the Co-
chairmen—would violate the provision for joint consultations and 
serve the U.S. policy of delaying an international parley. When the 
Soviet Union, faced with growing criticism of both Peking and Hanoi, 
scrapped the Polish proposal, the Chinese praised the change in Mos-
cow's position.48 
Despite occasional reconciliations the conflict between Peking and 
Moscow in world affairs grew worse, inevitably affecting their policies 
toward Laos. The Soviet Union often hesitated to take a peaceful ini-
tiative for fear of Chinese accusations. Sometimes even Moscow's 
silence was criticized. For example, People's Daily complained on June 
15: "Will you [the Geneva Co-chairmen] ignore, connive with and 
even encourage the aggressive actions of U.S. imperialism or immedi-
ately adopt effective measures to stop them?" As Co-chairman, the 
Soviet Government was then advised not to remain silent in the face of 
such U.S. activities but to discharge its international duties "seriously 
and correctly."49 
In the middle of 1964, however, Premier Khrushchev indicated his 
intention to retreat from an active role in Southeast Asia, even to the 
point of considering resignation from Geneva Co-chairmanship. He 
had to play the delicate game of preserving a general understanding 
with the United States in Laos while avoiding at the same time Chinese 
accusations of a "sell-out." The Soviet Union indeed complained that 
the Polish proposal for negotiations had been rejected under "various 
unfounded pretexts" (presumably including one raised by Peking), and 
that the systematic violations of the Geneva accords by "certain states" 
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had placed the Co-chairmen in an awkward and fictitious position 
serving no useful purpose.50 If the international conference was not 
soon held, the Soviet Government threatened that it would be compelled 
to review the question of its continuing as a Co-chairman. When 
Khrushchev met with British Foreign Secretary R. A. Butler in July, 
he explained that the Soviet Union did not want deep involvement in 
Laos only to come into conflict with China.51 
But the Chinese seemed to enjoy this very awkward position of the 
Soviet Union. For they saw in Moscow's powerless Co-chairmanship 
a convenient instrument of pressure and propaganda. Moreover the 
resignation of a Co-chairman was likely to render the Geneva system 
more chaotic and to undermine Peking's efforts for another conference. 
Thus, the Chinese persuaded Moscow not to relinquish its obligations 
as Co-chairman but to fulfill them more seriously. They made it clear, 
though, that should Moscow still wish to resign the Co-chairmanship, 
it was essential to hold a new conference first to discuss that question.52 
After Khrushchev was overthrown in October, 1964, the new Soviet 
leaders—Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev and Premier Aleksei Kosy-
gin—gradually renewed their initiatives in Southeast Asia and never 
again raised the question of resigning from the Co-chairmanship. 
Until April, 1964, China alternated between suspicion and optimism 
in its attitude toward Premier Souvanna Phouma. From April to June, 
however, relations between him and China deteriorated to an exchange 
of hostilities. The Chinese had long expected Souvanna Phouma to 
follow Sihanouk's policy, but to their disillusionment, he turned out to 
be the Nehru of Laos. From the Chinese perspective Souvanna Phouma, 
formerly a close friend and patriotic neutralist, turned anti-Chinese and 
rendered himself the tool of U.S. imperialism, opposing the patriotic 
forces in Laos. This public dispute with Souvanna Phouma was diplo-
matically costly to the Chinese, but they could hardly avoid repudiating 
his increasingly anti-Communist activities, which ranged from the 
merger of neutralist-right-wing forces to the unilateral reorganization 
of the coalition structure and the acceptance of U.S. military commit-
ments.53 
The dispute further intensified when Souvanna Phouma directly 
challenged the fundamental premises of Chinese policy toward Laos. 
Not only did he question the legal basis of the Chinese Economic and 
118 
Cultural Mission in Khang Khay, but he also claimed that China had 
always followed a "policy of annexation" toward Laos. As evidence for 
this assertion he said that China was building a second road linking 
Yunnan and northern Laos; he also said that Laos had recently arrested 
two Chinese intruders in the northern part of the Kingdom. In re-
sponse the Chinese categorically stated that they had not started build-
ing another road in Laos since they completed in April, 1963, the "Lao-
tian-Chinese Friendship Highway," linking Phong Saly to Meng La in 
Yunnan Province.54 The two arrested Chinese "construction workers," 
they suggested, had merely crossed the border illegally; their case could 
be properly handled according to international practice. 
The Chinese also retorted that the Mission had been legally estab-
lished at the request of Premier Souvanna Phouma himself in 1961. 
Therefore, they said, "his lack of good faith" was "absurd and incred-
ible." Since November, 1961, the Mission had been a useful instrument 
of Chinese policy in dealing with the NLH in Khang Khay area. In 
addition to its cultural and economic functions the Mission had con-
trolled and coordinated a group of Chinese advisers and cadres attached 
to the NLH and thus, together with the Chinese Consulate-General in 
Phong Saly, facilitated Chinese activities in the "liberated areas," where 
the Russians had neither an official nor an unofficial representation. 
This is the reason that the Chinese, notwithstanding the heated contro-
versy with the RLG, continued to preserve the Mission. 
This controversy suggested that Souvanna Phouma's conservative 
nationalism conflicted sharply with China's Communist ideology and 
national interest. Obviously the Chinese could not leave untouched the 
implications of Souvanna Phouma's "vilifications" against their national 
pride and policy objectives in Laos. In an unmistakable warning, they 
declared: 
Nothing good will come to Prince Souvanna Phouma if he chooses to follow in 
the footsteps of U.S. imperialism and the Laotian right-wing faction, opposing 
the patriotic forces at home and China and Vietnam Democratic Republic abroad. 
He should know that U.S. imperialism is playing a malicious trick to make him 
burn all his bridges behind him, estrange him from all forces which had once 
supported him and drive him into a blind alley.55 
In order not to close the door completely on reconciliation, however, 
the Chinese presented three conditions whereby Souvanna Phouma 
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might escape from that "blind alley": first, to renew unity with the 
NLH; second, to deal with the right wing only on the basis of patrio-
tism; and third, to follow a strict foreign policy of peace and neutrality 
entailing the resumption of his cooperation with Peking. 
If he failed to fulfill these requirements, China repeated, the "genu-
ine" middle forces in Laos would discard him.56 The Chinese argued 
that the middle forces, born and nurtured in the course of the patriotic 
anti-imperialist struggles in Laos, had already coalesced into an objec-
tive social force. This analysis meant that Souvanna Phouma could lead 
the country only by conforming to this unalterable social force; if he 
refused, he would lose his authority. In the past the Chinese had ac-
cepted Souvanna Phouma's leadership of the middle forces out of politi-
cal expediency; but, as soon as he deviated from their expectations, they 
introduced a convenient sophistry about middle forces to question his 
leadership. In a discussion of the dual nature of middle forces in Chi-
nese revolutionary experience, Li Wei-han concluded that, as the revo-
lution progressed, a certain middle force, by losing a positive revolu-
tionary aspect and assuming a negative reactionary aspect, lost its 
qualifications for leading the revolution and often became friends of 
the enemy.57 No doubt the Chinese found this process of political de-
generation in Souvanna Phouma's recent "reactionary" and "hostile" 
inclinations. 
Already neutralized by Souvanna Phouma's obstructive tactics, Chi-
nese efforts to convene an unconditional conference on Laos were dealt 
a severe blow by the Gulf of Tonkin crisis in August, 1964. When 
North Vietnamese torpedo boats allegedly attacked two U.S. naval 
vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin, the U.S. immediately responded with air 
attacks against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Viet-
nam. Both President Johnson and Secretary Rusk argued that the 
North Vietnamese attacks were not an isolated event but part of a 
Communist drive to conquer South Vietnam and Laos and eventually 
dominate other free nations in Southeast Asia. "In Laos," the President 
added, "the North Vietnamese regime had maintained military forces, 
used Laotian territory for infiltration into South Vietnam, and most 
recently carried out combat operations."58 Although President Johnson 
said the United States did not seek a wider war, the U.S. air attacks in 
120 
North Vietnam could only lead to extended war efforts in subsequent 
years. 
During the crisis the Chinese claimed that some of the U.S. airplanes 
attacking North Vietnam took off from Laotian bases, that the Pathet 
Lao's "liberated areas" became a frequent target of U.S. bombing mis-
sions, and that there was increasing military cooperation between 
Phoumi Nosavan and South Vietnam. In their usual region-wide assess-
ment of the crisis they asserted that U.S. policy aimed to escalate armed 
aggression throughout Indo-China and to reverse its losing course in 
the Vietnam war. Faced with what they called America's new military 
blackmail in Indo-China, the Chinese apparently decided that their 
previous efforts for negotiations in Laos should give way to a campaign 
for a determined anti-U.S. struggle by the Indochinese people. For it 
seemed to them that a continuing insistence on negotiations under these 
tense circumstances might undermine the fighting will of the Pathet 
Lao and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.59 
Indeed the historical "lesson" which the Chinese derived from the 
Tonkin incident showed the correctness of their extreme ideological 
position against imperialism and modern revisionism and deemphasized 
the usefulness of negotiations in Indo-China. On the basis of the Tonkin 
experience they could confidently reiterate their favorite polemical 
thesis that "one must not harbor illusions about imperialism" and "re-
laxation of vigilance and abandonment of struggle will forfeit world 
peace."60 Given such an ideological approach toward U.S. military 
maneuvers in Indo-China, it seems most probable that when Chen 
Yi conferred with Souphanouvong and Phoumi Vonvichit in Peking 
on August 22, he gave them China's doctrinaire interpretation of the 
Tonkin crisis and advised them not to show any sign of weakness at 
the forthcoming summit talks of the three Laotian groups in Paris. 
At the tripartite meetings in September, Souphanouvong rejected 
Souvanna Phouma's proposals for neutralizing the Plain of Jars, occu-
pied at the time by the Pathet Lao, and for recognizing the reorganized 
Vientiane government. When Souphanouvong returned to Peking to 
attend the fifteenth anniversary of the CPR, he said that the failure of 
the Paris talks was as much a result of obstructionism by Phoumi Nosa-
van as of Souvanna Phouma's capitulation to U.S. policy.61 He still 
favored in principle a negotiated settlement in Laos, but his militant 
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determination was also evident. If the United States and its "vassals" 
continued to attack the Pathet Lao, he warned, he would be obliged to 
strike back, just as Peking was urging. The U.S. aggression in Indo-
China, he emphasized at Peking, required close cooperation among 
China, Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam as "four fraternal and 
neighboring countries." Significantly, he mentioned no role for the 
Soviet Union in this joint anti-U.S. struggle. 
We should note here the similarity of his policy to Peking's, and 
also the correspondence between the NLH's strategic outlook and 
Peking's policy shifts in 1964. Apparently the Chinese ideological cam-
paign against Soviet "revisionism" did increase the likelihood of Pe-
king's emerging from this ideological dispute as the champion of the 
NLH's anti-U.S. struggle. Peking's militant ideological position against 
the United States "aggression" in Asia was more attractive and mean-
ingful to the NLH leaders, who also faced in the United States a for-
midable arch-enemy. This common problem evidently led the NLH 
leaders to accept Peking's basic position and, with it, Peking's analysis 
of Laos' domestic and external problems. For example, Souphanou-
vong, like the Chinese, proclaimed that imperialism was unchanging 
and that opportunistic and revisionist illusions about U.S. imperialism 
were out of place. He also said that Johnson's accession to the Presi-
dency did not alter the "aggressive and bellicose" nature of U.S. "im-
perialism."62 In ideological arguments with Moscow the Chinese often 
accused the Soviet "modern revisionists" of preaching that the Johnson 
Administration was sensible and realistic. 
Outside the area of ideology and propaganda the Chinese supported 
the NLH's revolutionary movements with growing economic and mili-
tary assistance. Without such Chinese aid and North Vietnam's massive 
military and economic commitments, the NLH could not have felt 
secure in fighting for survival against the U.S. power in Southeast Asia. 
As the U.S. military buildup increased in South Vietnam and Thailand, 
the NLH tended to identify itself with China even more closely 
than before. In the wake of the Tonkin incident and Moscow's indeci-
sive position over the crisis, Souphanouvong probably felt it more urgent 
than ever to declare his appreciation for China's guidance and protec-
tion in his anti-U.S. crusade. 
He stated at Peking that the Chinese revolutionary experiences and 
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successes afforded the Laotian people an "extremely important lesson," 
a "good example of organization," and "correct and clear-sighted gui-
dance."63 He had never given such a public tribute to Moscow, and his 
admiration for the Chinese suggested his willingness to apply Mao's 
revolutionary experiences to the NLH's anti-U.S. struggle. In turn the 
Chinese praised the NLH's revolutionary leadership in Laos and bitterly 
criticized Premier Souvanna Phouma. This contrasted sharply with 
Moscow's apparent efforts to maintain a cooperative relationship with 
Souvanna Phouma and to close the widening gap between him and the 
NLH. This ambiguous and conciliatory approach tended to drive the 
NLH leaders further into Peking's embrace. 
With their first nuclear detonation in October, the Chinese obviously 
expected to increase their influence upon national liberation movements. 
In a post-detonation statement they emphasized that their mastering 
of nuclear power would be a "great encouragement" to the revolution-
ary peoples and a "great contribution" to the cause of defending world 
peace.64 Such calculations elicited a favorable reaction from the NLH 
leaders, who, unlike the Russians, enthusiastically welcomed the Chi-
nese test. In his message to Premier Chou En-lai, Souphanouvong 
praised the "tremendous contribution" which China's nuclear power 
could make to the Laotian people's anti-imperialist struggles. As close 
neighbors of China, he said, "Laotian people regard the success of the 
Chinese people as our own and rejoice at and are inspired by the im-
portant success of the Chinese people."65 More important, Nouhak 
Phoumsavan, an influential member of the NLH Central Committee, 
noted that the Chinese achievement dealt U.S. "imperialists" and other 
"reactionaries" a heavy blow and brought the policy of nuclear mono-
poly and blackmail into complete discredit.66 
Despite the test, the CPR was far from attaining actual nuclear capa-
bility, let alone rivaling America's nuclear power. Yet the test did 
demonstrate China's military potentialities and enhance the attractive-
ness of its revolutionary model for the Pathet Lao. As a result the Chi-
nese helped their image as leaders of national liberation movements, 
and encouraged the Pathet Lao's political and military activities. 
When the United States stepped up its military pressure both in 
Vietnam and in Laos during the dry season of 1964, the Chinese saw 
in the move a coordinated effort against all revolutionary movements in 
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Southeast Asia. As the U.S. "special war" in South Vietnam was falter-
ing, they argued, President Johnson hoped to salvage something by 
spreading the war into Laos. Around this time the Chinese became in-
creasingly conscious of "evidences" that the United States was extending 
the Vietnam war into Laos. First, William H. Sullivan, a "right-hand 
man" of Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor, was named Ambassador to 
Laos. Again President Johnson accused North Vietnam of both sta-
tioning and sending troops through Laos. Finally, the U.S. intensified 
its air attacks over the "liberated areas" of Laos and South Vietnam, and 
called for Phoumi Nosavan's military cooperation with South Vietnam. 
In the face of these and other "evidences" the Chinese issued repeated 
warnings against the United States. An "observer" in People's Daily 
(December 12, 1964), for example, asserted that the "liberated areas," 
the precious fruits of the Laotian people's struggles, should be protected 
from U.S. aggression and added that "those who play with fire will 
burn themselves." At the first session of the third National People's 
Congress, Chou En-lai declared that if the United States enlarged the 
Vietnam war, the Chinese People's Republic would "absolutely not sit 
idly by."67 
On the military front the Pathet Lao operations were effectively 
restrained by continued U.S. bombing and strafing, especially from 
January, 1965. It was reported at the time that the Chinese had equipped 
the Pathet Lao with their 37 mm anti-aircraft guns to resist U.S. air 
operations.68 When the Pathet Lao shot down two U.S. jets in mid-
January, the United States publicly sought to justify the air attack as 
a required response to the repeated Communist violations of the 1962 
accords. The Chinese immediately asked Moscow and London to take 
realistic actions against the new military adventure of the U.S. in Laos, 
but did not repeat the need of a conference on Laos.69 When the Na-
tional Liberation Front destroyed U.S. military installations in the 
Pleiku area in early February, the U.S. not only started retaliatory at-
tacks against the southern portion of North Vietnam but also intensified 
bombing missions against the "Ho Chi Minh" routes through Laos. 
In response to the accelerating American military challenge in Indo-
China, the Chinese firmly endorsed the formation and mobilization of 
an anti-U.S. united front among the Indochinese peoples and identified 
themselves with the cause of such "popular movements." After taking 
124 
part in the "International Conference for Solidarity with the People of 
Vietnam against U.S. Imperialist Aggression and for the Defense of 
Peace," held in Hanoi in November, 1964, the Chinese attached a 
greater political significance to the "Indochinese People's Conference" 
at Phnom Penh in February, 1965.70 
In a message of inspiration to the Presidium of the Phnom Penh 
Conference, Chou En-lai asserted that the United States, in gross vio-
lation of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements, had conducted a "war 
of aggression" in South Vietnam, "direct armed intervention" against 
Laos, and "political subversion" against Cambodia.71 He said that, 
without withdrawal of U.S. aggressors from this entire region, any 
international agreement on Indo-China would, like the 1954 and 1962 
agreements, be sabotaged; therefore, Chou emphasized, as an essential 
condition for any peaceful solution, the United States should withdraw 
its military forces from Indo-China "completely, immediately and un-
conditionally." This important policy statement meant that the Chinese 
in 1965 were not interested in any partial solution without unconditional 
withdrawal of U.S. forces from all parts of Indo-China. The Chinese 
would not turn back the clock to 1962, when they had agreed to a settle-
ment on Laos which did not require withdrawal of U.S. troops from 
South Vietnam. 
In a resolution on Laos the Conference, while demanding that the 
U.S. withdraw its military personnel from that country, proposed a 
new Geneva Conference without any prior conditions. Just as they were 
indifferent to a similar suggestion in February, the Chinese conspicu-
ously failed to endorse that proposal in their otherwise enthusiastic 
reaction to the Phnom Penh Conference. In his message to Prince 
Sihanouk and the Permanent Secretariat, Chou En-lai pledged that 650 
million Chinese people would not spare any effort in assisting the 
Indochinese people's anti-U.S. struggle until final victory. But North 
Vietnam was dissatisfied with the participation of South Vietnam's 
"bourgeois neutralists" and the establishment of the Permanent Secre-
tariat at the Conference.72 
Chou's pledge was soon spelled out in greater detail in Chen Yi's 
letter to North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Xuan Thuy. On March 
28, Chen promised to send the necessary material aid and even Chinese 
volunteers to the South Vietnamese people at the latter's request. This 
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was a response to an appeal issued a week earlier by the National Liber-
ation Front of South Vietnam, which declared that it might request 
soldiers from various countries for South Vietnam if the United States 
continued to commit its combat troops to South Vietnam and to extend 
the war to North Vietnam and Laos.73 The CPR had never made such 
a firm, though conditional, public commitment to the Pathet Lao's 
revolutionary cause. Yet the likelihood remained that it would not 
hesitate to make a similar pledge if that step was considered conducive 
to its own interests. In April, the CPR also supported the National 
Liberation Front and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam when they 
responded to President Johnson's proposal for "unconditional discus-
sions" on Vietnam by demanding the withdrawal of U.S. forces from 
South Vietnam as a precondition for such discussions.74 The CPR 
seemed to adopt a similarly rigid position on the question of reconven-
ing an international parley on Laos. 
Although the International Commission proved to be ineffective 
against these violent developments in Laos, it still remained a persistent 
target of Chinese attack. The Geneva accords stipulated that the Co-
chairmen should make appropriate recommendations concerning the 
Commission's termination not later than three years from July, 1962. 
When the NLH Central Committee asked the Co-chairmen in July, 
1965, to consider the Commission's status, the Chinese called the request 
"timely" and also asked the Co-chairmen to deliberate on the question 
of suspending the Commission's activities.75 In December, however, 
the British Government unilaterally published a 200-page report sub-
mitted by the Indian and Canadian delegations of the Commission in 
September, 1965. On the basis of an interrogation of three North Viet-
namese prisoners captured in Laos, these delegations had concluded 
that "regulars of the North Vietnamese Armed Forces" had entered 
Laos between February and September, 1964, in groups varying in size 
from 50 to 650 soldiers and had fought, along with the Pathet Lao 
troops, against the Royal Laotian Army.76 After warning the United 
States against using the report as a pretext to spread the war to Laos, 
the Chinese asked the British Government and the Indian and Canadian 
members of the Commission to cease all their "illegal activities" im-
mediately. 
Meanwhile, the Chinese made every effort to undermine the author-
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ity of the Vientiane government, nominally headed by Premier Sou-
vanna Phouma but actually controlled by the right-wing generals. After 
Generals Phoumi Nosavan and Siho Lamphoutacoul escaped into Thai-
land following an abortive coup d'etat in early February, 1965, Gen. 
Kouprasit Abhay, along with Generals Ouan Rathikoun and Oudone 
Sananikone, emerged as a new strong man in Vientiane. Instead of 
Prince Boun Oum (the United States favorite), Education Minister 
Leuam Insisiengmay assumed the Vice-Premiership vacated by Phoumi 
Nosavan. Such right-wing leaders as Phoui Sananikone, Sisouk Na 
Champassak, Leuam Insisiengmay, and Kouprasit Abhay strengthened 
their political foundations in July, through restricting the general elec-
tion for the National Assembly; some 25,000 civil servants, army officers, 
teachers, merchants, and policemen voted to elect 59 deputies out of 
192 candidates. Neither the NLH nor the Santiphab were allowed to 
participate in the elections.77 In September, Premier Souvanna Phouma 
reorganized the cabinet; while keeping four Pathet Lao posts intact, 
he appointed Prince Boun Oum as Minister of Religion and Sisouk Na 
Champassak as Minister of Finance in place of Phoumi Nosavan. The 
schism within the right-wing groups, coupled with the fatal split of 
the neutralist group, made the Laotian political scene all the more con-
fused and unpredictable. And the gap between the RLG and the NLH 
continued to widen as the latter, together with Hanoi and Peking, con-
sistently repudiated Leuam Insisiengmay's Vice-Premiership, restricted 
elections, and Souvanna Phouma's cabinet reshuffle. 
The Chinese welcomed and encouraged as correct revolutionary 
tactics a series of measures taken by the NLH to mobilize the united 
front movements in Laos. In order to identify and publicize themselves 
more fully, the Pathet Lao forces adopted a Chinese type of official 
name, "the Laotian People's Liberation Army," under Supreme Com-
mander Khamtay Siphandone (a member of the Standing Committee 
of the NLH Central Committee). The NLH sponsored its first mass 
movement for self-reliance and productivity, and held a conference of 
administrative representatives of the "liberated areas." Most significant 
was the first meeting of the Political Consultative Conference at Sam 
Neua in October, 1965, between the NLH and the progressive neutralist 
forces. The Conference issued the so-called "Four-Point Stand and 
Five-Point Solution," a major policy statement repeated throughout 
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1966 and 1967.78 The manifesto emphasized as an immediate task that 
the political and military power of patriotic forces be increased and the 
liberated areas transformed into strong bases for a "protracted war of 
resistance." Like the statement the National Liberation Front of South 
Vietnam made in March, 1965, the Laotian manifesto "reserved" the 
right to call for, if necessary, the "practical support in all aspects" of the 
people and governments of peace-loving countries. 
In response the Chinese praised the manifesto as an expression of 
the broad anti-U.S. united front and of the common will of the Laotian 
people. A spokesman for the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC) expressed China's "firm support" for the mani-
festo. Similar expressions of support and sympathy were echoed in a 
number of statements by China's various "people's organizations."79 
Yet the Chinese clearly refrained from making the same kind of public 
pledge on behalf of the Laotian manifesto as that which Chen Yi had 
issued in response to the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam 
in March. The difference was not sufficient, however, to suggest that 
the Chinese considered the revolutionary movement in Laos less im-
portant than that in South Vietnam. As the military situation in South 
Vietnam turned against the National Liberation Front in the winter of 
1965, the Chinese modified their earlier optimistic outlook and con-
comitant public pledge, and assumed a more flexible commitment 
which allowed them more freedom of diplomatic maneuver in the 
fluid situation of Southeast Asia.80 
Section Four: Laos, The Vietnam War, and The Chinese Cultural 
Revolution 
During the winter of 1965, and thereafter, the Vietnam war was 
rapidly escalating in violence level and in geographic scope, and conse-
quently spreading into Laos. The main military dimensions of Laos' 
conflict were directly relevant to the use of the "Ho Chi Minh trails." 
In an attempt to secure these complex jungle trails, guarantee the in-
creasing infiltration of military personnel and supplies into South Viet-
nam, and assist the Pathet Lao's military operations, North Vietnam 
strengthened its regular army troops in Laos to the 20,000-30,000 level 
at the end of 1965.81 According to Douglas Pike, even the actual head-
quarters of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam was be-
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lieved to be in the Attopeu area of Laos.82 The U.S. used its B-52 
strategic bombers against these trails and authorized its forces in South 
Vietnam to enter Laos in hot pursuit of enemy troops. It also stepped 
up its military aid to the Royal Laotian Army troops and assumed a 
direct advisory role over them. 
While the Chinese were providing North Vietnam with a substantial 
amount of military and economic assistance and more than 40,000 non-
combatant advisers and engineers, they were deeply concerned that the 
war in Vietnam might spill even further into Laos.83 They repeatedly 
warned that the U.S. was planning to dispatch its ground forces to Cen-
tral and Lower Laos and build a strategic bridgehead linking Thailand 
and South Vietnam. In a Foreign Ministry statement on January 18, 
1966, the Chinese condemned the rapid increase in the U.S. military 
build-up and bombing missions in Laos. On the following day Defense 
Minister Lin Piao sent a special message to Supreme Commander 
Khamtay Siphandone of the Laotian People's Liberation Army, praising 
its heroic fighting in the forefront against the United States. In order 
to counter the expected massive U.S. invasion into Laos, Lin Piao prom-
ised the "firm support" of the Chinese people and the Chinese People's 
Liberation Army.84 
We must note that the timing of these two Chinese statements 
against U.S. policy in Laos coincided with a temporary suspension of 
U.S. bombing over North Vietnam from December 24,1965, to January 
31, 1966. During this time President Johnson conducted a worldwide 
diplomatic campaign to bring North Vietnam to peace talks, and Secre-
tary Aleksandr Shelepin of the Soviet Communist Party led a top-level 
delegation to Hanoi. Fearing that the new Soviet leaders had inherited 
Khrushchev's weakness toward imperialism, the Chinese apparently 
suspected Shelepin of leading a peace mission ready to make a "deal" 
with the United States over Vietnam. To dispel any wishful thinking 
on Moscow's or Hanoi's part, the Chinese clearly stated: "A mere 
glance at the doings of United States imperialism in Laos and the whole 
of Indo-China will reveal the real aims of the Johnson Administration 
in its 'peace offensive' on the Vietnam question."85 
To intensify the moral condemnation against U.S. bombing raids 
in Laos, China's means of communication were extensively mobilized 
to protest the alleged use of toxic chemicals by the United States. In 
129 
a letter to the Geneva Co-chairmen in February, Phoumi Vongvichit 
claimed that the U.S. bombers were dropping napalm, phosphorous 
bombs, and toxic chemicals to massacre the Laotian people, and that 
the raids had been carried out on an increasingly larger scale—forma-
tions of 15 to 20 aircraft conducting from two to three hundred raids a 
day.86 The Chinese directly involved themselves by charging that U.S. 
jet planes had attacked and damaged their Consulate-General at Phong 
Saly and their Economic and Cultural Mission at Khang Khay in Feb-
ruary and March, 1966. A strong protest was lodged against the United 
States in Chinese Foreign Ministry statements issued immediately after 
each alleged attack:87 
In the course of expanding the war in Indo-China, U.S. imperialism has time 
and again made Chinese diplomatic missions in Laos targets of its attack. . . . 
This constitutes a deliberate provocation to the Chinese people. It is an account 
which must be settled. The Chinese Government strongly protests against this 
barbarous crime of the U.S. imperialists and their followers and solemnly points 
out that they must bear full responsibility for all the consequences arising there-
from. 
They issued a more serious warning to the RLG authorities for allowing 
the U.S. planes to carry out such raids and for taking part in anti-Peking 
activities. This put direct psychological pressure upon Vientiane against 
its open cooperation with Washington in Indo-China. Whereas Sou-
vanna Phouma questioned the legal basis for a Chinese Consulate-Gen-
eral at Phong Saly, both the NLH and the National Liberation Front 
of South Vietnam condemned the U.S. attack against the Chinese 
premises and expressed their solidarity and friendship with the "great, 
fraternal Chinese people." 
While Souvanna Phouma's leadership was somewhat troubled by 
the usual rivalries among divergent factions in Vientiane, as evidenced 
by the National Assembly's rejection of the Government's budget re-
quest in September and Air Force General Thao Ma's rebellion against 
General Kouprasit Abhay in October, the "liberated areas" strengthened 
ties among themselves.88 In a series of joint statements issued during 
1966, six NLH and progressive neutralist members of the 1962 National 
Union Government called upon the Laotian people, irrespective of 
political and religious beliefs, to unite around them for the final struggle 
against the United States.89 The second meeting of the Political Con-
sultative Conference of the NLH and the patriotic neutralist forces, held 
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in November, 1966, reaffirmed the correctness of the "Four-Point Stand 
and Five-Point Solution" adopted by the first meeting in October, 1965. 
It also decided to develop regular troops and guerrillas simultaneously, 
to promote the national patriotic movement in RLG-controlled areas, 
and to receive support from Indochinese and other Asian peoples. The 
NLH also organized the meetings for the youth and the intellectuals 
in the spring, held a cadre training institute in July, and sponsored the 
first meeting of administrative workers of Sam Neua in October. 
These conferences and activities, which were held under the NLH's 
auspices, were ultimately controlled and supervised by a small political 
elite of the Laotian People's Party (LPP)—a probable adjunct of the 
former Indochinese Communist Party. In an unusual "fraternal party 
greeting" sent to the Japanese Communist Party in October, 1966, Secre-
tary-General Kaysone Phoumvihan of the LPP Central Committee 
(NLH's Vice-Chairman) publicly admitted that "under the correct 
leadership of the Laotian People's Party, the Laotian people are solidly 
united in the Neo Lao Haksat and are encouraged by the unreserved 
support from various fraternal parties."90 It was the first time that the 
LPP revealed the name of its Secretary-General, its leadership over the 
NLH, and its fraternal relationship with the Japanese Communist 
Party. Yet there is little information to show the LPP's internal organi-
zation, membership size, and exact functions in Laos. Souvanna 
Phouma once said that the Pathet Lao presided over by Souphanouvong 
was only a "show window" of the People's Party Central Committee, 
which was controlled by Hanoi and Peking.91 
Of late Premier Souvanna Phouma had made extensive efforts to 
link the political and economic life of Vientiane with the free world, 
especially with pro-U.S. Asian countries. After Souvanna Phouma's 
official visit to Bangkok in November, 1965, Thai Prime Minister 
Thanom Kittikachorn, accompanied by Foreign Minister Thanat 
Khoman, paid his first state visit to Vientiane in March, 1966. The re-
sulting Thai-Laotian joint statement emphasized the need for trade 
expansion, economic and technical cooperation, and electrical power 
exchange.92 Economic and other contacts between Vientiane and Sai-
gon steadily grew after the reopening of the South Vietnamese Embassy 
to Laos in March, 1964: Laos, for example, even donated to South 
Vietnam 1 million hjp ($4,167) for flood relief in February, 1965. Japan 
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TABLE 6 
NATIONAL BUDGET OF LAOS: FY 1964-67a 
(In Millions of Dollars) 
FY1964 FY1965 FY1966 FY1967b 
Revenues 133* 197 197 26\6 
Expenidtures 50.6 43.0 59.8 64.1 
(1) Civil Budget (21.6) (13.2) (19.9) (24.5) 
(2) Military and 
Police Budget (29.0) (29.8) (39.9) (39.6) 
Total Deficits 37.3 23.3d 40.1 37.5 
a Source: Fact Sheet (Vientiane: USAID/Laos, 1967). 
b Actual as of July 26, 1967. 
c Includes $0.6 from Laos Stabilization Fund. 
d Without consideration of $5.2 from U.S. budget support. 
spent $2.8 million in aid to build power generators, a filter plant, and a 
water system in Laos. It also spent a few additional million dollars for 
industrial, mining, and other studies; for medical facilities, demon-
stration farms, and technical training; and for the 72-member Japanese 
"Peace Corps" volunteers in Laos.93 But the RLG had been deeply 
troubled by chronic economic problems—trade imbalance, heavy mili-
tary and security expenses, and immense budget deficits. 
In 1966 alone, Premier Souvanna Phouma met with U.S. Vice-Presi-
dent Humphrey at Vientiane, participated in the Ministerial Conference 
for Economic Development of Southeast Asia at Tokyo, paid state visits 
to the Soviet Union and France, and conferred with President Johnson 
in Washington. He sent a Lao observer to the meeting of the Asian and 
Pacific Council (ASPAC) in Seoul, expressed his willingness to estab-
lish diplomatic relations with South Korea and Malaysia, and pledged 
to the Asian Development Bank a contribution of $420,000.94 During 
TABLE 7 
FOREIGN TRADE OF LAOS: 1963-66a 
(In Millions of Dollars) 
1963 1964 1965 1966b 
Imports (A) c 29.0 25.5 
Imports (B) 0.7 0.9 
Deficits 28.3 24.6 
(B) / (A) % 2.4 3.5 
a Source: Fact Sheet (Vientiane: USAID/Laos, 1967). 
b Through June 30, 1966. 










1967, too, Souvanna Phouma carried on extensive diplomatic activities: 
he invited Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt to Laos in April, and 
Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in September; he conferred with 
Thai Prime Minister Thanom in April, spoke at the U.N. General 
Assembly in October, held discussions with President Johnson, and 
visited Australia in October.95 
TABLE 8 
U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO LAOS: FY1955-67a 
(In Millions of Dollars) 
FY FY FY FY FY 
1955/63 1964 1965 1966 1967 Total 
Project Assist. 
Agriculture 1.5 0.6 0.8 1.4 3.7 8.0 
Industry 1.9 0.2 .. .. 0.2 2.3 
Transportation 20.6 1.7 4.7 3.6 5.6 36.2 
Health 2.8 1.7 2.5 2.7 1.7 11.4 
Education 3.2 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.5 7.4 
Public Safety 1.9 .. 0.8 0.5 0.7 3.9 
Public Admin 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 1.6 
Community Develop. .. 10.6 3.6 6.8 8.8 10.4 40.2 
General & Misc 23.8 15.0 16.1 18.2 15.4 88.5 
67.3 23.8 32.6 36.3 39.5 199.5 
Non-Project Assist. 
Cash Grants 214.0 .. .. .. .. 214.0 
FEOF 3.7 4.0 10.0 13.8 31.5 
Invisibles 2.3 3.7 2.5 1.5 10.0 
Procurement Author. 30.9 2.8 2.5 3.0 1.3 40.5 
Import Program 11.5 8.0 4.9 2.0 0.6 27.0 
Section 402 0.3 .. .. .. .. 0.3 
PL480, Title II 0.8 .. .. .. 1.0 1.8 
PL480, Title III 0.9 1.7 0.3 0.4 .. 3 3 
258.4 18.5 15.4 17.9 18.2 328.4 
Totals 3257 423 48\0 542 577 527.9 
a Source: Fact Sheet (Vientiane: USAID/Laos, 1967). 
Following a temporary slowdown in 1962-63, the United States had 
increased its economic assistance to Vientiane. Assistant Secretary of 
State William P. Bundy argued at the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs in March, 1966, that "free world support continues to be 
essential to the [Laotian] Government's capacity to maintain itself 
against Communist military pressure."96 In fiscal year 1967, the U.S. 
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gave $58 million to Laos, excluding the classified military assistance 
believed to be higher than the economic aid. But it attempted to cor-
rect its earlier mistakes of overemphasizing military aid and of 
making its grants in cash payment. It launched such ambitious de-
velopment projects in strategic rural areas as "cluster villages" and 
"forward areas"; as of July, 1967, the "cluster villages" were con-
centrated in 14 areas involving 1,483 villages and more than 380,000 
people, and the "forward areas" in 9 areas involving 149 villages and 
83,000 people. The U.S. also expanded the scope of its multilateral 
economic assistance programs, including the Commodity Import Pro-
gram, the Foreign Exchange Operations Fund (FEOF), and the Nam 
Ngum Development as a part of the Mekong River Development Proj-
ects.97 
Compared with the extensive U.S. aid programs, China's economic 
assistance in Laos had been limited in size and area. The first aid proj-
ect the Chinese officially undertook was the construction of a modern 
highway linking Meng La in Yunnan Province and the city of Phong 
Saly in northern Laos. When they completed the 50-mile long road, 
including bridges, houses for maintenance workers, and other installa-
tions, they named it the "Laotian-Chinese Friendship Highway" and 
handed it over to the RLG in May, 1963. The Chinese probably saw 
the project as yielding considerable political and strategic benefits for 
a small outlay of capital and time, especially because Phong Saly had 
been the Pathet Lao's revolutionary stronghold and the site of a Chinese 
Consulate-General. 
The road construction was indicative of China's persistence in 
spreading its communications networks with Laos. The Chinese con-
cluded a civil transport agreement in 1962, and a further agreement in 
1963 on exchanging information between China's Hsinshua News 
Agency and the Laotian Ministry of Information, Publicity and Tour-
ism. They delivered to Laos two teletype sets to receive the Hsinhua 
news dispatches and sent two Chinese technicians to show how the sets 
were to be operated. In the early post-Geneva period, the Chinese 
agreed to consider the RLG's request for extending the highway from 
Phong Saly to Nam Tha and to advance to Laos a long-term loan for 
construction of "certain industrial projects" and for "necessary technical 
assistance and equipment."98 When relations between Vientiane and 
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Peking deteriorated in subsequent years, these agreements could not be 
implemented. But the Chinese appeared to increase their economic and 
military assistance to the "liberated areas" through their Economic and 
Cultural Mission at Khang Khay and Consulate-General at Phong 
Saly." 
In an effort to strengthen their relations with the "liberated areas," 
the Chinese also used various methods of "people's diplomacy"—ex-
change of visits, cultural cooperation, and organizational relations. 
They had invited to China a number of political and cultural delega-
tions, including journalists, artists, dancers, students, generals, Buddhist 
monks, Cabinet Ministers, and National Assemblymen.100 Yet the traf-
fic in visits, both official and unofficial, remained one-way; the Chinese 
did not send their high-ranking visitors to Laos. Of course the danger 
to visiting Chinese in the "liberated areas," as well as the strained rela-
tions between Peking and Vientiane, was in part responsible for this. 
A recent exception was the visit of China's Yunnan Art Troupe to 
Xieng Khouang in 1966, and to Sam Neua in 1967, to perform in the 
"liberated areas." 
Occupied more and more with the ever-growing war against the 
U.S. in recent years, North Vietnam tended to deemphasize the Pathet 
Lao's immediate revolutionary aspirations except where its own interest 
was directly involved. For example, North Vietnam could hardly 
strengthen the Pathet Lao's fighting capabilities; instead it often used 
the Pathet Lao troops as coolie labor along the "Ho Chi Minh trails" or 
as support forces in Vietnam operations. The coolie labor, food short-
age, and military pressure evidently caused a steady rise in Pathet Lao 
deserters during 1966, and thus a decline in Pathet Lao forces from 
30,000 in May, 1964, to 20,000 in June, 1966.101 When I interviewed Soth 
Phetrasi, a chief NLH representative to Vientiane, in October, 1967, he 
readily admitted the Pathet Lao's loss of "some grounds" during 1966, 
and attributed this solely to the intense U.S. bombing raids. But he was 
quick to add that the "liberated areas" still embraced more than three-
fifths of Laos with one-half of the total population; on the other hand, 
Souvanna Phouma said, "We control two-thirds of the territory and 
four-fifths of the population."102 The Pathet Lao leaders appointed 
their own governors in at least nine out of sixteen Lao provinces, includ-
ing Sam Neua (Houa Phan), Phong Saly, Nam Tha (Houa Khong), 
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TABLE 9 
"RESULTS" OF PATHET LAO'S MILITARY OPERATIONS: 1966-67a 
_ _ 
Total Casualties of the 




Airplanes Destroyed 203 287 
Persons Liberated 20,000 b 
Weapons Captured 2,727 b 
"•Sources: People's Daily (January 30, 1967) and Peking Review (April 12, 1968). 
b No figures were given in these two categories for 1967. 
Xieng Khouang, and Vientiane, and consolidated their political bases 
in the "liberated areas." In December, 1967, they held the first economic 
and financial conference of the "liberated areas" and even adopted a 
3-year economic plan (1968-70) ,103 
With North Vietnam absorbed in its own war efforts, the Chinese 
apparently assumed increasing responsibilities toward the Pathet Lao. 
It was believed that in 1966, they stepped up their military and economic 
aid to the Pathet Lao and sent to northern Laos more than 1,000 political 
advisers, anti-aircraft specialists, and logistical personnel. They were 
also in the process of extending the strategic highway in northern 
Laos.104 To boost the morale among the Pathet Lao forces, the Chinese 
promised all sorts of unreserved support, preached the "paper tiger" 
thesis of imperialism, and offered advice on revolutionary self-confi-
dence. In a letter to Phoumi Vongvichit in August, 1966, for example, 
Chen Yi asserted: "All revolutionary people are sure to win final victory 
so long as they do not believe the 'nice words' of the imperialists and are 
not intimidated by their bluster, but dare to wage tit-for-tat struggles 
against them."105 In the process the Chinese obtained an influential 
position in Laos and, by the same token, a risky liability in Southeast 
Asia. For the specter that the United States might commit its ground 
forces or its allied troops to Laos increasingly disturbed the Chinese in 
1966. A typical example is a Foreign Ministry statement issued in July: 
At the instigation of the United States, military personnel of Thailand and South 
Vietnam have successively infiltrated into the areas of Central and Lower Laos, 
and the U.S. Government is making active preparations for sending its ground 
forces into Laos. All this shows that U.S. imperialism is plotting to extend its 
war of aggression against Vietnam to Laos and to the whole of Indo-China.106 
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Evidently the Chinese sense of frustration and ineptitude at this 
period reflected in addition their concern over a series of diplomatic set-
backs and the intensification of the Vietnam war. Whereas the Chinese 
argued that the U.S. was weakening itself by strategic overextension and 
dispersal, they saw at the same time that the U.S. power had been ex-
tended very close to their own boundaries. Indeed, they clamored 
against the recent U.S. policy shift in "counter-revolutionary global 
strategy" from Europe to Asia with its concomitant concentration of 
forces and bases around mainland China. Moreover, the Chinese re-
garded this as a development of an anti-Peking "unholy alliance" forged 
among imperialists, revisionists, and reactionaries of the world; they 
argued that Moscow's policy of detente in Europe and in nuclear fields 
made such a U.S. strategic shift possible.107 This "unholy alliance" 
seemed to generate an increasing feeling of encirclement and isolation 
among the Chinese leaders. 
When the British Government again unilaterally published in 
August, 1966, a 700-page majority report prepared by Indian and Cana-
dian members of the International Commission concerning its investi-
gation of North Vietnamese military intervention in Laos, the Chinese 
assailed it as "illegal," blaming both the Commission and the Geneva 
Co-chairmen. In a letter to Phoumi Vongvichit, Chen Yi said that the 
British Government and the Commission had renewed their slanders 
against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Neo Lao Haksat 
"for the purpose of deluding world opinion and serving U.S. imperial-
ism's scheme of expanding its war of aggression."108 Even though the 
Soviet Government opposed the Commission's investigation and re-
port, the Chinese nonetheless seized this opportunity to make their 
first public accusation against Moscow's role in Laos. As the Geneva 
Co-chairmen, Chen Yi said, the British and Soviet governments had 
consistently connived at the Commission's illegal activities and thus had 
fully proved themselves "accomplices of U.S. imperialist aggression." 
By this charge Chen Yi undoubtedly intended to provide Phoumi Vong-
vichit with additional grounds for suspicion toward the Soviet Union; 
the NLH leaders were already dissatisfied with the 15-day state visit 
which King Savang Vattana and Premier Souvanna Phouma had paid 
to Moscow in May, 1966, on the invitation of President Podgorny of 
the Supreme Soviet Presidium. 
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In the wake of its published report on Laos, Phoumi Vongvichit 
categorically declared that the Commission had forfeited its legal basis 
for operation since July, 1965. Although the Chinese supported his 
opposition against the Commission's "illegal" activities, they still recog-
nized its potential usefulness and thus simply asked the Geneva Co-
chairmen to initiate discussions about the question of the Commission's 
legal status. Chairman G. L. Puri of the Commission told me that the 
Commission had the legal right to continue its functions unless its 
members unanimously agreed to terminate them. In 1967, the NLH 
modified Phoumi Vongvichit's categorical position and Soth Phetrasi 
took a more flexible attitude closer to the Chinese position.109 
Not only the United States and Great Britain but also the Soviet 
Union held a common view that the present Commission should be 
preserved as the only available machinery that might stabilize the 
worsening situation in Laos. In a message to the Commission in early 
September, 1966, the Soviet Government refuted the Commission's 
majority report, but suggested that "the International Commission must 
perform its functions in strict accordance with the Geneva agreements." 
Unlike the bitter statements of Phoumi Vongvichit and Chen Yi, the 
Soviet message neither assailed the Commission as a tool of the U.S. 
aggression nor raised any issue about its legal status.110 
In addition to the critical repercussions of the ever-enlarging war in 
Vietnam throughout 1966 and 1967, the Chinese People's Republic con-
fronted a serious domestic crisis in the violent "Great Proletarian Cul-
tural Revolution." Although it is too early to assess its full effects, this 
domestic political convulsion did affect China's approach toward Laos 
in certain respects. At the time of the Revolution the Chinese Embassy 
in Vientiane erected on its compound a large red monument with a 
quotation from Mao Tse-tung's teachings in Chinese and in Lao: "The 
people, and the people alone, are the motive force in the making of 
world history."111 This monument symbolized China's conscious effort 
to demonstrate the significance of the Revolution and to carry on an 
international campaign glorifying Mao's political and revolutionary 
ideals. The Chinese translated into Lao a little red book, Quotations 
from Chairman Mao Tse-tung, and his "three most often quoted 
articles"—namely, "Serve the People" (September, 1944), "In Memory 
of Norman Bethune" (December, 1939), and "The Foolish Old Man 
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Who Removed the Mountain" (June, 1945). They distributed these 
translated materials in the "liberated areas" through such channels as 
the Economic and Cultural Mission at Khang Khay, the Consulate-
General at Phong Saly, and a number of Overseas Chinese schools.112 
And the Chinese Cultural Service Center in Vientiane freely handed out 
all kinds of works of Mao, written in Chinese, Lao, French, Thai, and 
English. 
Evidently the Chinese Cultural Revolution received considerable 
support from some elements of the NLH and the Laotian People's Liber-
ation Army, especially from the second-echelon young cadres. In a 
message on October 1, 1966, Chairman Souphanouvong of the NLH 
Central Committee for the first time publicly praised the "great success" 
of the Cultural Revolution under the leadership of Chairman Mao Tse-
tung.113 A spokesman for the Army Supreme Command, General 
Singkapo Chounlamany, also said in October: 
The great socialist cultural revolution being made in China is an entirely new 
revolution. We are glad to see that it is a struggle to purify culture and ideology, 
and a struggle waged under the leadership of Chairman Mao Tse-tung. Each of 
us has infinite faith in Chairman Mao Tse-tung. We see that Mao Tse-tung's 
thought is the crystallization of the truth.114 
The Army's Political Department encouraged its soldiers to study Mao's 
writings, regularly carried Mao's quotations in its official paper Libera-
tion Army, and translated into Lao such military works of Mao as 
"Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," "Problems of 
Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan," and "Problems of War and 
Strategy."115. 
The Lao Army leaders apparently believed that Mao's concepts and 
tactics of the "people's war" might serve the purpose of ideological re-
form in an army losing its morale under increasing hardship. Indeed 
Singkapo called Mao's paper-tiger thesis a "weapon for the victorious 
struggles of the Laotian people," and added, "We take Mao Tse-tung's 
works as textbooks because his works reflect the spirit of people's war 
politically and militarily." And Nouhak Phoumsavan, a member of 
the Standing Committee of the NLH Central Committee, readily attri-
buted the success of the anti-imperialist struggles in Laos to Mao's 
notion of the people's war.116 When Sithone Komadam (a Vice-Chair-
man of the NLHCC) and Sisana Sisane (a member of the NLHCC) 
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visited Peking in January, 1967, Foreign Minister Chen Yi conferred 
with them and apparently explained the situation of the Cultural Revo-
lution.117 
As some Lao publications in Vientiane, including the Government-
operated Lao Presse, criticized and ridiculed the Cultural Revolution 
and Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese Embassy in October, 1966, strongly 
protested to the RLG for executing and condoning anti-Peking "plots." 
The Chinese also complained of the frequent visits to Taiwan of some 
National Assemblymen, the attendance of Government Ministers at a 
reception held by pro-Chiang Chinese in Vientiane, and the spread of 
a rumor ascribing the recent Mekong River flood—the worst in a few 
decades—to Chinese nuclear explosions.118 Such deliberate right-wing 
activities, warned People's Daily (November 14,1966), assisted the U.S. 
"aggressive wars" in Indo-China and its "criminal acts" on China's 
periphery. Similar protests were presented to Souvanna Phouma during 
1967, especially in regard to the visit of a Nationalist Chinese economic 
delegation to Vientiane and the publication of two anti-Peking Chinese-
language newspapers in Laos. In order not to irritate Peking, Souvanna 
Phouma suspended these two newspapers and asked all journalists in 
Vientiane to avert any cause of international misunderstandings.119 
During the Cultural Revolution the Chinese assumed a militant, 
predominantly ideological line in their declarations toward Laos. For 
example, in a message to Supreme Commander Khamtay Siphandone 
of the Laotian People's Liberation Army in January, 1967, Defense 
Minister Lin Piao said that the glorious victory of the Laotian people in 
their anti-imperialist struggle verified the wisdom of Mao Tse-tung's 
paper-tiger thesis on imperialism. He promised the "total support" of 
the Chinese people and Army to the Laotian people until the U.S. 
aggressors were completely defeated.120 But the Chinese were much 
less radical in Laos than in the latter country's two neutral neighbors, 
Burma and Cambodia. They appeared to be less creative and respon-
sive in Laos and more inward-looking and self-centered. I found that 
unlike Soviet and Pathet Lao representatives, Chinese diplomats in 
Vientiane were extremely cautious and reluctant to talk with foreign 
visitors.121 Preoccupied with such urgent domestic problems as political 
rearrangement, military modernization, and economic reconstruction, 
the CPR indeed failed not only to initiate any major step toward re-
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solving the persistent conflict in Laos, but also to show any favorable 
response to a series of proposals for negotiations on Laos and Vietnam. 
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Chapter VI 
Evaluation and Implications 
It is difficult to reconstruct an exact cause-and-effect relationship 
between Communist China's domestic conditions and its policies toward 
Laos, but some kind of close relations can be ascertained. In addition 
to respecting Lenin's dictum that to separate foreign policy from politics 
in general was wrong and unscientific, the Chinese seemed to project 
their experiences with domestic revolutionary politics and socialist 
transformation into their strategic assessment and external behavior. 
As we saw in this case study, such major internal events as the First 
Five-Year Economic Plan, the Great Leap Forward Movement, and 
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution had profound impact upon 
China's international positions. The usual pattern of domestic-external 
linkages is known to be either symmetrical or asymmetrical; neverthe-
less, our study shows that there were a variety of complex situations 
which did not neatly conform with either of these simplistic explana-
tions. 
Specific events within Laos, for example, necessitated a policy ad-
justment on China's part—often irrespective of its general internal 
politics and revolutionary strategy. A Chinese response was thus re-
quired by a challenge or an opportunity arising from various political 
conditions in Laos. These included armed conflicts, negotiated settle-
ments, cabinet crises, national elections, a coup d'etat, and Vientiane's 
changing attitudes toward the Pathet Lao and Communist countries. 
For instance, China's "militancy" shown in Laos during 1959 was attri-
butable more to the ascendancy of Phoui Sananikone's anti-Communist 
initiatives than to the broad trend of China's extreme domestic mood 
and its rigid external posture. Of particular importance to China were 
the extent of foreign interference in Laos and the relative roles of the 
Geneva Co-chairmen, the International Control Commission, the 
United Nations, and SEATO. 
When the process of their policy adjustment toward Laos proved 
ineffective or counterproductive, the Chinese often appeared confused 
and indecisive. At such times they failed to take any reasonable initia-
tive or response with regard to Laos' crisis. Sometimes they were com-
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placent about the status quo or unable to do anything positive about 
Laos. Again they were sometimes preoccupied with other priority 
issues or anxious to avoid an impression of their overt interference in 
the domestic affairs of Laos. After the beginning of a civil war in late 
1960, and particularly after the opening of the second Geneva Confer-
ence, however, they actively sought to assume a leading role in every 
major political event in Laos. 
The development of Sino-Laotian relations was also greatly affected 
by the form of Sino-Soviet competition and by the role Hanoi played 
in Laos. In spite of calling in identical languages for support of the 
Pathet Lao's national liberation or for struggle against the U.S., both 
China and Russia demonstrated substantial differences in their con-
ceptions of and responses to Laos' situations. In a subtle but serious 
quest to influence the Pathet Lao's strategy and tactics, the Chinese 
enjoyed and exploited their geographic, historical, and ideological 
advantages over the Soviets. The strategists both in Peking and in Mos-
cow could make an assessment or a decision concerning Laos only after 
having carefully considered possible countermoves by the other country. 
Once in a while the Soviet Union assumed an assertive role in the 
Pathet Lao movement and solicited Hanoi's cooperation to that end, 
as they did in late 1960. 
As a Co-chairman of the Geneva Conferences the Soviet Union took 
on a special obligation to see that the agreements were respected and 
followed by all parties. But the dilemma inherent in Moscow's dual 
responsibilities—to keep peace and order in Laos as Co-chairman and to 
assist the Pathet Lao's liberation movement as a Communist power— 
was used by China in such a way as to drive Moscow into an embarrass-
ing position. Whenever the U.S. intensified its military maneuvers in 
Laos, and the Soviet Union showed an ambiguous reaction thereto, the 
Pathet Lao leaders tended to move closer to the Chinese camp. We 
must note the similarity of the Pathet Lao's policy to Peking's and the 
correspondence between the former's strategic outlook and the latter's 
policy shifts since the Gulf of Tonkin crisis of 1964. The conflict of 
national interests between China and Russia did not always keep them 
from working together or from assisting each other when each found 
an immediate common interest, as, for instance, cooperating to secure 
Laos' neutrality at the two Geneva Conferences. 
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But North Vietnam was of course more directly involved than either 
Peking or Moscow in the entire history of the Pathet Lao's political and 
military operations, and thus held a stronger tactical influence over 
Laotian revolutionary circumstances. In fact, the origin and survival 
of the Pathet Lao movement were based on Ho Chi Minh's inspiration 
and assistance. Although both Hanoi and Peking revealed potentially 
significant differences in their regional aspirations and diplomatic ap-
proaches toward Laos, they were remarkably successful at collaborating 
in their united struggles against the U.S. presence in Indo-China, but 
they acted in different ways most appropriate and characteristic to each. 
Faced with the threat of formidable U.S. military power, however, the 
Pathet Lao leaders appeared to be realistically attracted by China's 
growing strategic capabilities and militant commitments on their 
behalf. 
As the second Geneva formula for Laos' neutrality and coalition 
proved an irrevocable failure in recent years, the Chinese made a basic 
reappraisal of Laotian problems in the broad context of U.S. "imperial-
ism" and Soviet "revisionism." In close cooperation with the Pathet 
Lao and North Vietnam, they initially tried to restore the elements of 
the 1962 Geneva agreements in Laos, but continued their determined 
struggle against the rising anti-Communist movements within and 
without Laos. First, they exerted verbal and diplomatic pressure on 
the Royal Laotian Government and the United States in an attempt to 
check the untoward turn of events in Laos. They then promoted a cam-
paign for convening unconditionally another Geneva-type of conference 
to reaffirm the 1962 accords. 
In the wake of the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin crisis, however, the Chinese 
shifted their policy emphasis from proposals for a negotiated settlement 
in Laos to more assertive "tit-for-tat" tactics against the U.S. military 
buildup in Indo-China. Increasingly apprehensive of further extension 
of the U.S. military efforts from Vietnam to Laos, they voiced their de-
termination to resist such an American move, which would directly 
threaten their national security and other interests in Laos. They also 
helped mobilize a region-wide united front against the U.S. and its 
allies and reiterated their public pledge to support all revolutionary 
movements in driving the U.S. out of Indo-China and the whole of 
Southeast Asia. 
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But the Chinese did not encourage the Pathet Lao leaders to attempt 
an outright military conquest of Laos presumably because neither the 
Chinese nor the North Vietnamese were prepared to meet the probable 
massive intervention of U.S. ground forces in Laos. It is therefore con-
ceivable that the Pathet Lao's restrained armed activities in recent years 
were mainly designed to protect the "liberated areas," including the 
"Ho Chi Minh trails/' and to obtain a military upper hand which they 
wished to use as an effective means of achieving limited political objec-
tives—such as a restoration of the 1962 Geneva formula and a concomi-
tant settlement for Indo-China. Since the prospect for another negoti-
ated settlement in Laos was closely interwoven with overall political 
developments in Indo-China, especially the Vietnam war, the Chinese 
did not expect to see any durable solution in Laos which was not an 
integral part of the region-wide accommodation. In the meantime, they 
emphasized the necessity of the Pathet Lao's limited military operations 
to win a favorable position against the Royal Laotian Government. 
According to our case study, there were no clear evidences which 
could support the contention that China's policy toward Laos was in-
herently "aggressive" and "expansionist." But the general pattern of 
China's strategies and tactics toward Laos during 1954-67 seemed to be 
more rational and prudent than irrational and reckless. This compara-
tive rationality of China's policy manifested itself in various dimensions 
—the realistic recognition of basically limited power, the reasonable 
compromise between desired goals and available means, the avoidance 
of excessive risks and costs, and frequent policy adjustment. No doubt 
there were certain types of problems and situations in which the Chi-
nese exhibited signs of irresponsible behavior. They expressed in un-
limited ways their hatred and vituperation against U.S. "imperialists" 
and Lao "reactionaries." When their national security was threatened, 
their diplomatic prestige undermined, or the survival of the Pathet Lao 
forces endangered, they did not hesitate to issue threats and warnings. 
Yet they carefully refrained from making a direct, specific promise for 
the possible use of their armed forces in Laos. On the use of threats and 
warnings they were rather selective perhaps because they learned that 
repetitive and ambiguous bluffs might make others question the credi-
bility of China's other serious policy pronouncements. 
The demonstration of China's "militancy" and "bellicosity" was not 
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always irrational; it was employed mainly as a calculated instrument of 
obtaining a rather limited political objective in Laos. This trend was 
also reflected in China's negotiating tactics over Laos. The Chinese 
showed deeprooted ideological and historical suspicions about a nego-
tiated solution of antagonistic contradictions. But in a realistic revolu-
tionary framework they regarded diplomacy and negotiation with im-
perialists and reactionaries as one form of "struggle," a legitimate and 
justifiable part of dual revolutionary tactics. When they were convinced 
that they would win at the conference table an outcome which could 
not easily be realized by other means, the Chinese were apt to set aside 
their ideological rigidity and political militancy. In the negotiating 
processes over Laos they indeed displayed a willingness to make con-
cessions even on questions of "principle" concerning the Pathet Lao's 
national liberation. They usually accepted something less than they ori-
ginally demanded as their political realism acknowledged the principle 
of give-and-take in international bargaining. 
Our case study suggests that the Chinese attached the highest prior-
ity to their national security interest with regard to the actual and 
imagined U.S. involvement in Laos. This security concern made the 
Chinese sober and cautious in using their military power as a means of 
their foreign policy toward Laos. They were evidently aware that the 
level of their military preparedness and economic capability was far 
from being modernized and that the continued deterioration in their 
relations with the Soviet Union might compel China, in the event of a 
war with the U.S. over Laos, to fight on various fronts with decisive 
disadvantages in the fields of aerial confrontation and nuclear weapons. 
There was no indication of a Chinese threat to use the nuclear bomb 
in pursuing their objectives in Laos or elsewhere in Indo-China. 
It is probable that from domestic frustration or for political expedi-
ency the Chinese might accelerate their verbal militancy against Vien-
tiane and Washington or might even adopt an adventuristic gesture in 
this sensitive area of Sino-American conflict. However, in spite of their 
official claim that the Cultural Revolution prepared the Chinese people 
well for a war against the U.S., the Chinese were generally careful not 
to provoke any direct military confrontation with the vastly superior 
strategic power of the U.S. While they continued to warn against a pos-
sible invasion of U.S. ground forces into Laos, they never spelled out 
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how they would react in such a case. They simply indicated that once 
the Vietnam war was directly spilled over into Laos or Cambodia they 
might set up a "very broad front" in Southeast Asia. For all practical 
purposes, the Chinese are unlikely to be indifferent if their national 
security and other interests are imminently threatened by the total 
collapse of the Pathet Lao movement or by the substantial destruction 
of "liberated areas" as a useful buffer against approaching hostile forces. 
In the absence of these crucial or unexpected circumstances, the general 
direction of China's strategic and diplomatic approaches toward Laos 
is likely to remain rational and pragmatic—at least for the time being. 
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